{"service":"corpus","corpus":"gutenberg","source":"Project Gutenberg","license":"Public domain (per item)","record":{"id":"79856","title":"Collected papers, Volume I","text":"The Project Gutenberg eBook of Collected papers, Volume I\n    \nThis eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and\nmost other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions\nwhatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms\nof the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online\nat www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,\nyou will have to check the laws of the country where you are located\nbefore using this eBook.\n\nTitle: Collected papers, Volume I\n\nAuthor: Sigmund Freud\n        Leopold Löwenfeld\n\nEditor: Ernest Jones\n\nTranslator: Joan Riviere\n\n\n        \nRelease date: October 24, 2026 [eBook #79856]\n\nLanguage: English\n\nOriginal publication: New York: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1924\n\nOther information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856\n\nCredits: Stephen M. Kraus at readfreud.org/ (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)\n\n\n*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK COLLECTED PAPERS, VOLUME I ***\n\n                          THE INTERNATIONAL\n                          PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL\n                               LIBRARY\n\n                        EDITED BY ERNEST JONES\n\n                                No. 7\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n             THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY\n                                No. 7.\n\n                           COLLECTED PAPERS\n                                VOL. I\n\n                                  BY\n                       SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.\n\n                                  *\n\n                        AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION\n                       UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF\n                             JOAN RIVIERE\n\n              THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS\n              NEW YORK         LONDON            VIENNA\n                            M C M X X I V\n\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n                            COPYRIGHT 1924\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                         CONTENTS OF VOLUME I\n                                                                PAGE\n   EDITORIAL PREFACE .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      3\n   EARLY PAPERS\n       I   Charcot (1893)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      9\n      II   On the psychical mechanism of hysterical pheno-\n           mena (1893)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     24\n     III   Some points in a comparative study of organic\n           and hysterical paralysis (1893)   .  .  .  .  .  .     42\n      IV   The defence neuro-psychoses (1894)   .  .  .  .  .     59\n       V   The justification for detaching from neurasthenia\n           a particular syndrome: The anxiety-neurosis (1894)     76\n      VI   A reply to criticisms on the anxiety-neurosis (1895)  107\n     VII   Obsessions and phobias; their psychical mechanisms\n           and their ætiology (1895)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    128\n    VIII   Heredity and the ætiology of the neuroses (1896)      138\n      IX   Further remarks on the defence neuro-psychoses\n           (1896) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    155\n       X   The ætiology of hysteria (1896)   .  .  .  .  .  .    183\n      XI   Sexuality in the ætiology of the neuroses (1898)      220\n     XII   On psychotherapy (1904)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    249\n    XIII   Freud's psycho-analytic method (1904)   .  .  .  .    264\n     XIV   My views on the part played by sexuality in the\n           ætiology of the neuroses (1905)   .  .  .  .  .  .    272\n                                     *\n   ON THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC\n      MOVEMENT (1914)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    287\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                          EDITORIAL PREFACE                                  {3}\n\nTo write a preface is often a perfunctory matter, but in the preface\nto this series of Collected Papers we wish to direct the reader's\nspecial attention to two cardinal considerations.\n\nIn the first place it should be said that these Collected Papers, of\nwhich the present is the first volume, constitute the real basis of\nPsycho-Analysis. All Professor Freud's other work and theories are\nessentially founded on the clinical investigations of which these\npapers are the only published record. It is unfortunate that the\nEnglish-speaking public should for years have had access only to what\nmay be called the superstructure of his work, the application of his\npsycho-analytic method to the study of dreams, sexuality, totemism,\nand so on, while the basis of it all remained buried in a foreign\ntongue. It is now proposed to fill this central lacuna in English\npsycho-analytical literature by publishing, in four or more volumes, a\ntranslation of the _Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur\nNeurosenlehre_. Incidentally it may be said that the papers in this\nseries have been re-grouped, in co-operation with Professor Freud, so\nthat they do not follow the same order as that of the German original.\n\nThis brings us to the second consideration. If the reader wishes to\nextract the greatest profit from these volumes, it is quite essential\nthat he should constantly bear in mind the _date_ when each Paper was\nwritten. The only really satisfactory way of acquiring a knowledge of\nProfessor Freud's writings is to follow the order of development of\nhis work. It is hardly possible otherwise to obtain a coherent picture\nof the whole. To follow this development is not only a fascinating\nstudy in itself, disclosing as it does a beautiful example of the way\nin which ideas are gradually unfolded---and constantly extended and\nmodified---under the pressure of widening and deepening experience. It\nalso gives a conviction of the truly scientific nature of the author's\nwork, for the tentative \"feeling forward\" here revealed---now in one\ndirection, now in another, as occasion and opportunity present---is\nthe very antithesis of the promulgation of an _a priori_ philosophic\nsystem such as has sometimes been ignorantly imputed to him. One\ninflexible determination has always guided him, and that was the             {4}\ndetermination to keep ever in the closest contact with the actual\nmaterial daily brought before his observation, and not to be tempted\nalong side-tracks by speculations, however enticing these might\nappear. His path lay through a jungle hitherto completely unexplored.\nRarely did his path follow a straight line for long: deviations,\ndétours, fresh departures were often necessary, and occasionally even\nthe retracing of his steps. No one will expect that in these\ncircumstances of exploring an unknown territory the pioneer's trail\nwould be orderly and regular in its progress, or that the path should\nbe everywhere beaten equally smooth; but that the progress has been a\nreal and inspiring one is attested by the host of workers now\nfollowing in his steps.\n\nIn his preface to the first volume of the _Sammlung kleiner Schriften_\nProfessor Freud writes:---\"Whoever is familiar with the development of\nhuman knowledge will hear without astonishment that I have passed\nbeyond some part of the views here presented and have learnt to modify\nsome others. Still I have been able to retain unchanged the greater\npart, and do not really need to withdraw anything as completely\nerroneous and quite worthless\". He probably had in mind here\nparticularly the view that underwent most modification subsequently,\nthat concerning the importance of sexual traumas in infancy. Few\nepisodes in the history of scientific research provide a more dramatic\ntest of true genius than the occasion on which Professor Freud made\nthe devastating discovery that many of these traumas to which he had\nbeen obliged to attach ætiological significance had never occurred\noutside the imagination of the patients. The realization---so\nmodestly related in the last of the Early Papers (p. 276)---that an\nimagined event could in certain psychological circumstances produce an\neffect exactly equivalent to that of an actual event was one that only\nan investigator gifted with a supreme feeling for psychology could\nhave achieved. Initial error led to a profound discovery. Most of\nProfessor Freud's alleged \"inconsistencies\" will be found to carry a\nsimilar moral.\n\nIn the work of organizing the translations I have had the invaluable\nassistance of Mrs. Riviere; they have also been carefully revised by\nher as well as by myself. In this Frl. Anna Freud was very helpful,\nand we wish to express our indebtedness to her.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n                             EARLY PAPERS                                    {7}\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                  I                                          {9}\n                              CHARCOT[1]\n                                (1893)\n\nIn the person of J. M. Charcot whom, after a life of happiness and fame,\na sudden death without suffering or illness took from us on the 16th of\nAugust the young science of neurology has lost its most active promoter,\nneurologists of all countries have been bereft of their teacher, and\nFrance has lost prematurely one of its leading men. He was only\nsixty-eight years of age; his bodily strength and mental vigour,\ntogether with the hopes he so frankly expressed, seemed to promise him\nthat long life which has been granted to not a few of the thinkers of\nthis century. The imposing nine volumes of his _Œuvres Complètes_, in\nwhich his pupils had collected his contributions to the science of\nmedicine and of neuropathology, the _Leçons du Mardi_, the yearly\nreports of his clinic at the Salpêtrière, and other papers---all these\npublications, though they will remain precious to his pupils and to\nscience, cannot take the place of the man who still had much to give and\nto teach, whose personality and whose work no one ever approached\nwithout learning from them.\n\nHe had a perfectly honest, human delight in his own great success and\nused to speak freely about his early days and the road that he had\ntraversed. His scientific curiosity had been aroused early in life\nwhen he was but a young house-physician by the abundance of material,\nat that time utterly unintelligible, contained in the facts of              {10}\nneuropathology. At that period in his life, whenever he made the\nrounds in the wards of the Salpêtrière (the asylum for women) with his\nchief, when he saw all the wilderness of paralyses, tremors and spasms\nfor which no name or proper understanding existed forty years ago, he\nwould say, '_Faudrait y retourner et y rester_', and he kept his\nword. As soon as he had become _médecin des hôpitaux_ (hospital\nphysician) his goal was to get into the Salpêtrière, into one of the\nwards for nervous patients. Once there, he remained; instead of, as is\nthe privilege of French physicians, transferring in regular order from\nhospital to hospital and from ward to ward, at the same time changing\nhis speciality.\n\nThus his first impression and the resolution to which it led\ndetermined his whole future career. Having at his disposal a\nconsiderable number of patients afflicted with chronic nervous disease\nhe was enabled to take full advantage of his peculiar talent. He was\nnot much given to cogitation, was not of the reflective type, but he\nhad an artistically gifted temperament---as he said himself, he was a\n'_visuel_', a seer. He himself told us the following about his method\nof working: he was accustomed to look again and again at things that\nwere incomprehensible to him, to deepen his impression of them day by\nday, until suddenly understanding of them dawned upon him. Before his\nmind's eye, order then came into the chaos apparently presented by the\nconstant repetition of the same symptoms; the new clinical pictures\nwhich were characterized by the constant combination of certain\nsyndromes took shape; the complete and extreme cases, the 'types',\nwere then distinguishable with the aid of a specific kind of schematic\narrangement, and with these as a starting-point the eye could follow        {11}\ndown the long line of the less significant cases, the '_formes\nfrustes_', showing some one or other peculiar feature of the type and\nfading into the indefinite. He called this kind of mental work, in\nwhich he had no equal, 'practising nosography' and he was proud of\nit. He was heard to say that the greatest satisfaction man can\nexperience is to see something new, that is, to recognize it as new,\nand he constantly returned with repeated observations to the subject\nof the difficulties and the value of such 'seeing'. He wondered how it\nhappened that in the practice of medicine men could only see what they\nhad already been taught to see, he described how wonderful it was\nsuddenly to see new things---new diseases---although they were\nprobably as old as the human race; he said that he often had to admit\nthat he could now see many a thing which for thirty years in his wards\nhe had ignored. No physician will need to be reminded of the wealth of\nnew outlines which the science of neuropathology gained through his\nefforts, and of the much greater keenness and accuracy in diagnosis\nwhich was made possible by the aid of his observations. But to his\npupils, who made the rounds with him through the wards of the\nSalpêtrière---that museum of clinical facts for the greater part named\nand defined by him---he seemed a very Cuvier, as we see him in the\nstatue in front of the Jardin des Plantes, surrounded by the various\ntypes of animal life which he had understood and described; or else he\nreminded them of the myth of Adam, who must have experienced in its\nmost perfect form that intellectual delight so highly praised by\nCharcot, when the Lord led before him the creatures of Paradise to be\nnamed and grouped.                                                          {12}\n\nCharcot never tired of defending the claims of the purely clinical task\nof seeing and classifying phenomena, as against the encroaches of\ntheoretical medicine. One day a small group of foreign students brought\nup in the ways of German orthodox physiology annoyed him by raising\nobjections to his clinical innovations. 'That cannot possibly be', one\nof us interrupted him, 'that contradicts the theory of Young-Helmholtz.'\nHe did not reply, 'So much the worse for the theory, clinical facts rank\nfirst', and so forth. But he did say---leaving us deeply impressed '_La\nthéorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister_.'\n\nFor a long term of years Charcot held the chair of pathological\nanatomy in Paris, carrying on as a side-issue his neuropathological\nwork and the lectures which rapidly made him famous abroad as well as\nat home. It was fortunate, however, for neuropathology that the same\nman could fulfil the functions of two incumbents; on the one hand he\ncreated the clinical pictures by observations, and on the other he\nproved that in the typical case as well as in the _forme fruste_ the\nsame anatomical changes were the foundation of the disease. It is\ngenerally known how great the success of this anatomical-clinical\nmethod was in the sphere of organic nervous disease, with tabes,\nmultiple sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and so on. With\nthese chronic, not immediately fatal diseases, patient years of\nwaiting were often necessary before proof of the organic changes could\nbe established, and only in a hospital for incurables like the\nSalpêtrière was it possible to keep and to watch the patients for such\nlong periods. As it happened, Charcot made his first discovery in this\nfield before he was in charge of a ward. During his student days\nchance brought him into contact with a charwoman who suffered from a        {13}\npeculiar form of tremor and could not get work because of her\nawkwardness. Charcot recognized her condition to be 'choreiform\nparalysis', already described by Duchenne, of the origin of which,\nhowever, nothing was known. In spite of her costing him a small\nfortune in broken plates and platters, Charcot kept her for years in\nhis service and, when at last she died, could prove in the autopsy\nthat 'choreiform paralysis' was the clinical expression of multiple\ncerebro-spinal sclerosis.\n\nPathological anatomy has to serve neuropathology in two ways: first,\nto bring proof of morbid alterations, and secondly, to determine the\nlocalization of these changes; we all know that in the last two\ndecades the second part of the task has aroused greater interest and\nhas been more actively advanced. In this field also Charcot\nco-operated brilliantly, although the pioneer work was not done by\nhim; he followed to begin with the footsteps of our countryman Türck,\nwho is said to have lived and worked among us in comparative\nobscurity. Later, after the two important discoveries which\ninaugurated a new epoch in our knowledge of the 'localization of\nnervous diseases'---namely, the stimulation tests of Hitzig-Fritsch\nand Flechsig's work on the development of the spinal cord---his\nlectures on localization were the best and most significant aid\ntowards co-ordinating the new theories with the clinical side and\nmaking them available for clinical purposes. As regards the relation\nof the muscular system to the motor area of the cerebrum, I should\nlike to remind the reader how long the specific mode and topography of\nthis connection was a matter of conjecture (common representation of\nboth extremities in the same areas, representation of the upper\nextremity in the anterior, of the lower in the posterior central            {14}\nconvolution: that is, vertical disposition), until at last continued\nclinical investigations, with stimulation---as well as extirpation---\ntests on human beings during surgical operations, decided the matter\nin favour of Charcot's and Pitres' view, namely, that the middle third\nof the central gyri mainly serves the representation of the arm, while\nthe upper third and the mesial portion serve the representation of the\nleg; in other words, that the disposition in the motor areas is a\nhorizontal one.\n\nIt would not be possible to demonstrate Charcot's importance to the\nscience of neuropathology by enumerating particular achievements, for\nduring the last two decades there have been few questions of any\nsignificance to the formulation and discussion of which the 'school of\nthe Salpêtrière' has not made contributions of signal importance. The\n'school of the Salpêtrière' was, of course, Charcot himself; his\nwealth of experience, his power of plastic description, his\ntransparent clearness of diction was easily recognizable in the papers\nof every one of his pupils. Some members of this circle of young men\nwhom he gathered about him and made his partners in his work had\nattained to consciousness of their own individuality, and won\ncelebrity on their own account, and one or other of them would now and\nthen advance an opinion that seemed to the master clever rather than\ncorrect; this he would attack sarcastically enough in conversation and\nin his lectures without, however, in any way injuring his affectionate\nrelation with the pupil. Charcot does indeed leave behind him a group\nof pupils whose intellectual qualifications and whose work are pledges\nthat the practice of neuropathology in Paris will not readily descend\nform the high level to which it was brought by him.                         {15}\n\nIn Vienna we have repeatedly found that an academic teacher of\nintellectual importance is not also as a matter of course gifted with\nthat close personal influence on his students which expresses itself in\nthe formation of a numerous and important 'school'. If Charcot was more\nfavoured in this respect we must attribute it to his personal qualities\nas a man, to the magic of his aspect and his voice, to the gracious\nfrankness of his manner after the first strangeness of a new relation\nhad worn off, to the readiness with which he placed everything at the\ndisposal of his pupils, and to his life-long loyalty to them. The hours\nhe spent in his wards were hours of fellowship and interchange of ideas\nwith his whole medical staff. He never shut himself off from them; the\nyoungest assistant had an opportunity of seeing him at work and might\ninterrupt him, and the same privilege was granted to the foreigners who\nwere never absent from his rounds in later years. Finally, his pupils\nand assistants were regarded as part of his family in welcoming the\nguests on the evenings when Madame Charcot---assisted by a highly gifted\ndaughter, not unlike her father---received a distinguished company in\nher hospitable house.\n\nIn the year 1882 or 1883 the circumstances of Charcot's life and work\ntook on their final form. The idea had come to be generally realized\nthat the activity of this man was part of the national '_gloire_', to\nbe guarded all the more jealously since the unsuccessful war of\n1870--1871.  The government, headed by Charcot's old friend, Gambetta,\ncreated for him a chair of neuropathology at the Faculty of Medicine,\nwhich permitted him to give up his course in pathological anatomy,\nand, in addition, founded for him a clinic with auxiliary scientific\ndepartments at the Salpêtrière. '_Le service de M. Charcot_' now            {16}\nembraced (with the old wards of the chronic patients) several clinical\nhalls where men also were received, a large out-patient\ndepartment---the _consultation externe_---an histological laboratory,\na museum, an electro-therapeutic department, an eye-and-ear\ndepartment, and a special photographic studio. Each of these\ninstitutions offered opportunities for attaching former assistants and\npupils permanently to the clinic in good positions. The\ntwo-storey-high, weather-beaten buildings and the courts they enclosed\nreminded the foreigner extraordinarily of our Allgemeines Krankenhaus\nin Vienna, but the resemblance did not go very far. 'It is perhaps not\nbeautiful here', Charcot would say as he showed the visitor about his\ndomain, 'but you can find room for everything you want to do.'\n\nCharcot stood at the zenith of his career when this abundance of\nmaterial for teaching and investigating was placed at his disposal. He\nwas an indefatigable worker, always the most industrious of the whole\ngroup. His private practice, crowded with patients 'from Samarcand and\nfrom the Antilles', could not divert him from his activities as a\nteacher and investigator. This throng was assuredly not attracted\nmerely by the famous scientist, but as much or more by the great\nphysician, and by the sympathetic nature of the man, who always knew\nhow to give counsel, and could surmise and guess in those cases where\nthe present status of science did not permit him to know. He has often\nbeen reproached on account of his therapeuty, which with its\nmultiplicity of prescriptions could not but offend a rationalistic\nconscience: he simply continued the current and local methods\ncustomary at that time and place, without deceiving himself much about\ntheir effectiveness. Incidentally, he was not pessimistic in regard to      {17}\ntherapeutic results and was ever willing to encourage at his clinic\nexperiments with new methods of treatment, which had but a short-lived\nsuccess, as others were quick to point out. As a teacher, Charcot was\npositively fascinating; each of his lectures was a little masterpiece\nin construction and composition, perfect in style, and so impressive\nthat the words spoken resounded in one's ears and the subject\ndemonstrated remained before one's eyes for the rest of the day. He\nrarely made a demonstration with a single patient, but was accustomed\nto present a whole group or a number of contrasting types which he\nthen compared with one another. In the hall in which he gave his\nlectures hung a picture of the 'citizen' Pinel, causing the poor\ninsane of the Salpêtrière to be relieved of their chains; for after\nhaving been the scene of so many horrors during the French Revolution,\nthe Salpêtrière had also witnessed this most humane innovation. Maître\nCharcot himself made a strange impression during these lectures;\nusually bubbling over with vivacity and cheerfulness, with witticisms\nalways on his lips, he would appear at such moments solemn and\nserious, nay, even aged in his velvet cap; his voice seemed muffled,\nand we almost understood how malicious strangers could accuse the\nwhole performance of theatricality.  Those who expressed themselves in\nthis manner were probably accustomed to the lack of form in German\nclinical lectures or else they forgot that Charcot, who gave only one\nlecture a week, could prepare it carefully.