gutenberg.go-v.org

Collected papers, Volume I

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Collected papers, Volume I This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title: Collected papers, Volume I Author: Sigmund Freud Leopold Löwenfeld Editor: Ernest Jones Translator: Joan Riviere Release date: October 24, 2026 [eBook #79856] Language: English Original publication: New York: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1924 Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856 Credits: Stephen M. Kraus at readfreud.org/ (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK COLLECTED PAPERS, VOLUME I *** THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY

source: Project Gutenberglicence: Public domain (per item)database: /home/dbs/gutenberg.dbmode: tablerecords: 79861 (max_rowid)citation: https://www.gutenberg.org/

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Collected papers, Volume I

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.

Title: Collected papers, Volume I

Author: Sigmund Freud
Leopold Löwenfeld

Editor: Ernest Jones

Translator: Joan Riviere

Release date: October 24, 2026 [eBook #79856]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1924

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856

Credits: Stephen M. Kraus at readfreud.org/ (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK COLLECTED PAPERS, VOLUME I ***

THE INTERNATIONAL
PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL
LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST JONES

No. 7

------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY
No. 7.

COLLECTED PAPERS
VOL. I

BY
SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.

*

AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
JOAN RIVIERE

THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS
NEW YORK LONDON VIENNA
M C M X X I V

------------------------------------------------------------------------
COPYRIGHT 1924
------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I
PAGE
EDITORIAL PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
EARLY PAPERS
I Charcot (1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II On the psychical mechanism of hysterical pheno-
mena (1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
III Some points in a comparative study of organic
and hysterical paralysis (1893) . . . . . . 42
IV The defence neuro-psychoses (1894) . . . . . 59
V The justification for detaching from neurasthenia
a particular syndrome: The anxiety-neurosis (1894) 76
VI A reply to criticisms on the anxiety-neurosis (1895) 107
VII Obsessions and phobias; their psychical mechanisms
and their ætiology (1895) . . . . . . . . 128
VIII Heredity and the ætiology of the neuroses (1896) 138
IX Further remarks on the defence neuro-psychoses
(1896) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
X The ætiology of hysteria (1896) . . . . . . 183
XI Sexuality in the ætiology of the neuroses (1898) 220
XII On psychotherapy (1904) . . . . . . . . . 249
XIII Freud's psycho-analytic method (1904) . . . . 264
XIV My views on the part played by sexuality in the
ætiology of the neuroses (1905) . . . . . . 272
*
ON THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC
MOVEMENT (1914) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

------------------------------------------------------------------------

EDITORIAL PREFACE {3}

To write a preface is often a perfunctory matter, but in the preface
to this series of Collected Papers we wish to direct the reader's
special attention to two cardinal considerations.

In the first place it should be said that these Collected Papers, of
which the present is the first volume, constitute the real basis of
Psycho-Analysis. All Professor Freud's other work and theories are
essentially founded on the clinical investigations of which these
papers are the only published record. It is unfortunate that the
English-speaking public should for years have had access only to what
may be called the superstructure of his work, the application of his
psycho-analytic method to the study of dreams, sexuality, totemism,
and so on, while the basis of it all remained buried in a foreign
tongue. It is now proposed to fill this central lacuna in English
psycho-analytical literature by publishing, in four or more volumes, a
translation of the _Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur
Neurosenlehre_. Incidentally it may be said that the papers in this
series have been re-grouped, in co-operation with Professor Freud, so
that they do not follow the same order as that of the German original.

This brings us to the second consideration. If the reader wishes to
extract the greatest profit from these volumes, it is quite essential
that he should constantly bear in mind the _date_ when each Paper was
written. The only really satisfactory way of acquiring a knowledge of
Professor Freud's writings is to follow the order of development of
his work. It is hardly possible otherwise to obtain a coherent picture
of the whole. To follow this development is not only a fascinating
study in itself, disclosing as it does a beautiful example of the way
in which ideas are gradually unfolded---and constantly extended and
modified---under the pressure of widening and deepening experience. It
also gives a conviction of the truly scientific nature of the author's
work, for the tentative "feeling forward" here revealed---now in one
direction, now in another, as occasion and opportunity present---is
the very antithesis of the promulgation of an _a priori_ philosophic
system such as has sometimes been ignorantly imputed to him. One
inflexible determination has always guided him, and that was the {4}
determination to keep ever in the closest contact with the actual
material daily brought before his observation, and not to be tempted
along side-tracks by speculations, however enticing these might
appear. His path lay through a jungle hitherto completely unexplored.
Rarely did his path follow a straight line for long: deviations,
détours, fresh departures were often necessary, and occasionally even
the retracing of his steps. No one will expect that in these
circumstances of exploring an unknown territory the pioneer's trail
would be orderly and regular in its progress, or that the path should
be everywhere beaten equally smooth; but that the progress has been a
real and inspiring one is attested by the host of workers now
following in his steps.

In his preface to the first volume of the _Sammlung kleiner Schriften_
Professor Freud writes:---"Whoever is familiar with the development of
human knowledge will hear without astonishment that I have passed
beyond some part of the views here presented and have learnt to modify
some others. Still I have been able to retain unchanged the greater
part, and do not really need to withdraw anything as completely
erroneous and quite worthless". He probably had in mind here
particularly the view that underwent most modification subsequently,
that concerning the importance of sexual traumas in infancy. Few
episodes in the history of scientific research provide a more dramatic
test of true genius than the occasion on which Professor Freud made
the devastating discovery that many of these traumas to which he had
been obliged to attach ætiological significance had never occurred
outside the imagination of the patients. The realization---so
modestly related in the last of the Early Papers (p. 276)---that an
imagined event could in certain psychological circumstances produce an
effect exactly equivalent to that of an actual event was one that only
an investigator gifted with a supreme feeling for psychology could
have achieved. Initial error led to a profound discovery. Most of
Professor Freud's alleged "inconsistencies" will be found to carry a
similar moral.

In the work of organizing the translations I have had the invaluable
assistance of Mrs. Riviere; they have also been carefully revised by
her as well as by myself. In this Frl. Anna Freud was very helpful,
and we wish to express our indebtedness to her.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
EARLY PAPERS {7}
------------------------------------------------------------------------

I {9}
CHARCOT[1]
(1893)

In the person of J. M. Charcot whom, after a life of happiness and fame,
a sudden death without suffering or illness took from us on the 16th of
August the young science of neurology has lost its most active promoter,
neurologists of all countries have been bereft of their teacher, and
France has lost prematurely one of its leading men. He was only
sixty-eight years of age; his bodily strength and mental vigour,
together with the hopes he so frankly expressed, seemed to promise him
that long life which has been granted to not a few of the thinkers of
this century. The imposing nine volumes of his _Œuvres Complètes_, in
which his pupils had collected his contributions to the science of
medicine and of neuropathology, the _Leçons du Mardi_, the yearly
reports of his clinic at the Salpêtrière, and other papers---all these
publications, though they will remain precious to his pupils and to
science, cannot take the place of the man who still had much to give and
to teach, whose personality and whose work no one ever approached
without learning from them.

He had a perfectly honest, human delight in his own great success and
used to speak freely about his early days and the road that he had
traversed. His scientific curiosity had been aroused early in life
when he was but a young house-physician by the abundance of material,
at that time utterly unintelligible, contained in the facts of {10}
neuropathology. At that period in his life, whenever he made the
rounds in the wards of the Salpêtrière (the asylum for women) with his
chief, when he saw all the wilderness of paralyses, tremors and spasms
for which no name or proper understanding existed forty years ago, he
would say, '_Faudrait y retourner et y rester_', and he kept his
word. As soon as he had become _médecin des hôpitaux_ (hospital
physician) his goal was to get into the Salpêtrière, into one of the
wards for nervous patients. Once there, he remained; instead of, as is
the privilege of French physicians, transferring in regular order from
hospital to hospital and from ward to ward, at the same time changing
his speciality.