\n\nCharcot was very probably following a tradition of long standing with\nthis ceremonious lecture, in which everything was prepared and had to\nhappen as planned; nevertheless he felt the need of displaying his          {18}\nactivity to his pupils in a less artificial setting. For this purpose\nhe made use of the out-patient department which he took charge of\npersonally in the so-called _Leçons du mardi_.  There he examined\ncases quite unknown to him, risked all the chance occurrences of an\ninterrogation, laid his authority aside and confessed at times that in\none case diagnosis was impossible, and that in another appearances had\ndeceived him. Never did he appear greater to his students than on\nthese occasions, when he thus did his best to lessen the distance\nbetween teacher and pupils by giving them a complete and faithful\naccount of his own train of thought, by stating his doubts and\nmisgivings with the utmost frankness. The publication, at first in\nFrench, now also in German of these improvised lectures of the years\n1887 and 1888 has extended the circle of his admirers indefinitely;\nnor has any other neuropathological work ever achieved greater success\namong the medical public.\n\nAbout the time that the clinic was instituted and the course in\npathological anatomy given up, there occurred a change in Charcot's\nscientific interests to which we owe the best part of his work. He\nexplained that the theory of organic nervous diseases was for the\npresent fairly complete, and he began to turn his attention almost\nexclusively to hysteria, thus suddenly focussing general attention on\nthis subject. This most enigmatic of all nervous diseases---no\nworkable point of view having yet been found from which physicians\ncould regard it---had just at this time come very much into discredit,\nand this ill-repute related not only to the patients but was extended\nto the physicians who treated this neurosis. The general opinion was\nthat anything may happen in hysteria; hysterics found no credit\nwhatsoever.  First of all Charcot's work restored dignity to the\nsubject; gradually the sneering attitude, which the hysteric could          {19}\nreckon on meeting when she told her story, was given up; she was no\nlonger a malingerer, since Charcot had thrown the whole weight of his\nauthority on the side of the reality and objectivity of hysterical\nphenomena. Charcot had repeated on a small scale the act of liberation\ncommemorated in the picture of Pinel which adorned the lecture hall of\nthe Salpêtrière. Now that the blind fear of being fooled by the poor\npatient which had stood in the way of a serious study of the neurosis\nwas overcome, the question arose which mode of procedure would most\nspeedily lead to the solution of the problem. The wholly unprejudiced\nobserver might have found an opening in the following reflection: If I\nfind a person in a condition bearing all the marks of a painful\naffect, crying, screaming, raving, I am led to surmise that a mental\nprocess is going on in him of which these bodily phenomena are the\nadequate expression. In such a case the normal person is capable of\ntelling us what is troubling him, but the hysteric would answer that\nhe did not know; and the problem at once arises: How comes it that the\nhysteric is subject to an affect of the causes of which he claims to\nknow nothing?  If we adhere to the conclusion that there must exist a\ncorresponding psychic process, and at the same time believe the\npatient's assertion when he denies its existence, if we assemble all\nthe manifold signs which indicate that the patient nevertheless\nbehaves as though he knows the cause, if we search into the patient's\nlife and find therein a cause---a trauma---likely to create such an\naffective expression---then indeed the solution is forced upon us that\nthe patient is in a peculiar mental condition in which his impressions\nor memories are no longer all linked up one with the other, and in          {20}\nwhich it is possible for one memory to express its affect by means of\nbodily phenomena without the other mental processes---the\nego---knowing about it or being able to interfere; and the\nrecollection of the well-known psychological difference between sleep\nand the waking state might have lessened the strangeness of such an\nhypothesis. Let no one object that the theory of dissociation of\nconsciousness as a solution of the enigma of hysteria is too\nfar-fetched to suggest itself to the untrained and unprejudiced\nobserver. In fact the Middle Ages had chosen this very solution, in\ndeclaring possession by a demon to be the cause of hysterical\nmanifestations; all that would have been required was to replace the\nreligious terminology of those dark and superstitious times by the\nscientific one of to-day.\n\nCharcot did not choose this path in his explanation of hysteria,\nthough he drew plentifully from existing records of witchcraft trials\nand of possession in order to show that the manifestations of neurosis\nwere the same then as they are now. He treated hysteria like any other\ntheme of neuropathology, gave the complete description of its\nmanifestations, showed that these had their own laws, and taught his\npupils to recognize the symptoms which make the diagnosis of hysteria\npossible. He and his pupils occupied themselves in most careful tests\nwith the disturbances of sensibility caused by hysteria on the skin\nand the deeper tissues, with the behaviour of the sense organs,\npeculiarities of hysterical contractures and paralyses, trophic\ndisturbances and alterations of metabolism. The manifold forms of the\nhysterical attack were described and a scheme drawn up which\nrepresented the typical configuration of the attack of '_grande\nhystérie_' in four stages, and permitted the correlation of the\ncommonly observed attacks of '_petite hystérie_' with the type. They        {21}\nalso investigated the localization and frequency of the so-called\nhysterogenic zones and their relation to the attacks, and so\non. Equipped with all this information about the manifestations of\nhysteria it was possible to make a number of surprising discoveries;\nit was found that hysteria was far commoner among men than had been\nsuspected, especially among working-men, and that certain conditions\nwhich had been ascribed to alcoholic or lead poisoning were\nhysterical. It was possible to include a large number of hitherto\nunintelligible, unclassified affections under the head of hysteria,\nand to distinguish the part played by hysteria in cases where the\nneurosis was combined with other diseases, forming a complex clinical\npicture. Most far-reaching in its influence was probably that research\nwork concerning the nervous diseases following upon traumas---the\ntraumatic neuroses---the conception of which is still under discussion\nto-day; in all these affections Charcot successfully presented the\ncase for hysteria.\n\nSince the latest extensions of the conception of hysteria had so\nfrequently led to a rejection of any ætiological diagnosis, the need\narose to investigate the ætiology of hysteria. Charcot laid down a\nsimple formula for this: heredity is the unique originating cause of\nhysteria, which is therefore a form of degeneration, a member of the\n'_famille névropathique_', all other ætiological factors playing the\npart of precipitating causes, of '_agents provocateurs_'.\n\nThe building up of this great structure of doctrine was not, of\ncourse, achieved without violent opposition. This was, however,\nnothing but the barren objection of an older generation which disliked\nmaking any change in its views. The younger group of\nneuropathologists, in Germany as well, accepted Charcot's theories to\na greater or lesser extent.  Charcot himself was quite convinced of         {22}\nthe success of his teaching in regard to hysteria; if objections were\nraised that the four stages of the attack, or that hysteria among men,\netc., were not observable outside France, he pointed out that he had\nhimself overlooked these things for a long time, and reasserted that\nhysteria was the same everywhere and at all times. He disliked to hear\nthe French accused of being a far more nervous nation than other\npeoples, and hysteria spoken of as their national foible; he was\ndelighted when a paper on a case of 'reflex epilepsy' in a German\ngrenadier could be diagnosed by him at a distance as one of hysteria.\n\nAt one point Charcot's work rose above the level of his general\ntreatment of hysteria and took a step which gives him for all time the\nglory of being the first to elucidate hysteria. While he was occupied\nwith the study of hysterical paralyses appearing after traumas, the idea\noccurred to him to reproduce by artificial means such paralyses as he\nhad previously carefully differentiated from organic disturbances; for\nthis purpose he took hysterical patients and placed them in a state of\nsomnambulism by hypnotism. He succeeded in producing a faultless\ndemonstration and proved thereby that these paralyses were the result of\nspecific ideas holding sway in the brain of the patient at moments of\nspecial disposition. With this the mechanism of an hysterical phenomenon\nwas for the first time disclosed, and on this incomparably fine piece of\nclinical research his own pupil Janet, and also Breuer and others, based\ntheir theories of the neurosis which, while agreeing with the mediæval\nview, replaces the 'demon' of priestly imagination by a psychological\nformula.\n\nCharcot's application of the phenomena of hypnosis to hysteria enabled\na very great advance to be made in this important sphere of hitherto        {23}\nneglected and despised facts, because the weight of his reputation put\nan end once for all to doubts of the reality of hypnotic\nmanifestations. But this exclusively nosographic approach was not\nsuited to a purely psychological subject. Limiting the study of\nhypnosis to hysterical patients, distinguishing between greater and\nlesser hypnotism, establishing three stages of 'greater' hypnosis\ndistinguished by somatic signs---all these practices sank in the\nestimation of contemporaries when Liébeault's pupil, Bernheim,\nundertook the task of basing the theory of hypnotism on a broader\npsychological foundation and of making suggestion the nucleus of\nhypnosis. Only the opponents of hypnotism who content themselves with\nhiding their own lack of experience behind some recognized authority\nstill cling to Charcot's pronouncements, and like to quote an\nexpression uttered in his last years denying that hypnosis has any\ntherapeutic efficacy whatever.\n\nAs for the ætiological theories which Charcot defended in his doctrine\nof the '_famille névropathique_' and made the cornerstone of his whole\nconception of nervous diseases, they too will probably soon need to be\nprobed into and corrected. So greatly did Charcot over-estimate heredity\nas a cause that no loophole was left by which nervous disease could be\nacquired; to syphilis he allotted only a modest place among the '_agents\nprovocateurs_'; nor did he, in ætiology or elsewhere, differentiate\nsharply enough between the organic nervous affections and the neuroses.\nThe progress our science has made in additions to its knowledge will\ninevitably diminish the value of much that Charcot has taught us, but\nneither the passing of time nor the changing of ideas will diminish the\nglory of the man whom we---in France and elsewhere---are mourning\nto-day.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                  II                                        {24}\n\n                    ON THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM OF\n                       HYSTERICAL PHENOMENA[2]\n\n           (In collaboration with Dr. Joseph Breuer, 1892)\n\n\n                                  I\n\nStimulated by a chance observation, we have for a number of years been\ninvestigating the most varied types and symptoms of hysteria with\nreference to the exciting cause, the event which evoked the phenomenon\nin question for the first time, often many years before. In the great\nmajority of cases it is impossible to discover this starting-point by\nstraightforward interrogation of the patient, be it ever so thorough;\npartly because it is often a matter of experiences which the patient\nfinds it disagreeable to discuss, but chiefly because he really does not\nremember and has no idea of the causal connection between the exciting\noccurrence and the pathological phenomenon. As a rule it is necessary to\nhypnotise the patient and under hypnosis to arouse recollections\nrelating to the time when the symptom first appeared; one can then\nsucceed in revealing this connection in the clearest and most convincing\nmanner.\n\nIn a great number of cases this method of examination has yielded\nresults which appear to be valuable theoretically as well as\npractically. From the theoretical point of view the results are\nvaluable because, for the pathology of hysteria, the accidental factor\nis decisive to a far greater extent than is known or acknowledged. In       {25}\nregard to traumatic hysteria it is obviously the accident which has\nevoked the syndrome; and when we learn from the utterances of patients\nin hysterical attacks that they invariably hallucinate in every attack\na repetition of the original occurrence which evoked the first, the\ncausal connection then also becomes perfectly clear here. The question\nis more obscure in the case of other phenomena.\n\nOur experience has shown us, however, that the most varied symptoms,\nusually regarded as spontaneous and, so to speak, idiopathic products of\nhysteria, have just as strict a connection with the exciting trauma as\nthose mentioned above in which the relation of the two sets of facts to\none another is transparent. To exciting causes of this kind we have been\nable to trace anæsthesias as well as neuralgias of the most varied kind,\noften of many years duration, contractures and paralyses, hysterical\nattacks and epileptoid convulsions which all observers had taken for\ngenuine epilepsy, _petit-mal_, symptoms of the nature of tics, chronic\nvomiting and anorexia carried to the point of refusal of food, the most\nvaried disturbances of vision, constantly recurring visual\nhallucinations---and the like. The disproportion between the many years\nduration of an hysterical symptom and the single occurrence which evoked\nit is similar to that which we are accustomed to see regularly in\ntraumatic neurosis; it was quite frequently in childhood that the events\noccurred producing a more or less grave symptom which persisted from\nthat time onwards.\n\nThe connection is often so clear that it is quite evident how the\nexciting event has happened to produce just this and no other\nmanifestation; the phenomenon is determined in a perfectly clear\nmanner by the cause; to take the most ordinary example, a painful           {26}\naffect, which was originally excited while eating but was suppressed,\nproduces nausea and vomiting, and this continues for months as\nhysterical vomiting. A girl watching in harrowing anxiety at the\nbedside of a sick person falls into a twilight state and has a\nterrifying hallucination while her right arm which is hanging over the\nback of the chair 'goes to sleep'; from this develops a paresis of\nthat arm with contracture and anæsthesia. She wants to pray but can\nfind no words; finally she succeeds in repeating an English prayer\nwhich she learnt in childhood. Then later a severe and highly\ncomplicated hysteria develops in which she can speak, write and\nunderstand only English, while for a year and a half her mother-tongue\nremains unintelligible to her.---A child who is very ill at last falls\nasleep, and its mother tries her utmost to keep quiet and not to wake\nit; but just in consequence of this resolution (hysterical\ncounterwill) she makes a clucking noise with her tongue. On another\noccasion when she wishes to keep absolutely quiet this happens again,\nand so a tic in the form of tongue-clicking develops which for a\nnumber of years accompanies every excitement.---A highly intelligent\nman assists while his brother's ankylosed hip is straightened under an\nanæsthetic. At the instant when the joint gives way with a crack he\nfeels a violent pain in his own hip-joint which lasts for almost a\nyear; and so on.\n\nIn other cases the connection is not so simple; there exists only what\nmay be called a symbolic relation between the cause and the\npathological manifestation, such as normal people also fashion in\ndreams; for example, a neuralgia links itself on to some mental\ndistress, or vomiting accompanies a feeling of moral disgust. We have\nhad under observation patients who habitually made extensive use of         {27}\nsuch symbolism. In yet other cases a determination of this kind is not\nat the first glance clearly intelligible; to these belong precisely\nthe typical hysterical symptoms---hemianæsthesia, contraction of the\nfield of vision, epileptiform convulsions and the like. The exposition\nof our theories concerning this group must be reserved for a more\ndetailed consideration of the subject.\n\nSuch observations seem to us to prove the pathogenic analogy between\nordinary hysteria and traumatic neurosis and to justify an extension\nof the concept of traumatic hysteria. In traumatic neurosis the active\ncause of illness is not the trifling bodily injury but the affect of\nfright---the psychic trauma. Similarly, our investigations of many, if\nnot of the majority, of hysterical symptoms have revealed causes which\nmust be described as psychic traumas. Any experience which rouses the\ndistressing affects of fright, apprehension, shame, or psychical pain\ncan have this effect and it obviously depends on the sensitiveness of\nthe person concerned (as well as on a further condition which we will\nrefer to later) whether the experience acquires the importance of a\ntrauma. We not infrequently find in ordinary hysteria several partial\ntraumas instead of one grand trauma---a group of causes---which can\nonly achieve traumatic effectiveness by accumulation and which belong\ntogether only in so far as they form parts of a whole painful\nexperience. In still other cases circumstances in themselves\napparently indifferent have attained an otherwise unexpected\nimportance as traumas, either on account of their conjunction with\nreally effective experiences or because they occurred at a moment of\nspecial susceptibility. This importance they then retain henceforward.      {28}\n\nBut the causal connection between the exciting psychical trauma and the\nhysterical symptom is not of such a kind that the trauma (like an _agent\nprovocateur_) sets going a symptom which then becomes independent and\npersists on its own account. On the contrary, we are of opinion that the\npsychical trauma, or the memory of it, acts as a kind of foreign body\nconstituting an effective agent in the present even long after it first\npenetrated; and we see the proof of this in a highly remarkable\nphenomenon which also lends an important practical interest to these\nresults of our observations.\n\nThe discovery that we made, at first to our own great surprise, was\nthat when we had succeeded in bringing the exciting event to clear\nrecollection, and had also succeeded in arousing with it the\naccompanying affect, and when the patient had related the occurrence\nin as detailed a manner as possible and had expressed his feeling in\nregard to it in words, the various hysterical symptoms disappeared at\nonce, never to return. Recollection without affect is nearly always\nquite ineffective; the original psychical process must be repeated as\nvividly as possible, brought into _statum nascendi_ and then 'talked\nout'. In the case of excitation phenomena---contractures, neuralgias,\nand hallucinations---the symptoms appear again during this repetition\nin full intensity and then disappear for ever. Defects in functioning,\nparalyses and anæsthesias disappear in the same way, the transitory\nexacerbation not being of course perceptible in those cases.[3]             {29}\n\nOne may be inclined to suspect that the explanation lies in\nunintentional suggestion; the patient expects to be rid of his suffering\nas a result of the treatment, and this expectation might be the\neffective factor, not the 'talking out'. But this is not the fact; the\nfirst observation of this kind was a highly complicated case of hysteria\nhaving symptoms with distinct causes which were separately dispersed,\nand was analysed on these lines in the year 1881, that is, in the\n'pre-suggestion' era. It was made possible by spontaneous auto-hypnosis\non the part of the patient, and it occasioned the observer the greatest\nsurprise.\n\nInverting the phrase '_cessante causa cessat effectus_', we may well\nconclude from these observations that the exciting experience continues\nin some way to be effective even years after, not indirectly by means of\na chain of causes linking up with one another, but directly as the\nactual exciting cause---just as, for instance, the recollection of\nmental distress in full consciousness at some later period may stimulate\ntears; we thus conclude that _hysterical patients suffer principally\nfrom reminiscences_.[4]\n\n                                  II\n\nIt may at first appear strange that experiences long since past should\noperate with such intensity, and that the memory of them should not         {30}\nsuccumb to the fate which we see overtaking all our memories; perhaps\nthese facts may become rather more comprehensible in the light of the\nfollowing considerations.\n\nThe fading of a memory or of its affect depends on several factors.\nFirst and foremost it depends on whether an energetic reaction\n(discharge of feeling) supervened on the affective experience or\nnot. By _reaction_ we here mean the whole range of voluntary and\ninvoluntary reflexes, by which according to experience the affects are\nhabitually worked off---from weeping up to an actual act of\nrevenge. If this reaction occurs with sufficient intensity a great\npart of the affect disappears; common speech bears witness to these\nfacts of every-day observation in the expressions 'to cry oneself\nout', 'to storm oneself out (_sich austoben_)'. If the reaction is\nsuppressed the affect remains attached to the memory. An insult which\nis returned, if only in words, is remembered differently from one\nwhich had to be endured in silence.  Common speech also recognizes\nthis difference in the psychical and bodily consequences, and most\ncharacteristically designates silently endured suffering as a\n_Kränkung_,[5] wound, injury, mortification. The reaction of an\ninjured person to the trauma has a really complete 'cathartic' effect\nonly if it takes the form of a fully adequate reaction, such as an act\nof revenge. But man finds a surrogate for such an act in speech, by\nthe help of which the affect may be almost as effectually\n'abreacted'. In other cases talking is itself sufficient as a reflex,\nfor example, complaining or relieving the burden of a secret (the\nconfessional!). If a reaction of this kind by word or deed, or in the       {31}\nmildest cases by tears, does not ensue, the memory of the occurrence\nretains for a time its affective tone.\n\n'Abreaction' is, however, not the only kind of solution at the disposal\nof the normal psychical mechanism in a healthy person who has met with a\npsychical trauma. Even if the memory is not abreacted it becomes merged\nin the great complex of associations, and is then ranged alongside of\nother experiences which perhaps contradict it; thus it undergoes\ncorrection by means of other ideas. After an accident, for example, the\nremembrance of the danger and the subsequent (weakened) reproduction of\nthe terror is accompanied by the memory of the sequel, of the rescue and\nthe consciousness of present security. The memory of an injury to the\nfeelings is corrected by an objective evaluation of the facts,\nconsideration of one's actual worth and the like, and thus the normal\nman succeeds by means of associations in dissipating the accompanying\naffect.\n\nIn addition to this there is also that general effacing of impressions,\nthat fading of recollection called 'forgetting', which tends more than\nanything else to absorb ideas which have lost their affective tone.\n\nOur observations have shown that those memories which give rise to\nhysterical phenomena are retained with wonderful freshness and with\nfull affective tone for a long period. But we must mention as a\nfurther striking fact, to be turned to account later, that these\nrecollections are not at the disposal of the patient in the way that\nhis more commonplace memories are. On the contrary, when the patient\nis in his usual psychical condition these experiences are completely\nabsent from his memory or are present to it only in the most summary\nmanner.  Only when patients are questioned under hypnosis do these          {32}\nmemories recur with the undiminished vividness of recent events.