Thus his first impression and the resolution to which it led
determined his whole future career. Having at his disposal a
considerable number of patients afflicted with chronic nervous disease
he was enabled to take full advantage of his peculiar talent. He was
not much given to cogitation, was not of the reflective type, but he
had an artistically gifted temperament---as he said himself, he was a
'_visuel_', a seer. He himself told us the following about his method
of working: he was accustomed to look again and again at things that
were incomprehensible to him, to deepen his impression of them day by
day, until suddenly understanding of them dawned upon him. Before his
mind's eye, order then came into the chaos apparently presented by the
constant repetition of the same symptoms; the new clinical pictures
which were characterized by the constant combination of certain
syndromes took shape; the complete and extreme cases, the 'types',
were then distinguishable with the aid of a specific kind of schematic
arrangement, and with these as a starting-point the eye could follow {11}
down the long line of the less significant cases, the '_formes
frustes_', showing some one or other peculiar feature of the type and
fading into the indefinite. He called this kind of mental work, in
which he had no equal, 'practising nosography' and he was proud of
it. He was heard to say that the greatest satisfaction man can
experience is to see something new, that is, to recognize it as new,
and he constantly returned with repeated observations to the subject
of the difficulties and the value of such 'seeing'. He wondered how it
happened that in the practice of medicine men could only see what they
had already been taught to see, he described how wonderful it was
suddenly to see new things---new diseases---although they were
probably as old as the human race; he said that he often had to admit
that he could now see many a thing which for thirty years in his wards
he had ignored. No physician will need to be reminded of the wealth of
new outlines which the science of neuropathology gained through his
efforts, and of the much greater keenness and accuracy in diagnosis
which was made possible by the aid of his observations. But to his
pupils, who made the rounds with him through the wards of the
Salpêtrière---that museum of clinical facts for the greater part named
and defined by him---he seemed a very Cuvier, as we see him in the
statue in front of the Jardin des Plantes, surrounded by the various
types of animal life which he had understood and described; or else he
reminded them of the myth of Adam, who must have experienced in its
most perfect form that intellectual delight so highly praised by
Charcot, when the Lord led before him the creatures of Paradise to be
named and grouped. {12}

Charcot never tired of defending the claims of the purely clinical task
of seeing and classifying phenomena, as against the encroaches of
theoretical medicine. One day a small group of foreign students brought
up in the ways of German orthodox physiology annoyed him by raising
objections to his clinical innovations. 'That cannot possibly be', one
of us interrupted him, 'that contradicts the theory of Young-Helmholtz.'
He did not reply, 'So much the worse for the theory, clinical facts rank
first', and so forth. But he did say---leaving us deeply impressed '_La
théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister_.'

For a long term of years Charcot held the chair of pathological
anatomy in Paris, carrying on as a side-issue his neuropathological
work and the lectures which rapidly made him famous abroad as well as
at home. It was fortunate, however, for neuropathology that the same
man could fulfil the functions of two incumbents; on the one hand he
created the clinical pictures by observations, and on the other he
proved that in the typical case as well as in the _forme fruste_ the
same anatomical changes were the foundation of the disease. It is
generally known how great the success of this anatomical-clinical
method was in the sphere of organic nervous disease, with tabes,
multiple sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and so on. With
these chronic, not immediately fatal diseases, patient years of
waiting were often necessary before proof of the organic changes could
be established, and only in a hospital for incurables like the
Salpêtrière was it possible to keep and to watch the patients for such
long periods. As it happened, Charcot made his first discovery in this
field before he was in charge of a ward. During his student days
chance brought him into contact with a charwoman who suffered from a {13}
peculiar form of tremor and could not get work because of her
awkwardness. Charcot recognized her condition to be 'choreiform
paralysis', already described by Duchenne, of the origin of which,
however, nothing was known. In spite of her costing him a small
fortune in broken plates and platters, Charcot kept her for years in
his service and, when at last she died, could prove in the autopsy
that 'choreiform paralysis' was the clinical expression of multiple
cerebro-spinal sclerosis.