\n\nThus for six months one of our patients under hypnosis reproduced with\nhallucinatory vividness everything which had excited her on the\ncorresponding day of the previous year (during an acute hysteria); her\nmother's diary, of which she knew nothing, attested the perfect accuracy\nof the reproduction. Another patient lived through with hallucinatory\nclearness---partly in hypnosis, partly in spontaneous attacks---all the\nexperiences of an hysterical psychosis which she had suffered from ten\nyears before, and in regard to which amnesia had been almost complete\nuntil the moment of the re-emergence. Several ætiologically important\nrecollections dating back fifteen to twenty-five years were of\nastonishing integrity, and intensity of feeling; on reproduction their\neffect had the full force of new experiences.\n\nAs a reason for this we can only conjecture that these recollections\nhave met with an exceptional fate in reference to all the ordinary\nprocesses of effacement discussed above, for we find that they relate to\ntraumas which have not been sufficiently abreacted; closer investigation\nof the reasons which have prevented the operation of the latter then\nshows us at least two groups of conditions under which reaction to the\ntrauma does not ensue.\n\nIn the first group we reckon those cases in which the patient has not\nreacted to the psychical trauma because its nature excluded the\npossibility of any such reaction, as in the case of the apparently\nirretrievable loss of a loved person, or when social conditions made a\nreaction impossible, or when the trauma concerned something which the\npatient wished to forget and therefore deliberately repressed[6] and        {33}\nexcluded from his conscious thoughts.  Under hypnosis we discover\npainful ideas of precisely this character underlying the hysterical\nphenomena (e.g. in the hysterical deliria of saints and nuns, of\nabstinent women and well-brought-up children).\n\nThe second group of conditions is not determined by the content of the\nrecollection, but by the mental condition of the patient at the moment\nwhen the given experience occurred. That is to say, among the exciting\nfactors of hysterical symptoms we also discover under hypnosis ideas\nwhich though not in themselves significant owe their preservation to the\ncircumstance that they happen to coincide with a seriously disabling\naffect, for example, terror, or with a directly abnormal mental\ncondition, such as the half-hypnotic twilight state of day-dreaming,\nauto-hypnosis, and the like. In these cases it is the nature of these\nconditions which made a reaction to the experience impossible.\n\nNaturally both determinants may and often do occur together. This\nhappens when a trauma effective enough in itself occurs during a state\nof seriously disabling affect or of altered consciousness; but it seems\nthat in many persons an abnormal state of this kind is produced as the\nresult of a psychic trauma which then in its turn makes a reaction\nimpossible.\n\nBoth groups of determining conditions have this in common: that the\npsychical traumas which are not resolved by reaction will also fail of\nsolution by means of associative absorption. In the first group the\npatient's intention to do so causes him to forget the painful               {34}\nexperiences and consequently to exclude them from association as far\nas possible. In the second group the associative absorption does not\nsucceed because sufficient associative connection does not exist\nbetween the normal state of consciousness and the pathological state\nin which these ideas originally arose. We shall have immediate\noccasion to go more closely into these conditions.\n\nThus it may be said that the ideas which have become pathogenic are\npreserved with such freshness and affective force because the normal\nprocess of absorption by abreaction and by reproduction in a state of\nunrestrained association is denied them.\n\n                                 III\n\nIn describing the conditions which according to our experience are\ndecisive for the development of hysterical phenomena from psychical\ntraumas, we mentioned the abnormal states of consciousness in which\nsuch pathological ideas arise; and we laid stress on the fact that the\nrecollection of the effective psychical trauma is not to be found in\nthe normal memory of the patient, but in his memory under\nhypnosis. Indeed, the more we occupied ourselves with these phenomena\nthe more certain did our conviction become that that splitting of\nconsciousness, which is so striking in the well-known classical cases\nof _double conscience_, exists in a rudimentary fashion in every\nhysteria and that the tendency to this dissociation---and therewith to\nthe production of abnormal states of consciousness, which may be\nincluded under the term '_hypnoid_'---is a fundamental manifestation\nof this neurosis. This view is in agreement with those of Binet and\nthe two Janets; we have not had the opportunity, however, to confirm\ntheir highly remarkable discoveries in reference to anæsthetic              {35}\npatients.\n\nWe should like therefore to supplement the often-quoted phrase 'hypnosis\nis an artificial hysteria' with another---namely, 'the existence of\nhypnoid states forms the foundation and condition of hysteria'. There is\none thing common to all these hypnoid states and to hypnosis, in spite\nof all their differences---namely, that the ideas which emerge in them\nare marked by great intensity of feeling but are cut off from\nassociative connection with the rest of the content of consciousness.\nThese hypnoid states are capable of association among themselves and the\nideas belonging to them may in this way attain different degrees of\npsychical organization. Incidentally, however, the nature of these\nstates and the degree of their inaccessibility to the rest of conscious\nprocesses would very probably vary in a fashion similar to that of\nhypnosis, which ranges from light sleepiness to somnambulism, from\ncomplete recollection to absolute amnesia.\n\nIf such hypnoid states exist before the manifest illness, they provide\na foothold upon which the affect establishes itself with its\npathogenic recollection and its subsequent somatic\nmanifestations. This situation corresponds to dispositional\nhysteria. But our observations show that a severe trauma (such as that\nin a traumatic neurosis) or a troublesome suppression (for instance,\nof sexual affect) can effect a splitting of groups of ideas in people\npreviously free from it, and this would constitute the mechanism of\npsychically acquired hysteria. Between the extremes of these two forms\nwe must recognize a series within which the readiness to dissociation\nin the persons concerned and the volume of affect roused by the trauma\nvaries inversely.                                                           {36}\n\nWe have nothing new to say concerning the origin of dispositional\nhypnoid states. They often develop, we believe, from the 'day-dreams' so\nfrequently met with also in healthy people, great opportunity for which\nis provided, for instance, in the feminine occupation of needlework. The\nquestion why the 'pathological associations' formed in such states are\nso strong and why they influence somatic processes so much more strongly\nthan ideas habitually do is part of the problem of the operation of\nhypnotic suggestion in general. Our experiences teach us nothing new on\nthis point; they do, however, illuminate the contradiction between the\nstatement 'hysteria is a psychosis' and the fact that one finds among\nhysterics people with the clearest and most critical intellects, of\ngreat strength of character and will-power. These characteristics in\nsuch people are valid for their waking thoughts; in the hypnoid state\nthey become alienated from their conscious personalities as we all are\nin dreams. But whereas our dream-psychoses do not influence our waking\nexistence the products of hypnoid states intrude as hysterical phenomena\ninto waking life.\n\n                                  IV\n\nAlmost the same conclusions that we have just formed concerning\nhysterical symptoms of long duration may be repeated concerning\nhysterical attacks. As is well known, we possess a schematic\ndescription of the '_grande attaque_', worked out by Charcot,\naccording to which four phases may be recognized in a complete attack:\n(1) the epileptoid, (2) that of violent movements, (3) that of\n'_attitudes passionnelles_' (the hallucinatory phase), and (4) that of\nthe concluding delirium.  According to Charcot, all the various forms\nof an hysterical attack (which as a matter of fact are more frequently      {37}\nobserved than the full _grande attaque_) are derived from a\nshortening, lengthening, omission or isolation of these separate\nphases.\n\nOur attempt at explanation has to do with the third phase, the\n_attitudes passionnelles_. When this is well-marked it will reveal\nitself as an hallucinatory reproduction of a memory important for the\noutbreak of the hysteria, i.e. the memory of the one grand trauma in\nwhat is called _κατ' ἐξοχήν_ traumatic hysteria, or of a series of\ninter-related partial traumas which lie at the root of ordinary\nhysteria. The remaining alternative is that the attack will reproduce\nthose experiences which were raised to importance by happening to occur\nat a time of special sensitivity to traumas.\n\nBut there are also attacks which seems to consist of nothing but motor\nsymptoms and in which the _phase passionnelle_ is lacking. If we can\nsucceed in establishing a _rapport_ with the patient during such\ngeneral clonic attacks, during tonic catalepsy, or during an _attaque\nde sommeil_, or, better still, if we succeed in summoning up an attack\nwhile the patient is under hypnosis, we find that these attacks too\nare based on the memory of a psychic trauma or series of traumas which\nusually finds expression in an hallucinatory phase. For instance, a\nlittle girl has suffered for years from attacks of general convulsions\nwhich might have been epilepsy and had in fact been taken for it. To\nestablish a differential diagnosis she was hypnotised and was promptly\nseized by an attack. When asked: 'What do you see now?' she answered:\n'The dog, the dog is coming!' Further enquiry revealed that the first\nattack of the kind had appeared after she had been chased by a mad\ndog.  Therapeutic success later confirmed the diagnosis of a\npsychogenic malady.---A clerk who had become hysterical in consequence      {38}\nof being assaulted by his superior suffered from attacks during which\nhe fell to the ground in a frenzy of rage, but without uttering a word\nor betraying any signs of an hallucination. An attempt to produce the\nattack under hypnosis proved successful, and the patient revealed that\nhe was again living through the situation in which his superior had\nopenly insulted him in the street and thrashed him with a stick. A few\ndays afterwards he returned complaining that the same attack had\noccurred again, and this time he revealed under hypnosis that he had\nbeen living through the situation which provoked the actual outbreak\nof the disease, i.e. the trial in court where he failed to obtain\ncompensation for the injury.\n\nThe memories which come to the fore in hysterical attacks, or can be\nwakened during them, correspond also in all other respects with the\nexciting occurrences which we have found at the root of hysterical\nsymptoms of long duration. Like these, they relate to psychic traumas\nwhich have remained unresolved by abreaction or by associative mental\noperations; and like these, they---or at least their essential\nconstituents---are absent from the store of memories of which normal\nconsciousness is made up; they belong to the ideational content of\nhypnoid states of consciousness with their narrow fields of association.\nFinally, they also admit of the therapeutic test. Our observations have\noften demonstrated that a memory of this kind which had hitherto\nprovoked such attacks lost this power as soon as it was brought during\nhypnosis to a reaction or to associative readjustment.\n\nThe motor phenomena of hysterical attacks are to be explained partly\nas a general mode of reaction to the affect which accompanies the\nmemory, and may be compared, for example, with the beating movements        {39}\nof all the limbs which even an infant makes use of for this purpose;\nand partly as signifying direct emotional expressions of this memory;\nalthough they also elude this explanation to some extent as do the\nhysterical stigmata in chronic symptoms.\n\nThere is yet another aspect of the hysterical attack which reveals\nitself in the light of the theory we have just indicated: that in\nhysteria there are present ideational groups (arising in hypnoid\nstates) which, cut off from associative relations with the remainder\nbut associable _inter se_, establish a more or less highly organized\nnucleus of a second consciousness, a _condition seconde_. An\nhysterical symptom of long duration then corresponds to an intrusion\nof this _condition seconde_ into the somatic innervations usually\ncontrolled by normal consciousness; an hysterical attack, however,\ngives evidence of a higher organization of this _condition seconde_\nand, when of recent origin, signifies the moment at which this hypnoid\nconsciousness takes possession of the subject's whole personality\n(i.e. an acute hysteria); but recurring attacks which contain a memory\nsignify a recurrence of this moment. Charcot has already suggested\nthat the hysterical attack is probably the nucleus of a _condition\nseconde_. During the attack, control of the entire somatic innervation\nhas passed to the hypnoid consciousness. Experience shows that in\nthese cases normal consciousness is not always completely superseded;\nit may even perceive the motor phenomena of the attack while the\npsychic processes of the latter escape its notice.\n\nThe typical course of a severe hysteria is, as is well known, that\nfirst an ideational content is formed in hypnoid states, which then,\nwhen sufficiently developed, takes possession during a period of\n'acute hysteria' of the somatic innervation and personality of the          {40}\npatient, creates chronic symptoms and attacks, and then recedes until\nmere vestiges of it are left. If therefore the normal personality can\nregain control, what remains of the hypnoid ideational contents then\nreturns in hysterical attacks and again temporarily produces in the\npatient similar states, which are again susceptible themselves and\npredisposing to the influence of traumas. A sort of equilibrium\nbetween the psychical groups united in the same personality is then\nfrequently established; attacks and normal life exist side by side\nwithout affecting one another. The attacks then arise spontaneously,\nas memories commonly do; but they may also be provoked, just as any\nmemory may be aroused according to the laws of association.\nProvocation of an attack occurs either by stimulation of an\nhysterogenic zone or by a new experience resembling the pathogenic\nexperience. We hope to be able to show that no essential difference\nexists between the two conditions, apparently so distinct; that in\nboth cases a hyperæsthetic memory has been stirred. In other cases\nthis equilibrium is very unstable; the attack appears as an expression\nof the vestiges of hypnoid consciousness whenever the normal\npersonality is exhausted and powerless. It is not impossible that in\nsuch cases the attack may be divested of its original significance and\nmay return as a motor reaction without content.\n\nIt remains a task for further enquiry to discover what are the\nconditions determining whether in any given patient an hysteria will\ntake the form of attacks, or chronic symptoms, or a combination of both.\n\n                                  V\n\nIt is now clear how the method of psychotherapy which we have just\ndescribed leads to recovery. By providing an opportunity for the\npent-up affect to discharge itself in words the therapy deprives of         {41}\nits effective power the idea which was not originally abreacted; by\nconducting it into normal consciousness (in light hypnosis) it brings\nit into associative readjustment or else dispels it by means of the\nphysicians' suggestion, as happens in cases of somnambulism combined\nwith amnesia.\n\nWe regard the therapeutic effect achieved by employing this procedure as\nimportant. We naturally cannot cure that element in hysteria which is\ndispositional; we can do nothing against the return of hypnoid states.\nEven during the productive state of an acute hysteria our procedure\ncannot prevent the phenomena which have just been removed with such\ndifficulty being forthwith replaced by new ones. But when the acute\nstage has passed off and its vestiges remain in the form of chronic\nhysterical symptoms and attacks our method will frequently remove them\nin turn, and the results are permanent because radical. It therefore\nappears to us that in this respect it far surpasses the effect of\nremoval by direct suggestion which is now practised by\npsychotherapeutists.\n\nAlthough, by thus disclosing the psychical mechanism of hysterical\nphenomena, we have now made a further step along the path which Charcot\nfirst opened up so successfully with his explanations and experimental\nimitations of hystero-traumatic paralyses, we nevertheless do not\nconceal from ourselves that it is only the mechanism of the hysterical\nsymptom that has been brought within our grasp and not the inner causes\nof hysteria. We have but touched upon the ætiology of hysteria and have\nreally only been able to throw light on the causes of its acquired\nforms---the significance of the accidental factor for this neurosis.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                 III                                        {42}\n                  SOME POINTS IN A COMPARATIVE STUDY\n                OF ORGANIC AND HYSTERICAL PARALYSES[7]\n                                (1893)\n\nIn 1885 and 1886, when I was his pupil, Charcot was good enough to\nentrust me with the task of making a comparative study of organic and\nhysterical motor paralyses, based upon observations at the Salpêtrière,\nwhich might serve to discover some of the common characteristics of\nneuroses and lead to a conception of their nature. Accidental and\npersonal reasons prevented me from following his suggestion for a long\ntime; even now I only intend to give an account of some of the results\nof my work, omitting the details needed for a complete demonstration of\nmy views.\n\n                                  I\n\nI must begin with some remarks on the nature of organic paralyses,\nwhich incidentally represent generally accepted conclusions. Clinical\nneurology recognizes two forms of motor paralyses: periphero-spinal\n(or bulbar) and cerebral. This distinction is entirely in harmony with\nthe facts of the nervous system, which show that there are only two\nsegments in the course of the motor fibres: one extending from the\nperiphery to the anterior horn cells of the spinal cord, and a second\nwhich proceeds from here to the cerebral cortex. Modern\nneuro-histology, based upon the work of Golgi, Ramón y Cajal,\nKölliker, etc., formulates these facts as follows: The path of fibres\nconducting motor impulses consists of two neurones (a                       {43}\nneuro-histological unit composed of a cell and its fibres) which meet\nin intimate relation at the so-called motor cells of the anterior\nhorn. The essential clinical difference between these two types of\nparalysis is the following: _Periphero-spinal paralysis is a paralysis\nof individual elements while cerebral paralysis is a paralysis en\nmasse_. Types of the former are the facial palsy of Bell, the\nparalysis in infantile anterior poliomyelitis, etc. Now in these\ndiseases each muscle, we might say each muscle fibre, may be paralysed\nindividually and in isolation. It depends only upon the site and\nextent of the nerve lesion; there is, moreover, no definite rule\naccording to which one peripheral element escapes paralysis while\nanother is permanently subject to it.\n\nCerebral paralysis, on the other hand, is always a disease affecting a\nconsiderable portion of the periphery, an extremity, a segment of it, or\na complicated motor apparatus. It never affects one muscle alone, as for\nexample, the biceps brachii or the tibialis; in any apparent exceptions\nto this rule (cortical ptosis, for example) it is evident that the\nmuscles concerned are of the kind which in themselves fulfil a\nparticular function---in which they are the sole agents.\n\nIt may be noted that in cerebral paralyses affecting the extremities\ndistal segments always suffer more than proximal ones; the hand, for\nexample, is more paralysed than the shoulder. As far as I know, there is\nno isolated cerebral paralysis of the shoulder in which the hand retains\nits motor power, while the reverse is the rule in incomplete paralyses.\n\nIn a critical study of aphasia, published in 1891 (_Zur Auffassung der\nAphasien_, _Wien_, _1891_), I attempted to show that the cause of this\nimportant difference between periphero-spinal and cerebral paralysis\nwas to be sought in the structure of the nervous system. Each element       {44}\nin the periphery corresponds to one in the grey substance, which is,\nas Charcot expresses it, its neural terminus; the periphery is then,\nso to say, projected on to the grey substance of the spinal cord,\npoint by point, element for element. I have proposed that the\nparticularized periphero-spinal paralysis should be named 'projection\nparalysis'. The relation between the elements of the spinal cord and\nthose of the cortex is, however, different. The number of conducting\nfibres would no longer suffice for a second projection of the\nperiphery, to the cortex. We must suppose that the fibres coming from\nthe spinal cord to the cortex no longer represent single peripheral\nelements, but rather a group of them; on the other hand, a peripheral\nelement may correspond to several spino-cortical fibres. The change in\narrangement occurs at the point where the two segments of the motor\nsystem meet.\n\nTherefore I would say that the reproduction of the periphery in the\ncortex is no longer an accurate one, point for point; it is not a true\nprojection. The relation is established so to say by representative\nfibres, and I propose therefore to name the cerebral form of paralysis\n'representation paralysis'.\n\nNaturally, when a projection paralysis is total and very extensive, it\ntoo becomes a paralysis _en masse_ and its striking distinctive\ncharacteristic disappears. Cortical paralysis, on the other hand, which\nis differentiated from the other cerebral paralyses by a greater\ntendency to dissociation, nevertheless invariably presents the character\nof a representation paralysis.\n\nThe other differences between projection paralysis and representation\nparalysis are well known. Among them I may mention the preservation of\nnutrition and of electrical reaction in the latter. Although                {45}\nclinically very important, these signs have not the theoretical\nsignificance that is to be ascribed to the first differential trait\nmentioned, i.e., whether the paralysis be one of individual elements\nor _en masse_.\n\nHysteria has often been credited with the faculty of simulating the most\nvaried kinds of organic nervous diseases. The question arises whether it\ncan simulate accurately the characteristics of both types of organic\nparalysis, whether there are hysterical projection paralyses and\nhysterical representation paralyses, as in the organic symptomatology.\nAn important fact at once confronts us here. Hysteria never simulates\nthe periphero-spinal or projection paralyses; hysterical paralyses show\nthe characteristics of organic representation paralyses only. This is\nindeed a very interesting fact, since Bell's palsy, musculo-spinal\nparalysis, etc., are among the most common diseases of the nervous\nsystem.\n\nIt should be noted in this connection, in order to avoid all confusion,\nthat I am dealing only with flaccid hysterical paralyses and not with\nhysterical contractures. It seems to me impossible to apply the same\nrules to both hysterical paralyses and hysterical contractures. The\ncontention that the paralysis never affects an isolated muscle (unless\nsuch a muscle be the sole agent of a function), that the paralysis is\nalways _en masse_, agreeing in this respect with an organic cerebral\nrepresentation paralysis, can only be maintained in respect of flaccid\nhysterical paralyses. Further, in regard to the nutrition and electrical\nreactions of the paralysed part hysterical paralysis shows the same\ncharacteristics as organic cerebral paralysis.\n\nBut although hysterical paralysis may be related in this way to\ncerebral and especially to cortical paralysis, which exhibits a             {46}\ngreater aptitude for dissociation, important distinctive traits are\nnot lacking between them. In the first place, it is not subject to the\nconstant fixed rule of organic cerebral paralyses, namely, that the\ndistal segment is always more extensively affected than the proximal\none. In hysteria, the shoulder or the thigh may be more seriously\nparalysed than the hand or the foot. Movements may occur in the\nfingers while the proximal part is still absolutely motionless.  There\nis not the least difficulty in producing artificially an isolated\nparalysis of the thigh, of the leg, etc., and clinically we quite\nfrequently meet with these isolated paralyses which do not conform to\nthe rules of organic cerebral paralyses.\n\nIn this important respect hysterical paralysis is, so to speak,\nintermediate in type between projection paralysis and representation\nparalysis. On the one hand it does not possess all the characteristics\nof dissociation and isolation proper to the former; on the other hand it\nis by no means subject to the rules which strictly govern the latter.\nWith these reservations we may say that hysterical paralysis also is a\nrepresentation paralysis, but one possessing a special manner of\nrepresentation which remains to be discovered.[8]\n\n                                  II\n\nAs a step in this direction I propose to study the other traits which\ndifferentiate hysterical paralysis from the most perfect form of            {47}\ncerebral organic paralysis---namely, cortical paralysis.  The first of\nthese distinguishing characteristics has been mentioned, the fact that\nhysterical paralysis may be much more dissociated and systematised\nthan cerebral paralysis. The symptoms of organic paralysis appear in\nhysteria as if apportioned. Hysteria reproduces the common organic\nhemiplegia (paralysis of the upper and lower extremities and of the\nlower half of the face) only to the extent of imitating the paralysis\nof the limbs; frequently it even splits off the paralysis of the arm\nfrom that of the leg, exhibiting with the greatest ease paralysis in\nthe form of a monoplegia. It reproduces in an isolated form the motor\naphasia seen in the syndrome of organic aphasia and, as I have\nobserved in some unpublished cases, it can create a total aphasia\n(motor and sensory) for a given language, without affecting in the\nleast the ability to understand and to speak another, a phenomenon\nunheard-of in organic aphasia. This power of dissociation is again\nmanifested in those isolated paralyses in which one segment of a limb\nis affected while other portions of the same limb are entirely intact,\nand again, when one function is completely abolished (abasia astasia)\nwhile another function performed by the same organ is unaffected. The\nmore complex the function in question, the more striking is this\ndissociation. In organic disease, whenever several functions are\nimpaired in different degrees, it is always the most complex function,\nthe one most recently acquired, that is most extensively affected by\nthe paralysis.\n\nIn addition to the above, hysterical paralysis presents another\ncharacteristic, which is, as it were, the hall-mark of the neurosis.\nIndeed, as I heard Charcot say, hysteria is a malady with extravagant\nmanifestations, with a tendency to produce its symptoms in the              {48}\nseverest possible degree. This characteristic is not met with only in\nthe paralyses but also in the contractures and anæsthesias.  The\ndegree of distortion that may be produced by hysterical contractures\nis well known and is hardly equalled in organic symptomatology. We\nalso know how frequently hysteria exhibits the absolute, profound\nanæsthesias, of which the organic lesions only reproduce a faint\nsketch.  The same is true of the paralyses; they are often as complete\nas is possible. The hysterical aphasic does not utter a word, while\nthe organic aphasic almost always retains a few syllables, 'yes',\n'no', an oath, etc.; the paralysed arm is absolutely inert, and so\non. This characteristic is too well known to dwell on it at length. On\nthe other hand, it is known that in organic paralysis partial paresis\nis always more common than complete paralysis.\n\nHysterical paralysis, then, shows an _exact delimitation_ and an\n_excessive intensity_. It possesses these two qualities\nsimultaneously, and it is in this respect that it contrasts most\nstrongly with organic cerebral paralysis, in which these two\ncharacteristics are never associated. Monoplegias do exist in organic\nsymptomatology also, but they are almost always monoplegias _a\npotiori_ and not sharply delimited. If an arm is paralysed in\nconsequence of a cortical lesion, there is almost always a minor\nconcomitant affection of the face and leg; and if this complication is\nno longer visible at a given period, it existed nevertheless at the\nbeginning of the disease. Cortical monoplegia is indeed always a\nhemiplegia, of which one part or another has been more or less effaced\nbut still remains recognizable. To go further, let us suppose that the\nparalysis has affected the arm alone, that it is a pure cortical            {49}\nmonoplegia; in such a case we shall see that the paralysis is one of\nmoderate degree. As this monoplegia increases in degree, and as soon\nas it becomes a total paralysis, it at once loses its characteristic\nof being a pure monoplegia and will be accompanied by motor\ndisturbances in the leg or the face. _It cannot become a complete\nparalysis and at the same time remain restricted in area_.\n\nThis is the very condition, however, that hysterical paralysis can\neasily accomplish, as we may see daily in clinical work. For example, it\nmay affect the arm exclusively without showing a trace in the leg or the\nface. Further, in the arm it is as complete as a paralysis can possibly\nbe, and this forms a striking contrast to organic paralysis, a\ndifference that gives occasion for serious reflection.\n\nThere are, of course, cases of hysterical paralysis in which the degree\nof paralysis is not excessive and in which the dissociation offers\nnothing remarkable. Such cases are recognized by other traits; but they\nare cases that do not bear the typical stamp of neurosis and, since they\ncannot teach us anything about the nature of the latter, are of no\ninterest for our present purpose.\n\nLet me add a few remarks of minor importance, though they overstep the\nlimits of my subject.\n\nTo begin with, I may recall the fact that hysterical paralyses are\nmuch more frequently accompanied by sensory disturbances than are\norganic paralyses; such disturbances are altogether more profound and\nfrequent in neurosis than in organic disease. Nothing is more common\nthan hysterical anæsthesia or analgesia. Recollect, in contrast to\nthis, how obstinately sensation persists in cases of organic\nlesion. If a peripheral nerve is cut, the anæsthesia will be less\nextensive and intense than might be expected. When an inflammatory          {50}\nprocess attacks the spinal nerves or the spinal cord centres the\nresult always is that motility suffers in the first instance, while\nsensibility remains or is merely diminished; for some part of the\nnervous elements which have not been completely destroyed always\npersists. With cerebral lesions the frequency and the permanency of\nmotor hemiplegia is well known, while the accompanying hemianæsthesia\nis vague and transitory, and is not always present. Only a few special\nlocalizations can produce a marked and lasting sensory disturbance\n(_carrefour sensitif_), and even this fact is not free from doubt.\n\nThis difference in the nature of the sensory disturbances in organic\nlesions and in hysteria is scarcely explicable with our present\nknowledge. The solution of this problem would probably reveal the core\nof the whole matter.\n\nAnother point that seems to me worthy of mention is that there are\nsome forms of cerebral paralysis which, just like the periphero-spinal\nprojection paralyses, are not found in hysteria. Paralysis of the\nlower half of the face, the most frequent manifestation of organic\nbrain disease, should be mentioned first in this connection, and, if I\nmay be permitted to enter the field of sensorial disturbances,\nhomonymus lateral hemianopsia. I know that I run a risk in stating\nthat a given symptom does not exist in hysteria when the researches of\nCharcot and his pupils are almost daily discovering new and hitherto\nunsuspected symptoms. But I must take things as they are at the\nmoment. The existence of an hysterical facial paralysis is seriously\ncontested by Charcot, and, even if we believe those who vouch for it,\nit is a very rare phenomenon. Hemianopsia has not as yet been seen in\nhysteria, and I believe it never will be.                                   {51}\n\nNow how is it that hysterical paralyses closely simulate cortical ones\nand yet differ from them in the distinctive characteristics that I have\nattempted to enumerate, and what is the special type of representation\nto which they conform? The answer to this question would embody a large\nand important part of the theory of this neurosis.\n\n                                 III\n\nNot the least doubt exists about the conditions controlling the\nsymptomatology of cerebral paralysis. They are the facts of\nanatomy---the structure of the nervous system, the distribution of its\nvessels and the inter-relation between these two sets of facts and the\nnature of the lesion. We have said that the basis of the difference\nbetween the projection paralysis and the representation paralysis lies\nin the smaller number of fibres proceeding from the spinal cord to the\ncortex in comparison with the number proceeding from the periphery to\nthe spinal cord. Again, every clinical detail of a representation\nparalysis finds its explanation in some detail of cerebral anatomy and,\n_vice versa_, we can deduce the structure of the brain from the clinical\ncharacteristics of the paralyses. We believe that a perfect parallel\nexists between these two series of facts.\n\nThus if cerebral paralysis does not show any great tendency to\ndissociation, it is because the fibres conducting motor impulses run\ntoo close together for a great part of their intra-cerebral course for\nthem to be injured individually. If cortical paralysis shows a greater\ntendency to monoplegias, it is because the diameter of the conducting\nbundle, brachial, crural, etc., goes on increasing up to the\ncortex. If paralysis of the hand is the most complete of all the\ncortical ones, it is, I believe, because the contralateral relation\nbetween hemisphere and periphery is more nearly complete for the hand       {52}\nthan for any other part of the body. If the distal segment of an\nextremity suffers a greater degree of paralysis than a proximal\nsegment, it may be assumed that the representative fibres of the\ndistal segment are more numerous than those of the proximal one, so\nthat the influence of the cortex is more important for the former than\nfor the latter. If moderate-sized lesions of the cortex do not succeed\nin producing pure monoplegias, we infer from this that the motor\ncentres of the cortex are not cleanly separated from one another by\nindifferent areas, or that there are factors operating at a distance\n(_Fernwirkungen_) which nullify the effect of an exact separation of\nthe centres.\n\nSimilarly, if disturbances of various functions are always found in a\nmixed form in organic aphasia, this is explained by the fact that\nbranches of the same artery nourish all the speech centres, or, if the\nview expressed in my critical study of aphasia is accepted, it is\nbecause we are dealing, not with separate centres, but with a continuous\nassociation area. In any event, there is always some reason to be found\nin anatomy for these things.\n\nThe remarkable combinations which are so often observed in the\nsymptomatology of cortical paralyses (motor aphasia and right\nhemiplegia, alexia and right hemianopsia) are explained by the proximity\nof the injured centres. Hemianopsia itself, a symptom that seems curious\nand strange to the unscientific mind, is only explicable by the crossing\nof the fibres of the optic nerve at the chiasma; like all the details of\ncerebral paralyses it is the clinical expression of an anatomical fact.\n\nSince there cannot be more than one authentic cerebral anatomy, and\nsince that one is expressed in the clinical characteristics of              {53}\ncerebral paralyses, it is evidently impossible for that anatomy to\nexplain the distinctive traits of hysterical paralyses.  For this\nreason we should not draw conclusions about cerebral anatomy based\nupon the symptomatology of these paralyses.\n\nWe must certainly turn our attention to the nature of the lesion to find\nthis difficult explanation. In organic paralyses the nature of the\nlesion plays a secondary part, it is rather the extent and localization\nof it that, under the given conditions of the structure of the nervous\nsystem, produce the characteristics of organic paralysis we have\nmentioned above. What can be the nature of the lesion in hysterical\nparalysis which alone dominates the situation, independent of\nlocalization, of extent, and of the anatomy of the nervous system?\n\nCharcot constantly taught us that it is a cortical lesion, but one of a\npurely dynamic or functional kind.\n\nIt is easy to understand the negative side of this proposition. It is\nequivalent to affirming that no appreciable tissue changes will be\nfound _post mortem_; but regarded from a positive stand-point, it is\nfar from being devoid of ambiguity. After all, what is a dynamic\nlesion? I am sure that many who read the works of Charcot think that\ndynamic lesion is indeed a lesion, but a lesion of which no trace is\nfound after death, like œdema, anæmia, active hyperæmia. But the\nlatter, although they do not necessarily persist after death, are true\norganic lesions, however insignificant and transitory. Paralyses\nproduced by lesions of this type partake, necessarily, of all the\ncharacteristics of organic paralyses.  Œdema and anæmia could no more\nproduce the dissociation and intensity of an hysterical paralysis than\ncould hæmorrhage and softening. The only difference would be that a         {54}\nparalysis produced by œdema, by vascular constriction etc., would be\nless lasting than a paralysis caused by the destruction of nervous\ntissue. All the other conditions are common to both, and the anatomy\nof the nervous system will determine the characteristics of a\nparalysis in a case of transitory anæmia no less than in a case of\npermanent anæmia.\n\nI do not think that these remarks are wholly uncalled-for. Reading\n'there must be an hysterical lesion' in a given centre (the same centre\nan organic lesion of which would produce the corresponding organic\nsyndrome) and recollecting that it is customary to localize the dynamic\nhysterical lesion in the same way as the organic lesion, we are led to\nbelieve that there lurks behind the expression 'dynamic lesion' the idea\nof a lesion like œdema and anæmia, which are in fact transitory organic\naffections. I maintain on the contrary that the lesion in hysterical\nparalyses must be entirely independent of the anatomy of the nervous\nsystem, since _hysteria behaves in its paralyses and other\nmanifestations as if anatomy were non-existent, or as if it had no\nknowledge of it_.\n\nIndeed, a good number of the features of hysterical paralyses justify\nthis statement. Hysteria is ignorant of the distribution of the nerves\nand for this reason does not simulate the periphero-spinal or\nprojection paralyses; it is not acquainted with the optic chiasma and\nconsequently does not produce a hemianopsia. It regards the organs\naccording to the common popular meaning of their names: the leg is the\nleg up to its insertion into the hip, the arm is the upper extremity\nas mapped out by our clothing. It would see no reason for combining a\nfacial paralysis to a brachial one. An hysterical patient who loses\nthe power of speech has no motive for forgetting the meaning of             {55}\nlanguage, since motor aphasia and word-deafness are not related in the\npopular mind. On this point I must agree completely with the views\nexpressed by Janet in the latest numbers of the _Archives de\nNeurologie_; hysterical paralyses demonstrate their truth just as well\nas anæsthesias and psychic symptoms do.\n\n                                  IV\n\nI shall now try finally to suggest what might be the lesion that causes\nhysterical paralyses. I do not claim that I shall demonstrate what it\nactually is; it is merely a matter of pointing out a line of thought\nthat may lead to a concept not in contradiction with the features of\nhysterical paralysis, in so far as this differs from organic cerebral\nparalysis.\n\nI will take the word 'functional or dynamic lesion' in its proper sense:\n'alteration in function or mechanism', alteration in a functional\nattribute. Such an alteration, for example, would be a diminution in\nexcitability or in a physiological quality which in the normal state\nremains constant or varies within fixed limits.\n\nBut it will be said that a functional alteration is only an organic one\nconsidered from a different aspect. Let us suppose that nervous tissue\nis in a state of transitory anæmia, its excitability will be diminished\nby that circumstance; it is not possible by this means to avoid\nconsidering organic lesions.\n\nI will try to show that a functional alteration may exist without an\naccompanying organic lesion, at least without a lesion capable of\ndetection even by means of the most delicate methods. In other words,\nI will give an appropriate example of a primary functional change; to\ndo so, I only ask permission to pass over into the field of\npsychology, which cannot be ignored in dealing with hysteria.               {56}\n\nWith Janet I maintain that it is the common, popular idea of the organs\nand of the body in general that is at work in hysterical paralyses as\nwell as in anæsthesias, etc. This idea is based, not upon a profound\nknowledge of neuro-anatomy, but upon our tactile and, above all, our\nvisual perceptions. If it determines the characteristics of hysterical\nparalysis the latter must prove to be ignorant and independent of any\nidea of the anatomy of the nervous system. The lesion of hysterical\nparalysis will be an alteration of the concept, of the idea 'arm', for\nexample. But what kind of alteration in regard to the concept is capable\nof producing a paralysis?\n\nPsychologically considered, the paralysis of the arm is embodied in the\nfact that the concept 'arm' cannot enter into association with those\nother ideas that make up the ego, of which the body of the individual is\nan important part. The lesion, then, would consist in the abolition of\nthe accessibility of the concept 'arm' in association. The arm acts as\nif it did not exist in the interplay of associations. Of course, if the\nphysical conditions corresponding with the concept 'arm' are profoundly\nchanged then the concept will also be lost, but I must show that it may\nbe inaccessible without being destroyed and without its physical\nsubstratum (the nervous tissue of the corresponding cortical area) being\ndamaged.\n\nI will commence with examples taken from ordinary life. A comic story\nis told of a loyal subject who would no longer wash his hand because\nhis sovereign had touched it. The relation of this hand to the idea\n'king' seems to be so important for the psychic life of this person\nthat he refused to let it enter into other relations. We obey the same\nimpulse when we break the glass in which we have drunk the health of a\nnewly-married couple. Ancient savage tribes, in burning the horse, the      {57}\nweapons, and even the wives of a deceased chief together with his\nbody, followed a similar idea that no one should touch them after\nhim. The motive for all these acts is clear. The affective value which\nattaches to the first association is reluctant to let the object enter\ninto a new association with another object and consequently renders\nthe idea inaccessible to association.\n\nIf we now pass on to the field of the psychology of concepts we find\nthat this is not a simple comparison but an almost identical situation.\nIf the concept 'arm' is attached to an association of great affective\nvalue it will be inaccessible to the free play of other associations.\nThe arm will be paralysed in proportion to the persistence of that\naffective value or to the diminution in the latter effected by suitable\npsychic measures. This is the solution of the problem that we have\nraised; for in every case of hysterical paralysis we find that the\nparalysed organ or the abolished function is engaged in a subconscious\nassociation endowed with great affective value, and it may be\ndemonstrated that the arm becomes free as soon as this affective value\nis removed. The concept 'arm' exists, then, in the physical substratum;\nbut it is not accessible to conscious associations and volition because\nits entire associative affinity, so to speak, is saturated by a\nsubconscious association with the recollection of the event, of the\ntrauma, that produced the paralysis.\n\nCharcot was the first to teach us that we must turn to psychology for\nthe explanation of the hysterical neurosis. Breuer and I have followed\nhis example in a preliminary paper.[9] In this paper we show that the\npermanent symptoms of so-called non-traumatic hysteria (the stigmata\nexcepted) may be explained by the same mechanism that Charcot               {58}\nrecognized in traumatic paralyses. But we also give the reasons why\nthese symptoms persist and why they can be cured by a special form of\nhypnotic psychotherapy. Every occurrence, every psychic impression is\nsupplied with a certain affective value (_Affektbetrag_), of which the\nego rids itself either by means of a motor reaction or by a process of\nmental association. If the person cannot or will not free himself of\nthis excess, the memory of the impression acquires the importance of a\ntrauma and becomes the cause of the permanent symptoms of\nhysteria. When the impression remains subconscious its elimination is\nimpossible. We have called this theory: _Das Abreagieren der\nReizzuwächse_ (the abreaction of an accumulation of stimuli).\n\nTo sum up, I think that it is quite in harmony with our general\nconception of hysteria, formed from the teachings of Charcot, to state\nthat the lesion in hysterical paralyses consists of nothing but the\ninaccessibility of the concept of the organ or function to the\nassociations of the conscious ego; that this purely functional change\n(the concept itself being intact) is caused by the fixation of that\nconcept in subconscious association with the memory of the trauma; and\nthat this concept cannot become free or accessible as long as the\naffective value of the psychic trauma has not been eliminated by an\nadequate motor reaction or a conscious psychic process. Even if this\nmechanism does not take place, if a direct auto-suggestive idea is\nalways necessary in an hysterical paralysis, as in the traumatic cases\nof Charcot, we have succeeded in showing what the nature of the lesion,\nor rather of the change, in hysterical paralysis may be, so as to\nexplain the differences between it and organic cerebral paralysis.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                  IV                                        {59}\n                   THE DEFENCE NEURO-PSYCHOSES[10]\n\n                  An endeavour to provide a psycho-\n                 logical theory of acquired hysteria,\n                   many phobias and obsessions, and\n                   certain hallucinatory psychoses.\n\n                                (1894)\n\nAfter a close study of several patients suffering from phobias and\nobsessions a tentative explanation of these symptoms forced itself upon\nme; and as it later enabled me successfully to divine the origin of\nsimilar pathological ideas in other cases, I consider it worthy of\npublication and of further tests. Along with this 'psychological theory\nof phobias and obsessions', observation of these patients has resulted\nin a contribution to the theory of hysteria, or rather an alteration in\nit, which appears to account for an important characteristic common both\nto hysteria and to the neuroses mentioned above. Further, I had\nopportunities of gaining some insight into the psychological mechanism\nof a form of disease that is undoubtedly of mental origin, and then\nfound that the tentative point of view I had adopted established an\nintelligible connection between these psychoses and the two neuroses\nmentioned. At the end of this essay I shall bring forward an hypothesis\nwhich I have employed in all three cases.\n\n                                  I\n\nLet me begin with the alteration that in my view we are called upon to\nmake in the theory of the hysterical neurosis.                              {60}\n\nSince the publication of the fine work carried out by P. Janet, J.\nBreuer and others, it may be taken as generally acknowledged that the\nsyndrome of hysteria, in so far as it permits of understanding up to the\npresent, justifies the concept of a splitting of consciousness, with the\nformation of separate psychical groups; opinions are less definite,\nhowever, concerning the origin of this splitting of consciousness and\nthe part which this character plays in the structure of the hysterical\nneurosis.\n\nAccording to Janet's theory[11] the splitting of consciousness is a\nprimary feature of the hysterical change. It is dependent on an inborn\nweakness in the capacity for psychical synthesis, on the narrowness of\nthe 'field of consciousness' (_champ du conscience_) which in the form\nof a psychic stigma is evidence of the degeneration of hysterical\npersons.\n\nIn contradistinction to Janet's view, which seems to me to admit of many\nand various objections, we have that advocated by J. Breuer in our joint\npublication[12]. According to Breuer, the 'foundation and condition' of\nhysteria is the occurrence of peculiar dream-like states of\nconsciousness with diminished capacity for association, for which he\nsuggests the name 'hypnoid states'. The splitting of consciousness is\nthen secondary and acquired; it occurs because the ideas which emerge in\nhypnoid states are cut off from associative connection with the\nremaining contents of consciousness.\n\nI can now bring forward evidence of two other more extreme forms of\nhysteria in which it is impossible to regard the splitting of\nconsciousness as primary in Janet's sense. In the first of these forms\nI repeatedly succeeded in demonstrating that the splitting of the           {61}\ncontents of consciousness is the consequence of a voluntary act on the\npart of the patient; that is to say, it is instituted by an effort of\nwill, the motive of which is discoverable. By this I do not of course\nmean that the patient intends to produce a splitting of his\nconsciousness; the patient's aim is a different one, but instead of\nattaining its end it produces a splitting of consciousness.\n\nIn the third form of hysteria, as shown by the mental analysis of\nintelligent patients, the splitting of consciousness plays an\ninsignificant part, or perhaps none at all. These are the cases in which\nall that had happened was that the reaction to traumatic stimuli had\nfailed to occur, so that they are accordingly dissolved and cured by\n'abreaction'[13]---they are the pure 'retention' hysterias.\n\nIn connection with what I have to say about phobias and obsessions I\nshall here deal only with the second form of hysteria, which for reasons\nthat will soon be evident I shall designate as _defence hysteria_, and\ndistinguish by this name from _hypnoid_ and _retention hysteria_. I may\nalso provisionally represent my cases of defence hysteria as cases of\n'acquired hysteria', because there was in them no question either of\ngrave hereditary taint or of individual atrophic degeneration.\n\nThese patients whom I analysed had enjoyed good mental health up to\nthe time at which an intolerable idea presented itself within the\ncontent of their ideational life; that is to say, until their ego was\nconfronted by an experience, an idea, a feeling, arousing an affect so\npainful that the person resolved to forget it, since he had no\nconfidence in his power to resolve the incompatibility between the          {62}\nunbearable idea and his ego by the processes of thought.\n\nSuch unbearable ideas develop in women chiefly in connection with sexual\nexperiences and sensations, and the patients can recollect with the most\nsatisfactory minuteness their efforts at defence---their resolution to\n'push the thing out', not to think of it, to suppress it. I will give\nfrom my experience some examples which I could easily multiply: A young\ngirl who disapproved of herself because while nursing her sick father\nshe had let her mind dwell on the thought of a young man who had made a\nslight erotic impression on her; a governess who had fallen in love with\nher employer and had resolved to thrust this affection from her mind\nbecause it appeared to her incompatible with her pride; and so on.[14]\n\nI do not of course assert that an effort of will to thrust such things\nout of the mind is a pathological act, nor am I able to say whether and\nin what manner intentional forgetting is successful in people who remain\nhealthy, although subject to similar mental impressions. I only know\nthat this kind of 'forgetting' did not succeed with the patients whom I\nanalysed, but led to various pathological reactions, giving rise either\nto hysteria, or to an obsession, or to an hallucinatory psychosis. The\nability to bring about by an effort of will one of these states, which\nare all of them associated with splitting of consciousness, is to be\nregarded as the manifestation of a pathological disposition---which,\nhowever, is not necessarily identical with personal or hereditary\n'degeneration'.\n\nIn regard to the intermediate processes between the patient's effort\nof will and the onset of the neurotic symptom, I have formed an\nopinion which may be expressed in the customary psychological               {63}\nabstractions somewhat as follows: The task which the ego undertakes in\ndefence---of treating the unbearable idea as '_non arrivée_'---is\nabsolutely insoluble; both the memory-trace and the affect attached to\nthe idea are there once and for all, and it is no longer possible to\nextirpate them. But it amounts to an approximate fulfilment of this\ntask if the ego succeeds in transforming a strong idea into a weak\none, in depriving it of its affect---the quantity of excitation with\nwhich the idea is charged. The weak idea will then make practically no\ndemands on the work of association; the quantity of excitation,\nhowever, which is then detached from the idea, must be utilized in\nanother direction.\n\nUp to this point the processes are the same in hysteria and in phobias\nand obsessions; from now onwards their ways diverge. In hysteria the\nunbearable idea is rendered innocuous by the quantity of excitation\nattached to it being transmuted into some bodily form of expression, a\nprocess for which I should like to propose the name of _conversion_.\n\nThe conversion may be either total or partial, and it proceeds along\nthe line of the motor or sensory innervation that is more or less\nintimately related to the traumatic experience. Thus the ego succeeds\nin resolving the incompatibility within itself; but instead it has\nburdened itself with a memory-symbol, which dwells in consciousness,\nlike a sort of parasite, either in the form of a persistent motor\ninnervation or else as a constantly recurring hallucinatory sensation,\nand remains until a reversion takes place in the opposite\ndirection. The memory-trace of the repressed idea is not, however,\nannihilated by this process; on the contrary, from now onwards it\nforms the nucleus of a secondary psychical group.                           {64}\n\nI will only add a few more words to this conception of the\npsycho-physical processes in hysteria. When once such a nucleus of an\nhysterical splitting has been formed owing to a 'traumatic' factor it\nwill be developed by the influence of other factors (which might be\ncalled 'auxiliary traumatic' factors) as soon as an impression of a\nsimilar kind, subsequently experienced, succeeds in breaking through the\nbarriers erected by the will, in furnishing the weakened idea with fresh\naffect and in re-establishing for a time an associative connection\nbetween the two psychical groups---until a further conversion creates a\ndefence against it. The distribution of excitation thus brought about in\nhysteria proves as a rule an unstable one; the excitation which is\ndirected into a wrong channel (into somatic innervation) now and then\nfinds its way back to the idea from which it was detached, and then\ncompels the subject either to undertake the work of associative\nabsorption or else to discharge it by the way of hysterical attacks---a\nconclusion which is supported by the familiar opposition between the\nhysterical attack and chronic symptoms. Breuer's cathartic method\nachieves its results by deliberately effecting such a re-transmutation\nof the excitation from the somatic into the mental field, in order then\nto enforce a resolution of the opposed elements by a process of thought\nand a discharge of the excitation in speech.\n\nThe conclusion that the splitting of consciousness in acquired\nhysteria is based on an act of will also explains with surprising\nsimplicity the remarkable fact that hypnosis regularly widens the\nnarrowed consciousness of the hysteric and makes the psychical group\nwhich has been split off accessible. Indeed, we know it to be a\npeculiarity of all sleep-like conditions that they abrogate that\ndistribution of excitation upon which the 'will' of the conscious           {65}\npersonality depends.\n\nThus we can see that the characteristic factor in hysteria is not to be\nfound in the splitting of consciousness but in the _capacity for\nconversion_, and we may assume that the psycho-physical capacity to\ntransmute such large quantities of excitation into somatic innervation\nis an important element of the disposition to hysteria, which in other\nrespects is still unknown.\n\nThis capacity does not in itself preclude mental health and leads to\nhysteria only where there is some mental incompatibility or an\naccumulation of excitation. With this new turn in the theory Breuer and\nI approach Oppenheim's[15] and Strümpell's[16] well-known definition\nof hysteria, and recede from Janet[17] who assigns too great importance\nto the splitting of consciousness as a characteristic of hysteria. The\npresentation here given may claim to have rendered the relation between\nconversion and the hysterical splitting of consciousness intelligible.\n\n                                  II\n\nIf the capacity for conversion does not exist in a person predisposed\nto hysteria and yet the separation of its affect from an unbearable\nidea is nevertheless undertaken as a defence against the latter, then       {66}\nthis affect must persist in the psychical sphere. Thus weakened, the\nidea remains present in consciousness, detached from all associations;\nbut its affect, now freed from it, attaches itself to other ideas\nwhich are not in themselves unbearable, but which through this 'false\nconnection' grow to be obsessions. This is shortly the psychological\ntheory of obsessions and phobias which I mentioned to start with.\n\nI will now enumerate the various elements necessary to the structure of\nthis theory that admit of direct proof, and then describe those that I\nhave myself supplied. Apart from the final result of the process, that\nis, the obsession, it is possible in the first place to demonstrate the\nultimate source of the affect which is now falsely attached to some\nother idea. In all the cases I have analysed it was in the sexual life\nthat a painful affect---of precisely the same quality as that attaching\nto the obsession---had originated. On theoretical grounds it is not\nimpossible that this affect may at times arise in other spheres; I have\nmerely to state that hitherto I have not discovered any other origin of\nit. Incidentally, it is easy to see that it is precisely in regard to\nthe sexual life that unbearable ideas most frequently arise.\n\nFurther, we have the most unequivocal utterances on the part of\npatients in proof of the effort of will, the attempt at defence, upon\nwhich the theory lays emphasis; and in at least a number of cases the\npatients themselves will inform us of the fact that the phobia or\nobsession first made its appearance after this effort of will had\napparently succeeded in its aim. 'Once something very disagreeable\nhappened to me, and I did my utmost to thrust it out of my mind, to\nthink no more about it.  Finally I succeeded, but then I got this,\nwhich since then I have never been rid of.' With these words a patient      {67}\nconfirmed the chief points of the theory I have developed here.\n\nNot all those who suffer from obsessions are themselves so clear about\nthe origin of them. As a rule, when one draws these patients' attention\nto the original idea of a sexual nature, the answer is, 'It can't come\nfrom that; indeed, I thought very little about that. For a moment I was\nscared, but I turned my mind to something else and since then it hasn't\ntroubled me.' In this frequent objection we have a proof that the\nobsession represents a substitute or surrogate for the unbearable sexual\nidea, and has taken its place in consciousness.\n\nBetween the patient's effort of will which successfully represses the\nintolerable sexual idea, and the appearance of the obsessional idea,\nwhich though having little intensity in itself is now endowed with\nincomprehensibly strong affect, there lies a gap which the theory here\ndeveloped aims at filling in. The detachment of the sexual idea from its\naffect and the connection of the latter with another idea, suited to it\nbut not intolerable, are processes which occur outside\nconsciousness---they may be presumed but they cannot be proved by any\nclinical-psychological analysis. Perhaps it would be more correct to\nsay: These processes are not of a psychical nature at all, but are\nphysical processes the psychical consequences of which are so\nrepresented as if what is expressed by the words 'detachment of the idea\nfrom its affect and false connection of the latter' had really happened.\n\nAlongside the cases which show the unbearable sexual idea followed\nsubsequently by the obsession, there is another series in which\nobsessions and painful sexual ideas are present simultaneously. We\ncannot very well call the latter 'sexual obsessions', for _one_\nessential feature of obsessions is missing from them; they are fully        {68}\njustified, whereas the painfulness of the ordinary obsession\nconstitutes a problem for both physician and patient.  So far as I\nhave been able to see in cases of this kind, it appears that in them a\nperpetual defence is going on against sexual ideas continually arising\nanew; that is, we are here concerned with an operation that has not\nyet been completed.\n\nAs long as they are conscious of the sexual origin of their obsessions,\nthe patients often keep them concealed. When they complain about them,\nthey as a rule express their astonishment that they are subject to the\naffect in question---that they feel anxious, or that they have such and\nsuch an impulse, and so on. To the experienced physician this affect\nappears, on the contrary, to be justified and comprehensible; he only\nfinds it surprising that an affect of that kind should be associated\nwith an inappropriate idea. The affect of the obsession appears to him,\nin other words, to be _dislocated_ or _transposed_, and if he is\nproceeding on the assumptions here laid down he can in a great number of\ncases attempt its re-translation into the sexual.\n\nAny idea which is either suited by nature to be associated with an\naffect of this quality or else bears a certain relation to the\nunbearable idea---in consequence of which it appears practicable to\nemploy it as a surrogate for the latter---may be made use of in\nsecondary connection with the detached affect. Thus for example, an\nunattached anxiety, the sexual origin of which the patient is unable\nto recall, will seize upon the common primary phobias of mankind in\nregard to animals, thunderstorms, darkness and the like, or upon\nthings which are manifestly associated with the sexual in some way or\nother, such as urination, defæcation, defilement and contagion\ngenerally.                                                                  {69}\n\nThe ego gains considerably less advantage by choosing the method of\n_transposition_ of affect as a measure of defence than it does by the\nhysterical conversion of psychical excitation into somatic innervation.\nThe affect which the ego had to endure remains unchanged and\nundiminished, just as before---the only difference being that the\nunbearable idea is suppressed and cut off from recollection. The\nrepressed ideas then form again the nucleus of a second psychical group,\nwhich, as it seems to me, is accessible even without the aid of\nhypnosis. If in phobias and obsessions the striking symptoms which in\nhysteria accompany the formation of an independent psychical group fail\nto appear, this is probably because in the former the whole\ntransformation takes place within the psychical sphere---the relation\nbetween psychical excitation and somatic innervation has undergone no\nchange.\n\nTo illustrate what has been said concerning obsessions I will give a few\nexamples, which are probably typical:\n\n1. A young girl suffered from obsessive reproaches. If she read in the\npapers about counterfeiting coinage the thought occurred to her that\nshe also had forged coins; if an unknown criminal had committed a\nmurder she asked herself anxiously whether she had not done the\ndeed. At the same time she was quite conscious of the absurdity of\nthese obsessive reproaches. This sense of guilt gained for a time such\nan influence over her that her critical faculty was stifled, so that\nshe accused herself to her relations and her physician of having\nreally committed all these crimes (psychosis through simple\nintensification---overwhelming-psychosis---_Überwältigungspsychose_). A\nclose examination then revealed the source in which her sense of guilt\narose: Accidentally stimulated by a voluptuous sensation, she had           {70}\nallowed herself to be led astray by a friend into masturbation and had\npractised it for years, with full knowledge of her wrong-doing and\naccompanied by most intense self-reproaches, which as usual were of no\navail. An excessive indulgence after attending a ball had evoked the\nintensification leading to the psychosis. After a few months of\ntreatment and close watching the patient was cured.\n\n2. Another young girl had suffered from the dread of being forced to\npass water and wet herself ever since the time when an impulse of this\nkind had really obliged her to leave a concert during a performance.\nThis phobia had gradually made her completely unable to enjoy herself\nor to go into society. She only felt well if there was a closet near\nat hand to which she could have access without arousing attention. Any\norganic complaint justifying this lack of confidence in her control of\nthe bladder was excluded; at home under quiet conditions and at night\nthe urgency did not arise. A penetrating enquiry showed that the\nurgency had appeared for the first time in the following\ncircumstances: A gentleman to whom she was not indifferent had been\nsitting not far from her at the concert; she began to think about him\nand to imagine how she would sit beside him as his wife. During this\nerotic reverie she had that bodily sensation which is to be compared\nwith erection in men and which in her case---I do not know if it is\nalways so---ended with a slight desire to micturate. She became\ngreatly frightened by the sexual sensation, to which she was otherwise\nquite accustomed, because she had resolved within herself to overcome\nher affection for this man as well as for all others, and the next\nmoment the affect transferred itself to the accompanying desire to\nmicturate and compelled her to leave the hall after a very painful          {71}\nstruggle. In her life she was so prudish that she positively shuddered\nat anything sexual and could not even contemplate the thought of\nmarrying; on the other hand, she was sexually so hyperæsthetic that\nduring every erotic reverie, which she willingly indulged in, that\npleasurable sensation appeared. The erection was always accompanied by\nthe desire to micturate which, up to the time of the scene at the\nconcert, had made no impression on her. Treatment led to a nearly\ncomplete mastery of the phobia.\n\n3. A young woman who in five years of married life had had only one\nchild complained to me of an obsessive impulse to throw herself from the\nwindow or balcony, and also of the fear of stabbing her child which\nseized her at the sight of a sharp knife. She confessed that marital\nrelations seldom occurred, and only with precautions against conception;\nbut she added that this was no privation to her as she was not of a\nsensual nature. I ventured to tell her that at the sight of a man she\nhad erotic ideas and that she had therefore lost confidence in herself\nand regarded herself as a depraved person, capable of anything. The\nre-translation of the obsession into the sexual was successful; in tears\nshe confessed at once to her long-concealed misery in her marriage and\nlater on related in addition some painful thoughts of an unchanged\nsexual nature, such as the often-recurring sensation of something\nforcing itself under her skirts.\n\nI have turned experiences of this kind to therapeutic advantage by\nre-directing the attention of patients with phobias and obsessions, in\nspite of all their protestations, back to the repressed sexual ideas\nand, where feasible, in blocking the source whence they arose. I            {72}\nnaturally cannot assert that _all_ phobias and obsessions arise in the\nmanner here described; for, first, my experience of them embraces only\na limited number as compared with the relative frequency of these\nneuroses, and secondly, I myself know that these 'psychasthenic'\nsymptoms, as Janet terms them, are not all to be estimated alike.[18]\nThere are, for example, pure hysterical phobias. I believe, however,\nthat the mechanism of transposition of affect will be found to exist\nin the great majority of phobias and obsessions; and I would therefore\nurge that these neuroses, which are as often found in an isolated form\nas combined with hysteria or neurasthenia, should not be loosely\nclassified together with ordinary neurasthenia, in which there is\nabsolutely no ground for assuming a psychical mechanism of the\nprincipal symptoms.\n\n                                 III\n\nIn both the cases described above defence against an unbearable idea\nwas effected by detachment of its affect from it; the idea itself\nremained in consciousness, although weakened and isolated. Now there\nexists a very much more energetic and successful kind of defence,\nwhich takes the following form: the ego rejects the unbearable idea\ntogether with its associated affect and behaves as if the idea had\nnever occurred to the person at all. But, as soon as this process has\nbeen successfully carried through, the person in question will have\ndeveloped a psychosis, and his state can only be described as one of\n'hallucinatory confusion'. A single example will serve to illustrate        {73}\nthis.\n\nA young girl gave her first impulsive affection to a man and firmly\nbelieved in the return of her love. As a matter of fact she was\nmistaken; the young man had another motive for visiting the house.\nDisappointments were not spared her; first of all she defended herself\nagainst her experiences by means of hysterical conversion, thus\npreserving her belief that he would one day come and seek her hand; but\nat the same time she felt unhappy and ill on account of incomplete\nconversion and of the perpetual experience of fresh painful impressions.\nFinally on a certain day, the day of a family festival, she waited for\nhim in a state of intense excitement. The day wore on without his\ncoming; after all the trains by which he could arrive had gone by, her\ncondition passed into one of hallucinatory confusion. He _is come_, she\nhears his voice in the garden, hastens downstairs in her night-dress to\nreceive him. From that time she lived for two months in a happy dream,\nof which the content was that he is there, ever by her side, everything\nis as it was a little while ago (before the time of the disappointment\nagainst which she had so strenuously defended herself). The hysteria and\nthe depression of spirits were both overcome; nothing of the latter\nperiod of doubt and suffering was alluded to during her illness; she was\nhappy as long as she was left undisturbed, and only raved when some\ncircumstance of her surroundings prevented her from carrying out the\nlogical promptings of her blissful dream. This psychosis, which at the\ntime of its occurrence had been unintelligible, was explained ten years\nlater with the aid of an hypnotic analysis.\n\nThe fact to which I now wish to call attention is that the content of\nsuch an hallucinatory psychosis consists precisely in the accentuation      {74}\nof the very idea which was first threatened by the experience\noccasioning the outbreak of the illness.  One is therefore justified\nin saying that the ego has averted the unbearable idea by a flight\ninto psychosis; and the process by which this result is obtained again\nwithdraws itself out of range of self-perception as well as of\npsychological-clinical analysis. It is to be regarded as the\nexpression of a high degree of pathological predisposition and may\nperhaps be described somewhat as follows: The ego has broken away from\nthe unbearable idea; but, the latter being inseparably bound up with a\npart of reality, in so far as the ego achieves this result it has also\ncut itself loose from reality, totally or in part. In my opinion, this\nis the condition under which certain ideas acquire hallucinatory\nvividness, and consequently when this form of defence is successfully\ncarried through the person finds himself in a state of hallucinatory\nconfusion.\n\nI have very few analyses of psychoses of this kind at my disposal; but I\nthink we must here be concerned with a type of psychical illness that is\nvery frequently developed, for in no insane asylum are analogous\nexamples wanting---for instance, the mother who, falling ill after the\nloss of her baby, is to be seen incessantly rocking a log of wood in her\narms, or the jilted bride arrayed in all her finery who has for years\nbeen awaiting her betrothed.\n\nIt is perhaps not superfluous to point out that the three modes of\ndefence here described, together with the three forms of illness to\nwhich they lead, may all be combined in the same person. The\nsimultaneous appearance of phobias and hysterical symptoms, observed\nso often in practice, is one of those factors which render it\ndifficult to distinguish hysteria in a clear-cut manner from other          {75}\nneuroses, and make it necessary to set up the category of 'mixed\nneuroses'. To be sure, hallucinatory confusion is not often compatible\nwith a continuance of hysteria, nor of obsessions, as a rule. On the\nother hand, it is not rare for a defence psychosis to break out\nepisodically in the course of an hysterical or mixed neurosis.\n\nI should like finally to dwell for a moment on the hypothesis which I\nhave made use of in the exposition of the defence neuroses. I mean the\nconception that among the psychic functions there is something which\nshould be differentiated (an amount of affect, a sum of excitation),\nsomething having all the attributes of a quantity---although we possess\nno means of measuring it---a something which is capable of increase,\ndecrease, displacement and discharge, and which extends itself over the\nmemory-traces of an idea like an electric charge over the surface of the\nbody. We can apply this hypothesis, which by the way already underlies\nour theory of 'abreaction',[19] in the same sense as the physicist\nemploys the conception of a fluid electric current. For the present it\nis justified by its utility in correlating and explaining diverse\npsychical conditions.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                  V                                         {76}\n                   THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DETACHING\n                    FROM NEURASTHENIA A PARTICULAR\n                  SYNDROME: THE ANXIETY-NEUROSIS[20]\n                                (1894)\n\nIt is difficult to say anything of general validity concerning\nneurasthenia so long as we allow this name to cover all that Beard\nincluded under the term. In my opinion, nothing but gain to\nneuropathology can result if we make an attempt to distinguish from\nneurasthenia proper all those neurotic disturbances of which the\nsymptoms, on the one hand, are more closely related to one another\nthan to the typical symptoms of neurasthenia (headache, spinal\nirritation, and dyspepsia with flatulence and constipation) and, on\nthe other hand, show in their ætiology and their mechanism essential\ndifferences from typical neurasthenia. If we accept this plan we shall\nsoon obtain a more or less uniform picture of neurasthenia; and shall\nthen be in a position to differentiate more sharply than had hitherto\nbeen possible between neurasthenia proper and various kinds of\npseudo-neurasthenia, such as the clinical picture of the organically\ndetermined nasal reflex neurosis, the nervous disorders of the\ncachexias and arterio-sclerosis, the early stages of general paralysis\nof the insane and of the psychoses. Further, it will be possible---as\nMöbius proposed---to eliminate many of the nervous conditions of the\nhereditarily degenerate; and we shall also find good reason to include      {77}\nunder melancholia many neuroses (especially intermittent and periodic\ntypes) which are to-day called neurasthenia. But the most decisive\nchange of all will be introduced if we decide to distinguish from\nneurasthenia the syndrome I here propose to describe, which fulfils\nwith unusual completeness the conditions set forth above. The symptoms\nof this syndrome are clinically much more closely related to one\nanother than to those of neurasthenia proper (that is, they frequently\nappear together and replace each other during the course of the\nillness), while the ætiology and mechanism of this neurosis are\nessentially different from what remains of true neurasthenia after\nthis subtraction has been made from it.\n\nI call this syndrome 'Anxiety-Neurosis', because all its component\nelements can be grouped round the central symptom of 'morbid anxiety'\nand because individually they each have a definite connection with\nthis.  I believed that this conception of the symptoms of the\nanxiety-neurosis had originated with myself until an interesting paper\nby E. Hecker[21] came into my hands, in which I found the same idea\nexpounded with the most satisfying clearness and\ncompleteness. Although Hecker recognizes certain symptoms as\nequivalents or incomplete manifestations of an anxiety-attack, he does\nnot separate them from neurasthenia as I propose to do; this is\nevidently due to his not having taken into account the difference in\nthe ætiological conditions of the two forms of disease.  When this\nlast difference between them is fully recognized, we have no longer         {78}\nany motive for designating anxiety symptoms by the same term as those\nof neurasthenia proper; for the purpose served by giving a name,\nhowever arbitrary it may be in other respects, is above all that of\nenabling us more easily to form generalizations.\n\n            I. CLINICAL SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF ANXIETY-NEUROSIS\n\nWhat I call 'anxiety-neurosis' manifests itself in a partial and in a\ncomplete form, and may be met with either as an isolated state or\ncombined with other neuroses. The cases which are more or less complete\nand at the same time isolated are naturally those which in particular\ngive support to the idea that anxiety-neurosis is a clinical entity. In\nother cases where there is a complex of symptoms corresponding to a\nmixed neurosis, we have to distinguish and separate from it those\nsymptoms which belong neither to neurasthenia nor to hysteria and so on,\nbut to anxiety-neurosis.\n\nThe clinical picture of anxiety-neurosis comprises the following\nsymptoms:\n\n1. _General irritability_. This is a common nervous symptom and as\nsuch belongs to many nervous conditions. I include it here because it\ninvariably appears with anxiety-neurosis and is important\ntheoretically.  An increase of irritability always signifies an\naccumulation of excitation or an inability to tolerate such an\naccumulation, that is, an absolute or a relative accumulation of\nexcitation. One form of expression of this increase of\nirritability---auditory hyperæsthesia---seems to me worthy of special\nmention; this undue sensitiveness to noise is undoubtedly explicable\non the basis of the close inborn connection between auditory\nimpressions and fright.  Auditory hyperæsthesia is frequently a cause\nof sleeplessness, more than one form of which belongs to the                {79}\nanxiety-neurosis.\n\n2. _Anxious expectation_. I cannot better describe the condition I have\nin mind than by this name and by appending a few examples. A woman who\nsuffers from anxious expectation will imagine every time her husband\ncoughs, when he has a cold, that he is going to have influenzal\npneumonia, and will at once see his funeral in her mind's eye. If when\nshe is coming towards the house she sees two people standing by her\nfront door, she cannot avoid the thought that one of her children has\nfallen out of the window; if the bell rings, then someone is bringing\nnews of a death, and so on; whereas on all these occasions there is no\nparticular ground for exaggerating a mere possibility.\n\nAnxious expectation of course fades off imperceptibly into normal\nanxiousness. It comprises all that is covered by the word\n'nervousness'---apprehensiveness, the tendency to look on the dark side\nof things; but at every opportunity it exceeds the limits of this\nplausible form of nervousness and is frequently recognized by the\npatient himself as a kind of compulsion. For one form of anxious\nexpectation---that relating to one's own health---we may reserve the old\nterm _hypochondria_. Hypochondria does not always coincide with a high\ndegree of anxious expectation; in general it requires as a preliminary\ncondition the presence of paræsthesias and disagreeable bodily\nsensations, and therefore hypochondria is the form favoured by true\nneurasthenics when they fall victims to anxiety-neurosis, as they often\ndo.\n\nThe tendency to _pangs of conscience_, scrupulousness and pedantry may\nbe a further expression of anxious expectation, a tendency which is\nespecially frequent among morally sensitive people and likewise ranges      {80}\nfrom the normal to an exaggeration known as _folie du doute_.\n\nAnxious expectation is the nuclear symptom of this neurosis; it clearly\nreveals, too, something of the theory of it. We may perhaps say that\nthere is here _a quantum of anxiety in a free-floating condition_, which\nin any state of expectation controls the selection of ideas, and is ever\nready to attach itself to any suitable ideational content.\n\n3. This is not the only way in which apprehensiveness---which is not\nusually present in consciousness but is ever lying in wait---can express\nitself. It can, on the contrary, erupt suddenly into consciousness\nwithout being called forth by any train of thought, and thus bring about\nan _anxiety-attack_. An anxiety-attack of this kind either consists of a\nfeeling of anxiety alone without any associated idea, or associated with\nthe nearest interpretation, such as sudden death, a stroke, or\napproaching insanity; or else the feeling of anxiety is combined with\nparæsthesias (similar to the hysterical aura); or finally, together with\nthe feeling of anxiety there is an accompanying disturbance of any one\nor more of the bodily functions, such as respiration, heart's action,\nvasomotor innervation, or glandular activity. The patient lays stress on\none or other of these symptoms, and complains of 'heart-spasms',\n'difficulty in breathing', 'drenching sweats', 'ravenous hunger' and the\nlike; and in his description the feeling of anxiety frequently recedes\ninto the background or is described quite vaguely as a 'feeling of\nillness', of 'distress', and so on.\n\n4. It is interesting, and important diagnostically, that the degree to\nwhich these elements are combined in anxiety-attacks varies\nextraordinarily, and that almost every accompanying symptom can alone\nconstitute the attack just as well as the anxiety itself can. There         {81}\nare consequently _rudimentary anxiety-attacks_ and _equivalents of an\nanxiety-attack_ (all probably having the same meaning), showing a\nmanifold and hitherto little appreciated variety of forms. A closer\nstudy of these larval anxiety-states (Hecker) and their diagnostic\ndifferentiation from other attacks should soon become a necessary\npiece of work in neuropathology.\n\nI will here append a list including only those types of anxiety-attack\nknown to me:\n\n_a_. Attacks accompanied by disturbances of the _heart's action_, such\nas palpitation, either with transitory arhythmia, or with tachycardia of\nlonger duration that may end in grave weakness of the heart, the\ndifferentiation from organic morbus cordis never being easy; or\npseudo-angina pectoris---diagnostically a delicate problem!\n\n_b_. Attacks accompanied by disturbances of _respiration_, several forms\nof nervous dyspnœa, attacks similar to asthma, and the like. I would\nemphasize that even these attacks are not always accompanied by\nrecognizable anxiety.\n\n_c_. Attacks of _sweating_, often nocturnal.\n\n_d_. Attacks of _tremor_ and _shuddering_, which are only too easily\nconfounded with hysteria.\n\n_e_. Attacks of _ravenous hunger_, often accompanied by giddiness.\n\n_f_. Attacks of sudden _diarrhœa_.\n\n_g_. Attacks of locomotor _vertigo_.\n\n_h_. Attacks of so-called _congestion_, practically embracing all that\nhas been called vasomotor neurasthenia.\n\n_i_. Attacks of _paræsthesias_ (but these seldom occur without anxiety\nor some similar feeling of distress).                                       {82}\n\n5. _Awakening in fright_ (the _pavor nocturnus_ of adults), which is\nusually combined with morbid anxiety, dyspnœa, sweating and the like, is\nvery frequently nothing but a variety of the anxiety attack. This\ndisturbance conditions a second type of sleeplessness which also lies\nwithin the compass of anxiety-neurosis.---I have no doubt in my own mind\nthat the _pavor nocturnus_ of children also includes a type which\nbelongs to anxiety-neurosis. The hysterical tinge, i.e. the coupling of\nmorbid anxiety with the reproduction of some appropriate experience of\ndream, gives the _pavor nocturnus_ of children the appearance of being\nsomething distinct; but it also appears in a pure form without dream or\nrecurring hallucination.\n\n6. _Vertigo_ takes a prominent place in the group of symptoms of the\nanxiety-neurosis. Its mildest form is better described as giddiness; and\nits graver manifestations, 'attacks of vertigo' (with or without\nanxiety), constitute one of the most momentous symptoms of this disease.\nThe dizziness of the anxiety-neurosis is neither rotatory nor is it\nconfined to particular planes or directions as is Menière's vertigo. It\nbelongs to the class of locomotor or co-ordinatory dizziness, as do the\ncases of oculo-motor paralysis; it consists of a specific discomfort\naccompanied by the feeling that the ground is rocking, the legs giving\nway, that one can't keep upright because one's legs are as heavy as lead\nand are shaking and wobbling. This dizziness never leads to a fall. I\nventure, however, to assert that a profound fainting fit may supervene\nin the place of an attack of vertigo of this kind. Other swoon-like\nconditions in anxiety-neurosis appear to result from cardiac collapse.\n\nAn attack of vertigo is not seldom accompanied by the worst kind of\nmorbid anxiety, and is frequently attended by cardiac and respiratory       {83}\ndisturbances. According to my observations the vertigo produced by\nheights, mountains and precipices also frequently belongs to the\nanxiety-neurosis; further, I do not know whether one would not be\njustified in recognizing alongside this the existence of a vertigo of\ngastric origin.\n\n7. On the basis of chronic apprehensiveness (anxious expectation) on\nthe one hand, and a tendency to attacks of vertigo with anxiety on the\nother, two groups of typical phobias develop, the first relating to\ncommon physiological dangers, the other to locomotion. To the first\ngroup belongs the fear of snakes, thunderstorms, darkness, vermin, and\nso on, as well as the typical moral over-sensitiveness, and the forms of\n'_folie du doute_'; the available anxiety is here used simply to\nexaggerate the aversions which are implanted instinctively in everyone.\nUsually, however, a phobia with obsessive strength arises only when,\nadded to such an instinctive aversion, a reminiscence of an experience\nin which the anxiety could come to expression supervenes---for example,\nafter the patient has actually experienced a thunderstorm in the open\nair. To attempt to explain such cases as mere continuations of strong\nimpressions would be incorrect; what makes these experiences significant\nand their retention in memory of long duration is indeed simply the\nanxiety, which both originally and subsequently thus found a means of\nexpression. In other words, such impressions remain potent only in cases\nwhere 'anxious expectation' is present.\n\nThe other group includes _agoraphobia_ with all its accessory forms,\ncollectively characterized by their relation to movement. We\nfrequently find a precursory attack of vertigo as the foundation of\nthe phobia; but I do not believe that one can postulate this every          {84}\ntime. Occasionally we see that after a first attack of giddiness\nwithout anxiety locomotion still continues possible without hindrance,\nalthough henceforth constantly accompanied by the sensation of\ngiddiness; but that under certain conditions, such as being alone, in\nnarrow streets and so on, locomotion becomes impossible when once\nanxiety has become combined with an attack of vertigo.\n\nThe relation of these phobias to those of the obsessional neurosis, the\nmechanisms of which I have discussed in an earlier paper[22] in this\nJournal, is of the following kind: the correspondence between them is\nthat in both an idea becomes obsessive in consequence of its being\nconnected with an unattached affect. The mechanism of _transposition of\naffect_ holds good therefore for both kinds of phobia; but in the\nphobias of the anxiety-neurosis (1) this affect is always the same,\nalways that of anxiety; (2) it does not originate in a repressed idea,\nproves not reducible further by psychological analysis, and is also not\namenable to psychotherapy. The mechanism of substitution does not\ntherefore hold good for the phobias of the anxiety-neurosis.\n\nBoth kinds of phobias (or obsessional ideas) frequently appear side by\nside, although the atypical phobias which are based on obsessional\nideas need not necessarily develop on the basis of an\nanxiety-neurosis. A very frequent, apparently complicated mechanism\nmakes its appearance when the content of an originally simple phobia\nof the anxiety-neurosis type is replaced by another idea, the\nsubstitution being then subsequently added to the phobia. The\n'protective measures' originally directed towards combating the phobia\nare the ideas most frequently employed as substitutions. Thus, for          {85}\nexample, 'brooding mania' arises from the patient's effort to disprove\nthat he is crazy, as his hypochondriacal phobia maintains: the\nhesitations and doubts, and still more the repetitions, of _folie du\ndoute_, arise from a justifiable doubt about his own powers of correct\nreasoning, since he is aware of the persistent disturbance of the\nobsessional idea; and so on. We can therefore assert that many\nsyndromes of the obsessional neurosis, such as _folie du doute_ and\nthe like, are also clinically, though not conceptually, to be reckoned\nas belonging to the anxiety-neurosis.[23]\n\n8. Digestive processes are subject to only a few disturbances in\nanxiety-neurosis, but these are characteristic. Sensations such as\nnausea and biliousness are not at all rare, and the symptom of ravenous\nhunger can, by itself or in combination with others (congestions),\nconstitute a rudimentary anxiety-attack; as a chronic condition\nanalogous to anxious expectation we find a tendency to diarrhœa which\nhas given rise to the queerest diagnostic mistakes. If I am not\nmistaken, it is this diarrhœa to which Möbius[24] has recently called\nattention in a short paper. I conjecture further that Peyer's reflex\ndiarrhœa, which he derives from the disorders of the prostate,[25] is\nnothing but this diarrhœa of anxiety-neurosis. The deception of a reflex\nrelationship comes about because the same factors which are active in\nthe origin of such prostatic affections also come into play in the\nætiology of anxiety-neurosis.\n\nThe behaviour of the gastro-intestinal tract in anxiety-neurosis\npresents a sharp contrast to the influence of neurasthenia on those\nfunctions. Mixed cases often show the well-known 'alternation of            {86}\ndiarrhœa and constipation'. The urgent need to micturate that occurs\nin the anxiety-neurosis is analogous to this diarrhœa.\n\n9. The _paræsthesias_ which may accompany attacks of vertigo or anxiety\nare interesting in that they (as also the sensations of the hysterical\naura) become associated in a definite sequence; but I find that, in\ncontrast to those of hysteria, these associated sensations are atypical\nand changing. A further similarity to hysteria ensues because a kind of\n_conversion_[26], which may otherwise easily be overlooked, to bodily\nsensations takes place in anxiety-neurosis, e.g. a conversion which\ntakes effect in rheumatic muscles. Quite a number of rheumatic persons,\nso-called, who moreover are demonstrable as such, in reality suffer from\nanxiety-neurosis. Along with this increased sensitiveness to pain I have\nobserved in a series of cases of anxiety-neurosis a tendency to\n_hallucinations_ which could not be explained as hysterical.\n\n10. Several of the symptoms mentioned which accompany or take the place\nof an anxiety-attack appear also in a chronic form. They are then still\nless easy to recognize, since the accompanying anxious sensation is less\nclearly recognizable than in anxiety-attacks. This is particularly true\nof diarrhœa, vertigo, paræsthesias. Just as an attack of vertigo may be\nreplaced by a fainting-fit, so may chronic giddiness be replaced by a\nconstant feeling of sinking to the ground, exhaustion, etc.\n\n          II. THE INCIDENCE AND ÆTIOLOGY OF ANXIETY-NEUROSIS\n\nIn many cases of anxiety-neurosis no ætiology is recognizable at\nall. It is remarkable that in such cases evidence of a grave                {87}\nhereditary taint is seldom difficult to establish.\n\nBut where there are grounds for regarding the neurosis as an acquired\none, careful enquiry to that end reveals a series of injurious\nconditions (_noxiæ_) and influences within the sexual life as important\nfactors in the ætiology. At first sight these appear to be very various\nin their nature but they soon disclose their common character, which\nexplains the fact that they always have the same effect on the nervous\nsystem; further, they are either present alone or together with other\n'ordinary' injurious factors, which latter may be regarded as having a\ncontributory effect. As this sexual ætiology of the anxiety-neurosis is\nso very commonly demonstrable I feel justified _for the purpose of this\nshort paper_ in disregarding cases with a doubtful or a different\nætiology.\n\nIn setting forth in greater detail the ætiological conditions under\nwhich anxiety-neurosis makes its appearance it will be advisable to\ntreat of men and women separately. Anxiety-neurosis appears in female\npersons---disregarding for the moment their predisposition---in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n_a_. as _virginal anxiety or anxiety in adolescents_. A number of\nunambiguous observations has shown me that anxiety-neurosis can be\nevoked in maturing girls by their first meeting with the sexual problem,\nthat is, by any more or less sudden revelation of what had hitherto been\nhidden, for example, seeing the sexual act, or hearing or reading\nsomething of that nature; in these cases anxiety-neurosis is typically\ncombined with hysteria;\n\n_b_. as _anxiety in the newly-married_. Young married women who remain\nanæsthetic during the first acts of intercourse often fall ill of an\nanxiety-neurosis which again disappears as soon as the anæsthesia           {88}\ngives way to normal sensitivity. Since the majority of young women\nremain healthy during a temporary anæsthesia of this kind, there are\nconditions necessary to the outbreak of this anxiety, which I will\nmention later;\n\n_c_. as anxiety in women whose husbands suffer from ejaculatio præcox or\nfrom impaired potency; and\n\n_d_. whose husbands practise coitus interruptus or reservatus. These\ncases belong together, for on analysing a large number of examples it is\neasy to convince oneself that they depend simply on whether the wife\nobtains satisfaction in coitus or not. The latter case provides the\ncondition for the genesis of an anxiety-neurosis. On the other hand, the\nwife is saved from neurosis if the husband who is afflicted with\nejaculatio præcox can immediately repeat the congress with a better\nresult. Congressus reservatus by means of condoms is not injurious to\nthe wife if she is very quickly roused and the husband very potent; if\nnot, this kind of contraception is no less injurious than the others.\nCoitus interruptus is almost always harmful; though only for the wife\nwhen the husband practises it regardlessly, that is to say, when he\ninterrupts coitus as soon as _he_ is near to ejaculation without\ntroubling himself about the stage of his wife's excitement. If on the\nother hand the husband waits for his wife's satisfaction then the coitus\nwill be equivalent to the normal for her---but the husband will become a\nsufferer from anxiety-neurosis. I have collected and analysed a great\nnumber of observations which have provided the material for these\nconclusions;\n\n_e_. as _anxiety in widows and voluntarily abstinent persons_, often\nfound in typical combination with obsessional ideas;                        {89}\n\n_f_. as anxiety in the _climacteric_ during the last great increase of\nsexual need.\n\nCases _c_., _d_., and _e_. embrace the conditions under which\nanxiety-neurosis in the female sex most frequently arises and is least\ndependent on hereditary predisposition. On the basis of these cases of\nanxiety-neurosis---curable, acquired cases---I shall try to prove that\nthe injurious sexual condition (_noxia_) discovered in them really\nrepresents the ætiological factor of this neurosis. Before doing so,\nhowever, I will go on to discuss the sexual conditions for\nanxiety-neurosis in men. I propose to set up the following groups, which\nall have their analogies among women:\n\n_a_. anxiety of the voluntarily _abstinent_, frequently combined with\n_defence_ symptoms (obsessional ideas, hysteria). The motives which are\ndecisive for intentional abstinence bring it about that a number of\nhereditarily-disposed or eccentric persons, etc. belong to this\ncategory;\n\n_b_. anxiety in men during _frustrated excitement_ (during an engagement\nto marry), in persons who (from fear of the consequences of sexual\nintercourse) content themselves with handling or gazing at the woman.\nThis group of conditions (which by the way applies equally to the other\nsex: engagement, relationships involving sexual forbearance) furnishes\nthe purest cases of the neurosis;\n\n_c_. anxiety in men who practise coitus interruptus. As has been said\nalready, coitus interruptus is harmful to the woman when it is\npractised without regard to her satisfaction; but it becomes harmful\nto the man if, in order to provide satisfaction for the woman, he\nvoluntarily controls coitus and delays the ejaculation. It thus\nbecomes intelligible that as a rule only _one_ partner of a married\ncouple practising coitus interruptus falls ill. Incidentally, coitus        {90}\ninterruptus but rarely leads to a pure anxiety-neurosis in men; there\nusually results a combination of it with neurasthenia;\n\n_d_. anxiety in _ageing men_. There are men who have a climacteric like\nwomen and who develop anxiety-neurosis at the time of their waning\npotency and increased libido.\n\nFinally I must add two other cases which are valid for both sexes:\n\n_e_. The neurasthenics who after practising masturbation fall victims to\nanxiety-neurosis as soon as they desist from their form of sexual\ngratification. These persons have rendered themselves particularly\nincapable of tolerating abstinence.\n\nI observe here that in order to understand the anxiety-neurosis it is\nimportant to realize that any pronounced manifestation of it occurs only\namong men who are still potent and among women who are not anæsthetic.\nAmong neurasthenics whose potency has already been seriously diminished\nby masturbation, the anxiety-neurosis resulting from abstinence is of a\nvery meagre character and confines itself as a rule to hypochondria and\nmild chronic dizziness. The majority of women are to be regarded as\n'potent'; a really impotent, i.e. really anæsthetic, woman is likewise\nonly mildly affected by anxiety-neurosis and tolerates the injurious\nsexual conditions described surprisingly well.\n\nHow far beyond this we may be justified in postulating a constant\nrelation between particular ætiological factors and particular symptoms\nin the complex of anxiety-neurosis, I do not yet wish to express any\nopinion.\n\n_f_. The last of the ætiological conditions I have to bring forward\nappears at first sight not to be of a sexual nature at                      {91}\nall. Anxiety-neurosis also arises (in both sexes) as a result of the\nfactor of over-work or exhausting exertion, for example, nights of\nwatching, sick-nursing, or even after severe illness.\n\nThe principal objection to my proposition of a sexual ætiology for the\nanxiety-neurosis will probably run as follows: abnormal conditions in\nthe sexual life of the kind mentioned are found so very frequently that\nthey must be forthcoming wherever one looks for them. Their presence in\nthe cases of anxiety-neurosis quoted does not therefore prove that the\nætiology of this neurosis is to be found in them. The number of people,\nmoreover, who practise coitus interruptus, etc., is incomparably greater\nthan the number of those afflicted with anxiety-neurosis and the great\nmajority of the former tolerate this unhealthy condition quite well.\n\nTo this I have to reply that we should certainly not be right in\nexpecting to find in the neuroses an ætiological factor of _rare_\noccurrence, seeing how very great their frequency admittedly is,\nespecially that of anxiety-neurosis; also that it actually fulfils a\npostulate of pathology if in an ætiological enquiry the ætiological\nfactor is proved to be more frequent than its effect, since for the\nlatter other conditions are also required (disposition, summation of\nspecific ætiological factors, reinforcement by other 'ordinary'\ninjurious factors); and further, that detailed exploration of suitable\ncases of anxiety-neurosis proves beyond question the importance of the\nsexual factor. I will here confine myself to the ætiological factor of\ncoitus interruptus only and to adducing certain observations which\nconfirm it.\n\n1. So long as an anxiety-neurosis in young married women is not yet\nestablished, but only appears sporadically and disappears again             {92}\nspontaneously, it is possible to demonstrate that every such wave of\nthe neurosis is traceable to a coitus lacking in satisfaction. Two\ndays after this experience, or in persons of little resistance, on the\nnext day, an attack of anxiety or vertigo regularly appears, bringing\nin its train the other symptoms of the neurosis, which all again\ndisappear together with the attack if marital relations occur\nsufficiently seldom. A chance absence from home on the part of the\nhusband, or a holiday in the mountains necessitating the separation of\nthe couple, have a good effect; the gynæcological treatment that is\nusually resorted to in the first instance is beneficial because\nmarital relations are broken off while it lasts. Strange to say,\nhowever, the success of local treatment is but transitory---and even\nin the mountains the neurosis reappears as soon as the husband in his\nturn arrives; and so forth. When a physician who understands this\nætiology advises a patient in whom the neurosis is not yet established\nto substitute normal relations for coitus interruptus a _therapeutic_\ntest of the statements made here is supplied. The anxiety is removed\nand does not return again without a fresh cause of a similar nature.\n\n2. In the history of many cases of anxiety-neurosis both among men and\nwomen we find a striking fluctuation in the intensity of the clinical\nsymptoms, and even in the appearance and disappearance of the whole\ncondition. One year, they will say, was pretty good, the next was\nfrightful; on one occasion the improvement coincided with a certain\ntreatment which however on the next attack turned out quite useless;\nand so on. Now if we enquire into the number and sequence of the\nchildren and compare this record with the history of the neurosis a\nsimple solution results---the periods of improvement and well-being         {93}\ncoincide with the wife's pregnancies, during which of course the need\nfor contraception was no longer present. The treatment that had been\nso beneficial to the man, however, regardless of whether it was at\nPfarrer Kneipp's or at a hydrotherapeutic sanatorium, was the one\nafter which his wife had become pregnant.\n\n3. From the anamnesis of patients we frequently find that the symptoms\nof anxiety-neurosis have at some definite time supplanted the symptoms\nof some other neurosis, for instance, neurasthenia, and have taken their\nplace. In such a case it can quite regularly be proved that, shortly\nbefore the change in the clinical picture, a corresponding change had\ntaken place from one to another of the various kinds of unhealthy sexual\nconditions possible.\n\nObservations of this kind can be supplemented to any extent at\npleasure, positively compelling the physician to acknowledge a sexual\nætiology for a certain category of cases; other cases, however, which\nwould otherwise remain quite unintelligible, can at least be\nunderstood without difficulty and classified by employing the sexual\nætiology as a key to them. These are those very numerous cases in\nwhich we find everything that is also present in the previous\ncategory---the clinical symptoms of anxiety-neurosis on the one hand,\nand the specific factor of coitus interruptus on the other---but where\nsomething else has interposed itself as well, namely, a long interval\nbetween the ætiology we assume and its effect, and perhaps also\nætiological factors of a non-sexual nature too. Take, for example, a\nman who has a heart-attack after receiving news of his father's death\nand from that time onwards suffers from anxiety-neurosis. The case is\nnot clear, for the man was not nervous before this event; the death of      {94}\nthe father who was well advanced in years did not occur under any\nspecial circumstances, and one must admit that the normal, expected\ndecease of an aged father is not an experience which usually causes\nillness in a healthy adult. Perhaps the ætiological analysis will be\nclearer if I add that this man had for eleven years practised coitus\ninterruptus and always with regard for his wife's satisfaction. The\nclinical symptoms at least are identical with those that appear in\nother persons after an unhealthy condition of the same sexual nature\nlasting for a short period and without the interpolation of another\ntrauma. Other cases must be estimated similarly, that of a woman in\nwhom anxiety-neurosis broke out after the loss of a child, or that of\na student whose studies preparatory to his qualifying examination were\ninterrupted by an anxiety-neurosis. I do not find that the effect in\nthese cases is explained by the ostensible ætiology. One is not\nnecessarily 'over-worked' by close study, and a healthy mother usually\nreacts only with normal grief to the loss of a child. More\nparticularly, too, I should expect that the student would develop\ncephalasthenia through over-work, and the mother in our example\nhysteria. That they both develop an anxiety-neurosis induces me to lay\nemphasis on the fact that the mother had lived for eight years in\nmarital coitus interruptus, and that the student had for three years\nhad a passionate love-relationship with a 'respectable' girl whom he\ndared not allow to conceive.\n\nThese considerations lead to the conclusion that the specific sexual\n_noxia_ contained in coitus interruptus at least disposes the person\nconcerned to acquire it in those cases where it is not in itself\nenough to induce anxiety-neurosis. The neurosis then breaks out as          {95}\nsoon as the influence of another ordinary injurious factor is added to\nthe latent effect of the specific factor; the former can _reinforce\nthe specific factor quantitatively but cannot replace it\nqualitatively_. The specific factor always remains decisive for the\nform taken by the neurosis. I hope to be able to prove this statement\nin regard to the ætiology of the neuroses also on a wider scale.\n\nSome few pages back I mentioned an assumption which is not improbable in\nitself---namely, that a _noxia_ such as coitus interruptus attains its\neffect by _summation_. According to the disposition of the person\nconcerned and the other burdens on his nervous system, a longer or\nshorter time will be required before the effect of this summation\nbecomes evident. Those persons who tolerate coitus interruptus\napparently without harmful results are in reality becoming thereby\ndisposed to the disorder of anxiety-neurosis, which may break out either\nat any time spontaneously or after an ordinary and otherwise\ninsufficient trauma; just as the chronic alcoholic will in the end\ndevelop a cirrhosis or other illness as an effect of summation, or under\nthe influence of a fever will go down with a delirium.\n\n              III. ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A THEORY OF THE\n                           ANXIETY-NEUROSIS\n\nThe following considerations can only claim the value of a preliminary\ntentative attempt at a theory; criticism of them should not affect the\nreader's acceptance of the _facts_ set forth above. Moreover, this\n'Theory of Anxiety-Neurosis' represents only a fragment of a more\ncomprehensive presentation of the neuroses which increases the\ndifficulty of assessing its value.\n\nThe material already brought forward in regard to the anxiety-neurosis\nhas provided a few openings for some insight into its mechanism. In         {96}\nthe first place it was surmised that we are here dealing with an\naccumulation of excitation; secondly, there was the exceedingly\nimportant fact that the anxiety, which underlies all the clinical\nsymptoms of this neurosis, _is not derived from any psychical\nsource_. A psychical origin would be present, for example, if we found\nas the basis of an anxiety-neurosis a single or repeated shock,\njustified by the circumstances, which had subsequently become the\nsource of the readiness to anxiety. But this is not what we find; an\nhysteria or a traumatic neurosis may develop as a result of a single\nshock---an anxiety-neurosis never. Since among the causes of\nanxiety-neurosis coitus interruptus forces itself so much into the\nforeground, I thought at first that the source of the continual\nanxiety might lie in the fear, revived with every act, that the method\nmight miscarry and be followed by conception. But I have found that\nthis state of mind either in man or woman during coitus interruptus is\nirrelevant for the genesis of anxiety-neurosis; that women who at\nbottom are indifferent to the consequences of a possible conception\nare just as liable to the neurosis as those who shudder at the\npossibility, and that all depends on which of the partners forfeits\nsatisfaction in this method of intercourse.\n\nA further indication is furnished by the observation, not before\nmentioned, that in whole groups of cases anxiety-neurosis is\naccompanied by a very noticeable abatement of sexual libido,[27]\ni.e. of _psychical desire_; so that, on being told that their\nsufferings result from 'insufficient satisfaction', patients regularly      {97}\nanswer that that is impossible, because all their need for it has now\ndisappeared. From all these data: that an accumulation of excitation\nis involved; that the anxiety which probably represents this\naccumulated excitation is of somatic origin, so that it is somatic\nexcitation which is accumulated; further, that the somatic excitation\nis of a sexual nature and that a decline in the psychical share in the\nsexual process goes along with it---all these data prepare our minds\nfor the statement that _the mechanism of anxiety-neurosis is to be\nsought in the deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the\npsychical field, and in an abnormal use of it, due to this\ndeflection_.\n\nThis conception of the mechanism of anxiety-neurosis becomes clearer\nif we accept the following view of the sexual process, which relates\nprimarily to men. In the sexually mature male organism somatic sexual\nexcitation is produced---probably continuously---and periodically acts\nas a psychical stimulus. In order to define this idea more clearly,\nlet us interpolate that this somatic sexual excitation takes the form\nof pressure on the walls of the vesiculæ seminales which are lined\nwith nerve-endings; this visceral excitation will then actually\ndevelop continuously, but only when it reaches a certain height will\nit be sufficient to overcome the resistance in the paths of conduction\nto the cerebral cortex and express itself as a psychical\nstimulus. Thereupon the constellation of sexual ideas existing in the\nmind becomes charged with energy and a psychical state of libidinous\ntension comes into existence, bringing with it the impulse to relieve\nthis tension. The necessary psychical relief can only be effected by\nwhat I shall describe as a _specific_ or _adequate activity_. For the\nmale sexual impulse this adequate activity consists in a complicated\nspinal reflex act resulting in the relief of the tension at these           {98}\nnerve-endings and in all the preparatory psychical processes necessary\nto induce this reflex. Nothing but the adequate activity would be\neffective; for, once it has reached the required level, the somatic\nsexual excitation is continuously transmuted into psychical\nexcitation; the activity which will free the nerve-endings from\nburdensome pressure and so abolish the whole of the somatic excitation\npresent, thus allowing the subcortical tracts to re-establish their\nresistance, must absolutely be carried into operation.\n\nI will refrain from describing more complicated forms of the sexual\nprocess in this manner. I will only add the statement that in essentials\nthis formula is applicable also to women, notwithstanding the confusion\nintroduced into the problem by all the artificial arresting and stunting\nthat the female sexual impulse undergoes. In women also we must\npostulate a somatic sexual excitation, and a condition in which this\nexcitation becomes a psychical stimulus, evoking libido and the impulse\nto a specific activity to which sensual pleasure is attached. Where\nwomen are concerned, however, we cannot state what is the process\nanalogous to the relief of tension in the vesiculæ seminales.\n\nThe ætiology of neurasthenia proper as well as of anxiety-neurosis can\nnow be brought within the compass of this conception of the sexual\nprocess. Neurasthenia arises whenever a less adequate relief\n(activity) takes the place of the adequate one, thus, when\nmasturbation or spontaneous emission replaces normal coitus under the\nmost favourable conditions; while anxiety-neurosis is produced by all\nthose factors which prevent the somatic sexual excitation from being\nassimilated psychically. The clinical symptoms of anxiety-neurosis          {99}\nappear when the somatic sexual excitation that is deflected from the\nmind is expended subcortically in quite inadequate reactions.\n\nI shall now try to test the ætiological conditions of anxiety-neurosis\ngiven above, in order to see whether they show the common character I\nhave ascribed to them. The first ætiological factor in men that I\nmentioned is voluntary abstinence. Abstinence consists in foregoing\nthe specific activity which otherwise follows upon libido. Privation\nof this kind can have two consequences, namely, that the somatic\nexcitation becomes augmented by accumulation, and secondly, that it is\nthen dissipated along other paths, through which it may find its\ndischarge more easily than along the path to the mind. Libido will\ntherefore subside again and the excitation will express itself instead\nsubcortically as anxiety. In cases where libido does not subside or\nwhere the somatic excitation is expended by a short cut in emissions,\nor where it actually becomes exhausted in consequence of being\nrestrained, anything else may arise, but not\nanxiety-neurosis. Abstinence leads to anxiety-neurosis in the way\ndescribed. Abstinence is also the agent in the second ætiological\ngroup, that of frustrated excitement. The third case, that of coitus\nreservatus with regard for the woman, acts by disturbing the psychical\nstate of preparedness for the sexual process, in that it adds to the\ntask of dealing with the sexual affect another, a deflecting,\npsychical task. In consequence of this psychical deflection libido\nalso gradually subsides, the further developments being then the same\nas in abstinence. Anxiety in ageing men (the male climacteric)\nrequires another explanation. There is no reduction in libido here;\nbut, just as during the climacteric in women, such an increase in the      {100}\nproduction of somatic excitation occurs that the psyche proves\nrelatively unable to master it.\n\nThere is no greater difficulty in bringing the ætiological conditions in\nwomen within the scope of our theory than in the case of men. Virginal\nanxiety is a particularly clear example; the constellations of ideas to\nwhich the somatic sexual excitation should become attached are not yet\nsufficiently developed. In anæsthetic newly-married women anxiety only\nappears when the first acts of intercourse arouse a sufficient quantity\nof somatic excitation. When local indications of the state of excitement\n(such as spontaneous local sensations, desire to micturate and the like)\nare lacking, then anxiety is also absent. In cases where intercourse\ninvolves ejaculatio præcox or coitus interruptus, the explanation is\nsimilar to that given for men---libido gradually declines from the\npsychically unsatisfying act, while the excitation called forth by the\nact is expended subcortically. An _estrangement_ between the somatic and\nthe psychical in the course taken by sexual excitation is established\nsooner and is more difficult to remove in women than in men. In\nwidowhood and in voluntary abstinence, as also in the climacteric, the\nprocess is the same in women as in men; although in abstinence there\nmust also be the additional factor of an intentional repression of\nsexual ideas which the abstinent woman battling with desire must\nfrequently resolve upon, and similarly, at the time of the menopause,\nthe detestation with which the ageing woman regards the unduly increased\nlibido must come into operation.\n\nThe two last ætiological conditions enumerated also seem to fall into\nline without difficulty.\n\nThe tendency to anxiety in masturbators who have become neurasthenic       {101}\nis explained by the fact that these persons very easily pass into a\ncondition of 'abstinence' after they have for so long been accustomed\nimmediately to discharge every access of somatic excitation, however\nsmall, although not in a normal manner.  Finally, the last case, in\nwhich anxiety-neurosis arises from serious illness, overwork,\nexhausting sick-nursing, etc., may be brought into relation with the\nmode of action of coitus interruptus and then find a simple\ninterpretation: by reason of the deflection of interest the mind is no\nlonger capable of mastering the somatic sexual excitation, a task\nwhich is continuously incumbent on it. We know to what a low level\nlibido can sink under these conditions; and we have here an excellent\nexample of a _neurosis which has, it is true, no sexual ætiology, but\nnevertheless shows a sexual mechanism_.\n\nThe theory here developed shows the symptoms of anxiety-neurosis to be\nin some measure _surrogates_ for the specific activity which should\nfollow upon sexual excitation, but has not done so. In further\ncorroboration of this I may point out that even in normal coitus the\nexcitation expresses itself also in accelerated breathing, palpitations,\nsweating, congestion and so on. In the corresponding anxiety-attacks of\nour neurosis we see the dyspnœa, palpitations, etc. of coitus in an\nisolated and exaggerated form.\n\nThe question may now be asked: Why does the nervous system under such\nconditions---of psychical incapacity to master sexual\nexcitation---take on the particular affective state of anxiety? The\nreply may be indicated somewhat as follows: The psyche develops the\naffect of anxiety when it feels itself incapable of dealing (by an\nadequate reaction) with a task (danger) approaching it externally; it      {102}\ndevelops the neurosis of anxiety when it feels itself unequal to the\ntask of mastering (sexual) excitation arising endogenously. That is to\nsay, _it acts as if it had projected this excitation into the outer\nworld_. The affect and the neurosis corresponding to it stand in a\nclose relation to each other; the first is the reaction to an\nexogenous, the second to an analogous, endogenous, excitation. The\naffect is a state which passes rapidly, the neurosis is a chronic\nstate; because an exogenous excitation acts like a single shock, an\nendogenous one like a constant pressure. _The nervous system reacts to\nan internal source of excitation with a neurosis, just as it reacts to\nan analogous external one with a corresponding affect_.\n\n                    IV. RELATION TO OTHER NEUROSES\n\nThere are still a few words to be said concerning the relation of\nanxiety-neurosis to the other neuroses in respect of its incidence and\nits inner connections with them.\n\nThe purest cases of anxiety-neurosis are as a rule the most developed.\nThese cases are found among young and sexually potent persons; they show\na uniform ætiology and no very long duration.\n\nMore frequently, however, anxiety symptoms occur contemporaneously and\nin combination with those of neurasthenia, hysteria, obsessions and\nmelancholia. If because of this clinical confusion we are to refrain\nfrom distinguishing anxiety-neurosis as a self-contained unity, then to\nbe logical we should have in addition to renounce the distinction\nbetween hysteria and neurasthenia which has been acquired so\nlaboriously.\n\nFor the analysis of 'mixed neuroses' I can advocate the following\nimportant formula: _Wherever a mixed_ _neurosis exists a combination       {103}\nof several specific ætiologies may be discovered_.\n\nThe number of ætiological factors which conditions a mixed neurosis may\noccur quite fortuitously; for instance, if a fresh injurious factor adds\nits effect to those already existing, e.g. a woman who had always been\nhysterical begins at a certain point in her married life to experience\ncoitus reservatus and then acquires anxiety-neurosis in addition to her\nhysteria; a man who had previously been in the habit of masturbating,\nand had become neurasthenic, becomes engaged to be married and is\nsexually roused during the intimacy with his fiancée, and then acquires\nanxiety-neurosis in addition to his neurasthenia.\n\nIn other cases the number of ætiological factors is no accident; on the\ncontrary, some one of them has brought another into activity; for\nexample, a woman whose husband practises coitus reservatus without\nregard to her satisfaction finds herself compelled to relieve by\nmasturbation the distressing excitation aroused by the act, as a result\nof which she develops an anxiety-neurosis, but not in a pure form,\nshowing at the same time symptoms of neurasthenia; another woman in the\nsame injurious situation will have to battle with lewd thoughts and\nvisions, against which she struggles to defend herself, and will in this\nway develop obsessional ideas as well as the anxiety-neurosis as a\nresult of coitus interruptus; lastly, a third woman's husband will lose\nhis attraction for her in consequence of coitus interruptus and she will\ndevelop an affection for another man which she carefully keeps secret,\nas a result of which we find a mixture of anxiety-neurosis and hysteria.\n\nIn a third category of mixed neuroses the interrelation of the\nsymptoms is even closer, in that the very same ætiological determinant     {104}\nregularly and simultaneously evokes both neuroses. Thus for example,\nthe sudden sexual revelation which is active in cases of virginal\nanxiety always gives rise to hysteria as well as anxiety-neurosis;\ncases of voluntary abstinence are for the most part from the beginning\nunited with true obsessional ideas; coitus interruptus never seems to\nme to be able to provoke a pure anxiety-neurosis in men, but always a\ncombination of it with neurasthenia; and so on.\n\nIt follows from these considerations that the ætiological conditions for\nthe incidence of the neuroses must be distinguished more clearly from\ntheir specific ætiological factors. The former, for example, coitus\ninterruptus, masturbation and abstinence, are still capable of various\ninterpretations; each one of them can produce many neuroses; only the\nætiological factors into which they can be resolved, such as _inadequate\nrelief_, _psychical inadequacy_, _defence by substitution_, have an\nunequivocal and specific relation to the ætiology of the individual\ngreat neuroses.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nIn its essence anxiety-neurosis presents the most interesting\nsimilarities to and differences from the other great neuroses,\nparticularly neurasthenia and hysteria. It shares with neurasthenia\nits main characteristic: the source of the excitation, the inciting\nfactor in the disturbance, is somatic in nature, whereas in hysteria\nand the obsessional neurosis it is psychical in nature. In other\nrespects we see rather a kind of antithesis between the symptoms of\nneurasthenia and those of anxiety-neurosis which may be summed up in\nthe words: impoverishment or accumulation of excitation\nrespectively. This antithesis does not prevent the two neuroses from\nbeing combined with one another, but is nevertheless clearly               {105}\ndemonstrated by the fact that the most extreme forms of both neuroses\nare also the purest.\n\nIn symptomatology anxiety-neurosis and hysteria have many points in\ncommon, which need to be better appreciated. The appearance of\nsymptoms either in a chronic form or as attacks, the paræsthesias\ngrouped like aurœ, the hyperæsthesias and points of pressure which are\nfound in certain surrogates of the anxiety-attack (dyspnœa and\nheart-attacks), the exacerbation (through conversion) of pains perhaps\nhaving an organic basis---these and other common features even permit\nthe conjecture that much of what we attribute to hysteria may with\nmore justification be laid at the door of anxiety-neurosis. If we go\ninto the mechanism of the two neuroses so far as it has been possible\nto discover it up to the present, aspects come to light which suggest\nthat anxiety-neurosis is actually the somatic counterpart of\nhysteria. In each of them there is an accumulation of\nexcitation---which perhaps accounts for the similarity of the symptoms\nalready described; in each of them there is a _psychical inadequacy as\na consequence of which abnormal somatic processes come about_. In each\nof them there occurs a deflection of excitation to the somatic field\ninstead of psychical assimilation of it; the difference is merely\nthis, that in anxiety-neurosis the excitation (in the displacement of\nwhich the neurosis expresses itself) is purely somatic (the somatic\nsexual excitation), whereas in hysteria it is purely psychical (evoked\nby conflict). Little wonder then that hysteria and anxiety-neurosis\nare regularly combined with one another, as in 'virginal anxiety' or\n'sexual hysteria', and that hysteria simply borrows a number of its\nsymptoms from the anxiety-neurosis. These intimate relations between       {106}\nanxiety-neurosis and hysteria provide a new argument for demanding the\ndistinction of anxiety-neurosis from neurasthenia; for if this\ndistinction is not admitted then neither are we justified in\nmaintaining the distinction between neurasthenia and hysteria which\nwas so laboriously come by and is so indispensable for the theory of\nthe neuroses.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                  VI                                       {107}\n                A REPLY TO CRITICISMS ON THE ANXIETY-\n                             NEUROSIS[28]\n                                (1895)\n\nIn No. 2 of Mendel's _Neurologisches Zentralblatt_ 1895, I published a\nshort paper in which I ventured an attempt to distinguish a series of\nnervous states from neurasthenia and give them independence under the\nname of 'Anxiety-Neurosis'.[29] I was led to do so by finding a\nconstant combination of certain clinical and ætiological characters,\nwhich may always decide us to make such distinctions. I found, as E.\nHecker[30] had done before me, that the neurotic symptoms in question\ncould all be united under the head of 'pertaining to the expression of\n_anxiety_'; and I was able to add from my study of the ætiology of the\nneuroses that these component parts of the complex 'anxiety-neurosis'\nshow special ætiological conditions which are almost the opposite of\nthe ætiology of neurasthenia. My observations had shown me that in the\nætiology of the neuroses (at least of the acquired and acquirable\nforms) sexual factors play a predominant part, hitherto far too little\nappreciated; so that the assertion: 'the ætiology of the neuroses lies\nin sexuality', with all its necessary inexactness _per excessum et\ndefectum_, nevertheless comes nearer to the truth than the other\ndoctrines ruling at the present time. A further statement to which         {108}\nexperience forced me was to the effect that the various sexual noxiæ\nwere not to be found indifferently in the ætiology of all neuroses,\nbut that there were evidently special relationships of particular\nnoxiæ to particular neuroses. I thought I could assume, therefore,\nthat I had discovered the specific causes of the different neuroses. I\nthen sought to comprehend in a short formula the peculiarity of the\nsexual noxiæ which constitute the ætiology of anxiety-neurosis, and\narrived at the statement, dependent on my idea of the sexual process\n(see pp. 98--9): Anxiety-neurosis is produced by anything which\nwithholds somatic sexual tension from the psychical and interferes\nwith its elaboration within the psychical field. If we refer to the\nconcrete circumstances in which this factor expresses itself, we come\nto the conclusion that voluntary or involuntary abstinence, sexual\nintercourse with incomplete gratification, coitus interruptus, the\ndeflection of psychical interest from sexuality and so on, are the\nspecific ætiological factors of the states I have called\nanxiety-neurosis.\n\nWhen I published the paper mentioned above, I in no way deceived\nmyself about its power to arouse conviction. In the first place I knew\nthat I had only given a scanty, incomplete presentation---one that was\neven in parts difficult to comprehend; it was perhaps just sufficient\nto arouse the reader's expectation. I had besides adduced hardly any\nexamples and quoted no statistics; the technique of collecting the\ncase-histories was not touched on; no provision was made to avoid\nmisunderstandings; other objections than the most obvious ones were\nnot considered; and concerning the theory itself, only the main theme\nwas brought into prominence and its limitations were\ndisregarded. Accordingly, everyone was justified in forming his own        {109}\njudgement upon the conclusiveness of the whole proposition. I had to\nlook forward, moreover, to yet another source of disagreement. I know\nvery well that I have advanced nothing new by suggesting the 'sexual\nætiology' of the neuroses, that undercurrents in medical literature\nacknowledging these facts have never been absent, and that the\nofficial medicine of the schools has actually been aware of them\nalso. But the last has behaved, however, as if it knew nothing about\nit, making no use of its knowledge, and deducing nothing from it. Such\nconduct must surely have a deep-rooted cause, originating perhaps in a\nkind of aversion from looking into sexual matters, or in a reaction\nagainst older attempts at explanation which were regarded as\noutworn. At all events, anyone who ventures to make something credible\nto others who could without any trouble have discovered it for\nthemselves, must be prepared to meet with opposition.\n\nWith such a state of affairs it would perhaps have been more expedient\nnot to answer critical objections until I had expressed myself in\ngreater detail upon the complicated theme itself and had made myself\nmore intelligible. Nevertheless I cannot resist the motives which\ninduce me immediately to join issue with a recent criticism of my\ntheory of anxiety-neurosis. I do this because the writer, L. Löwenfeld\n(Munich), the author of _Pathologie und Therapie der Neurasthenie und\nHysterie_, is one whose judgement probably has great weight with the\nmedical public, and because of a mistaken conception which Löwenfeld\nimputes to me; and also because I wish at once to combat the idea that\nmy theory is to be overthrown so very easily by the first casual and\nimpromptu objections.                                                      {110}\n\nLöwenfeld correctly discovers at a glance the essence of my work to be\nmy assertion that anxiety symptoms are due to a specific and uniform\nætiology of a sexual nature. If this cannot be established as a fact\nthen the principal reason for distinguishing an independent\nanxiety-neurosis from neurasthenia also falls to the ground. There\nremains, however, one difficulty to which I called attention---namely,\nthat anxiety symptoms have manifest relations also to hysteria; so that\nthe decision as Löwenfeld would have it brings the distinction between\nhysteria and neurasthenia to grief; though this difficulty is obviated\nby reference to heredity as the common cause of all the neuroses, a\npoint which will be discussed later.\n\nNow by what arguments does Löwenfeld support the case against my theory?\n\n1. I have emphasized as a point essential for comprehension of the\nanxiety-neurosis that the anxiety of that condition does not admit of a\npsychic derivation, that is, that the anxious expectation which\nconstitutes the nucleus of the neurosis cannot be acquired through a\nsingle or repeated affect of fright which is justified psychically.\nFright, as I have pointed out, may result in hysteria or a traumatic\nneurosis, but not in an anxiety-neurosis. It is easy to see that this\nnegation is simply the obverse of my assertion (with a positive\ncontent): the anxiety of my neurosis represents a somatic sexual tension\ndeflected from the psychical field where it would otherwise have made\nitself felt as libido.\n\nAgainst this, Löwenfeld lays stress on the fact that in a series of\ncases 'anxiety states appear immediately or shortly after a mental\nshock (fright alone, or accidents accompanied by fright) and that\nthese circumstances make the co-operation of sexual noxiæ of the kind      {111}\nmentioned at least most improbable.' He gives in brief, as a\nparticularly pregnant example, one observation of a patient out of\nmany. This example relates to a woman aged thirty, married for four\nyears, of tainted stock, who had undergone a first difficult\nconfinement a year before. A few weeks after it her husband had an\nattack of illness which frightened her exceedingly and in her\nexcitement she ran about the cold room in her chemise. From that time\nonward she was ill, first with anxiety and palpitations in the\nevenings, later with attacks of convulsive trembling, and in further\nsequence phobias and the like---the picture of a fully-developed\nanxiety-neurosis. 'Here', concludes Löwenfeld, 'the anxiety states are\nmanifestly of psychic origin consequent on a single shock.'\n\nI do not doubt that my honoured critic can produce many similar cases;\nI myself can supply a long series of analogous examples. Anyone who\nhad not seen such very common cases of the outbreak of\nanxiety-neurosis following upon a mental shock could not regard\nhimself as qualified to discuss the question of anxiety-neurosis. I\nwill only observe in this connection that neither shock nor anxious\nexpectation is necessarily always demonstrable in the ætiology of such\ncases; any other emotion will serve as well. If I hurriedly call to\nmind a few cases from recollection there occurs to me that of a man of\nforty-five who first had an anxiety-attack (with cardiac collapse) on\nreceiving the news of the death of his aged father: from that time\nonwards a complete and typical anxiety-neurosis with agoraphobia\ndeveloped; further, a young man who fell a victim to the same neurosis\non account of the disagreements between his young wife and his mother,\nand developed the agoraphobia afresh after every domestic quarrel; a       {112}\nstudent who was rather an idler and had his first anxiety-attacks\nduring a period of hard cramming under the spur of paternal\ndispleasure; a woman, herself childless, who fell ill in consequence\nof anxiety concerning the health of her small niece, and so on. As to\nthe facts themselves which Löwenfeld employs against me there cannot\nbe the slightest doubt.\n\nIt is otherwise with their interpretation! Are we then without further\nceremony to accept the _post hoc ergo propter hoc_ conclusion and save\nourselves all critical consideration of the raw material? Surely we\nare acquainted with examples enough in which the final exciting factor\ncannot keep up its reputation as _causa efficiens_ in the face of\ncritical analysis? Take the relation between trauma and gout, as an\nexample. The rôle of a trauma in provoking an attack of gout in the\ninjured limb is probably not different from the part it plays in the\nætiology of tabes and general paralysis of the insane; only in the\ncase of gout everyone would see that it is absurd to say the trauma\nhas 'caused' the gout, instead of provoked it. It should make us\ncautious when we meet with ætiological factors of such a\nkind---ordinary factors, I should like to call them---in the ætiology\nof the most varied forms of illness. Emotion, such as fright, is also\nan ordinary factor of this kind; fright can evoke chorea, apoplexy,\nparalysis agitans and what not, just as well as an\nanxiety-neurosis. Now I should certainly not continue to argue along\nthese lines, that because of their prevalence the ordinary factors do\nnot satisfy our requirements, and therefore there must be specific\ncauses besides; it would beg the question at issue. But I am justified\nin concluding as follows: If a single specific cause can be proved in\nthe ætiology of all or almost all cases of anxiety-neurosis, then our      {113}\nview will not necessarily be erroneous because the outbreak of illness\nonly occurs under the influence of some one or other ordinary factor,\nsuch as emotion.\n\nSo it was in my cases of anxiety-neurosis. The man who fell\nill---inexplicably---after receiving the news of his father's death (I\nmake this interpolated comment because this death was not unexpected and\ndid not occur in unusual or tragic circumstances) had for eleven years\npractised coitus interruptus with his wife whom he usually endeavoured\nto satisfy; the young man who could not tolerate the quarrels between\nhis wife and his mother had practised withdrawal with his young wife\nfrom the beginning, in order to save them the burden of offspring; the\nstudent who developed anxiety-neurosis through overwork, instead of\ncerebrasthenia as we should expect, had for three years had a\nrelationship with a girl whom he dared not let become pregnant; the\nwoman who had no children herself and fell ill of anxiety-neurosis owing\nto the illness of a niece was married to an impotent man and had never\nbeen sexually gratified; and so on. Not all these cases are equally\nclear nor prove my theory with equal force; but if I add them to the\nvery considerable series of cases in which the ætiology shows nothing\nbut the specific factor, they conform without a dissentient note to the\ntheory I have put forward and make it possible for us to extend our\nætiological comprehension beyond the boundaries which have existed\nhitherto.\n\nIf anyone wishes to prove to me that I have unduly neglected the\nsignificance of ordinary ætiological factors in the foregoing\ndiscussion, he must confront me with observations in which my specific\nfactor is lacking, that is, with cases in which, although the _vita        {114}\nsexualis_ is (more or less) normal, anxiety-neurosis breaks out after\na mental shock. Now let us see whether Löwenfeld's case fulfils this\ncondition. My worthy opponent has manifestly not clearly recognized\nthis necessity in his own mind, otherwise he would not have left us so\ncompletely in the dark concerning the _vita sexualis_ of his\npatient. I will leave on one side the fact that the case of the lady\nof thirty is obviously complicated by an hysteria, about the psychical\norigin of which I should be the last to have any doubt; I naturally\nadmit without protest the presence of an anxiety-neurosis alongside\nthis hysteria. But before I make use of a case as evidence either for\nor against my theory of the sexual ætiology of the neuroses I must\nstudy the sexual conduct of the patient more thoroughly than Löwenfeld\nhas done here. I should not be contented with the conclusion that,\nbecause the lady had the mental shock shortly after a confinement,\ncoitus interruptus had probably played no part during the previous\nyear and that therefore no sexual noxiæ had arisen here. I know of\ncases of women who become pregnant year after year and develop\nanxiety-neurosis because---_incredibile dictu_---all sexual relations\nceased after pregnancy had set in; so that in spite of having many\nchildren they might have lived all the years of their married life in\nsexual privation. It is known to every physician that women do\nconceive from men whose potency is very feeble and who are not able to\ngive them satisfaction; and finally there are many women who are\nafflicted with a congenital anxiety-neurosis, that is to say, are\nendowed with a _vita sexualis_ (or develop it without demonstrable\nexternal provocation) of the kind usually acquired by coitus\ninterruptus and similar noxiæ---a consideration which upholders of\nthe ætiology of heredity ought to take into account. In a number           {115}\nof these women we are able eventually to discover a past history of a\nhysterical illness in their youth, which has affected the _vita\nsexualis_ ever since or has established a deflection of sexual tension\naway from the psychical field. Women with this kind of sexuality are\nincapable of real satisfaction, even in normal coitus, and develop\nanxiety-neurosis either spontaneously or after further effective\nfactors have supervened. Which of all these factors mentioned could\nhave contributed to Löwenfeld's case I do not know; but I repeat that\nthis case is evidence against me only if the lady who responded to a\nsingle fright with an anxiety-neurosis had previously enjoyed a normal\n_vita sexualis_.\n\nIt is impossible to pursue ætiological research by means of the\nanamnesis of patients if we accept the patient's account as he gives it\nor are satisfied with what he volunteers. If syphilidologists allowed\nthemselves to depend upon the declarations of their patients, when\nendeavouring to trace an initial infection of the genitalia back to an\nact of sexual intercourse, they would have to attribute an imposing\nnumber of chancres to a chill in persons who protest their virginity,\nand gynæcologists would have little difficulty in confirming the miracle\nof parthenogenesis among their unmarried clients. I hope that some day\nthe idea will gain admittance that neuropathologists too may be subject\nto similar ætiological prejudices in the work of collecting the\ncase-histories of the great neuroses.\n\n2. Löwenfeld further says that he has repeatedly seen anxiety-states\nappear and disappear where a change in the sexual life had certainly\nnot taken place, but where there were other factors in play.               {116}\n\nI too have had exactly the same experience, but I was not misled by\nit.  I too have brought anxiety-attacks to an end by psychical\ntreatment, improvement of the patient's general condition and so on. I\nhave naturally not concluded from this that lack of treatment was the\ncause of anxiety-attacks. Not that I would credit Löwenfeld with a\nconclusion of this kind, to be sure; my joking remark is only intended\nto show that the state of affairs may easily be so complicated as to\nnullify his objection completely. I have not found any difficulty in\nharmonizing the fact brought forward here with the theory of a\nspecific ætiology of anxiety-neurosis. It will readily be granted that\nætiological factors exist which, in order to become effective, must\nact with a certain intensity (or quantity) and over a certain length\nof time, which therefore _summate_; the effects of alcohol are a\nstandard example of illness produced by summation. Accordingly we must\nreckon with a space of time in which the specific ætiology is at work,\nbut during which its effects are not yet manifest. During such a\nperiod the person is not yet ill, but he is disposed to a particular\nillness---in this case to anxiety-neurosis---and as soon as the\n'ordinary' noxia supervenes it can excite the outbreak of the neurosis\njust as well as a further increase in operation of the specific\nnoxia. We can also express this as follows: It is not sufficient for\nthe specific ætiological factor to exist; a certain measure of it must\nalso be reached, and in attaining this measure a degree of the\nspecific noxia can be made up by an amount of 'ordinary' injurious\nfactors. If the last is again eliminated, the level of the specific\nætiological factor falls below the threshold; the symptoms recede\nagain. The entire therapy of the neuroses rests upon the fact that the\ntotal load upon the nervous system, to which the latter is succumbing,     {117}\ncan be reduced below this level by very various influences on the\ncombination of ætiological factors. No conclusions can be drawn from\nthis state of things in regard to the presence or absence of a\nspecific ætiology.\n\nThese considerations are surely indisputable and assured. Anyone who\ndoes not think them sufficient may permit the following argument to\nweigh with him. According to the views of Löwenfeld and many others the\nætiology of anxiety states lies in heredity. Now heredity can certainly\nnot be altered; if anxiety-neurosis is curable by treatment we (and\nLöwenfeld too) ought to conclude that heredity cannot account for its\nætiology.\n\nFor the rest, I might have been spared defending myself against both\nof Löwenfeld's objections if my worthy opponent had bestowed greater\nattention upon my paper itself. Both objections are anticipated in it\nand answered (p. 92 ff.); I could only repeat here what I said there;\nI have even purposely analysed the same cases of illness\nafresh. Further, the ætiological formulæ upon which I had previously\nlaid weight are contained in the text of my former paper. I will\nrepeat them once again here. I maintain that: _There exists a specific\nætiological factor for the anxiety-neurosis which in taking effect can\nbe reinforced quantitatively by 'ordinary' injurious factors but\ncannot be replaced by them qualitatively_. Further: _This specific\nfactor determines more than anything the type of neurosis; whether a\nneurotic illness occurs at all depends on the total load on the\nnervous system_ (_in relation to its capacity to carry the load_). As\na rule neuroses are _overdetermined_; that is to say, several factors\nin their ætiology operate together.                                        {118}\n\n3. I shall have less trouble in refuting Löwenfeld's next comments\nbecause on the one hand they have little to do with my theory and on the\nother because they call attention to difficulties which I acknowledge.\nLöwenfeld says: 'The Freud","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"Project Gutenberg","citation":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856","license":"Public domain (per item)","year":"","url":"/record/79856","fields":{"author":"Sigmund Freud","language":"English","chars":"653103","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856"}},"generated_at":"2026-11-22T20:37:50Z"}