Pathological anatomy has to serve neuropathology in two ways: first,
to bring proof of morbid alterations, and secondly, to determine the
localization of these changes; we all know that in the last two
decades the second part of the task has aroused greater interest and
has been more actively advanced. In this field also Charcot
co-operated brilliantly, although the pioneer work was not done by
him; he followed to begin with the footsteps of our countryman Türck,
who is said to have lived and worked among us in comparative
obscurity. Later, after the two important discoveries which
inaugurated a new epoch in our knowledge of the 'localization of
nervous diseases'---namely, the stimulation tests of Hitzig-Fritsch
and Flechsig's work on the development of the spinal cord---his
lectures on localization were the best and most significant aid
towards co-ordinating the new theories with the clinical side and
making them available for clinical purposes. As regards the relation
of the muscular system to the motor area of the cerebrum, I should
like to remind the reader how long the specific mode and topography of
this connection was a matter of conjecture (common representation of
both extremities in the same areas, representation of the upper
extremity in the anterior, of the lower in the posterior central {14}
convolution: that is, vertical disposition), until at last continued
clinical investigations, with stimulation---as well as extirpation---
tests on human beings during surgical operations, decided the matter
in favour of Charcot's and Pitres' view, namely, that the middle third
of the central gyri mainly serves the representation of the arm, while
the upper third and the mesial portion serve the representation of the
leg; in other words, that the disposition in the motor areas is a
horizontal one.

It would not be possible to demonstrate Charcot's importance to the
science of neuropathology by enumerating particular achievements, for
during the last two decades there have been few questions of any
significance to the formulation and discussion of which the 'school of
the Salpêtrière' has not made contributions of signal importance. The
'school of the Salpêtrière' was, of course, Charcot himself; his
wealth of experience, his power of plastic description, his
transparent clearness of diction was easily recognizable in the papers
of every one of his pupils. Some members of this circle of young men
whom he gathered about him and made his partners in his work had
attained to consciousness of their own individuality, and won
celebrity on their own account, and one or other of them would now and
then advance an opinion that seemed to the master clever rather than
correct; this he would attack sarcastically enough in conversation and
in his lectures without, however, in any way injuring his affectionate
relation with the pupil. Charcot does indeed leave behind him a group
of pupils whose intellectual qualifications and whose work are pledges
that the practice of neuropathology in Paris will not readily descend
form the high level to which it was brought by him. {15}

In Vienna we have repeatedly found that an academic teacher of
intellectual importance is not also as a matter of course gifted with
that close personal influence on his students which expresses itself in
the formation of a numerous and important 'school'. If Charcot was more
favoured in this respect we must attribute it to his personal qualities
as a man, to the magic of his aspect and his voice, to the gracious
frankness of his manner after the first strangeness of a new relation
had worn off, to the readiness with which he placed everything at the
disposal of his pupils, and to his life-long loyalty to them. The hours
he spent in his wards were hours of fellowship and interchange of ideas
with his whole medical staff. He never shut himself off from them; the
youngest assistant had an opportunity of seeing him at work and might
interrupt him, and the same privilege was granted to the foreigners who
were never absent from his rounds in later years. Finally, his pupils
and assistants were regarded as part of his family in welcoming the
guests on the evenings when Madame Charcot---assisted by a highly gifted
daughter, not unlike her father---received a distinguished company in
her hospitable house.

In the year 1882 or 1883 the circumstances of Charcot's life and work
took on their final form. The idea had come to be generally realized
that the activity of this man was part of the national '_gloire_', to
be guarded all the more jealously since the unsuccessful war of
1870--1871. The government, headed by Charcot's old friend, Gambetta,
created for him a chair of neuropathology at the Faculty of Medicine,
which permitted him to give up his course in pathological anatomy,
and, in addition, founded for him a clinic with auxiliary scientific
departments at the Salpêtrière. '_Le service de M. Charcot_' now {16}
embraced (with the old wards of the chronic patients) several clinical
halls where men also were received, a large out-patient
department---the _consultation externe_---an histological laboratory,
a museum, an electro-therapeutic department, an eye-and-ear
department, and a special photographic studio. Each of these
institutions offered opportunities for attaching former assistants and
pupils permanently to the clinic in good positions. The
two-storey-high, weather-beaten buildings and the courts they enclosed
reminded the foreigner extraordinarily of our Allgemeines Krankenhaus
in Vienna, but the resemblance did not go very far. 'It is perhaps not
beautiful here', Charcot would say as he showed the visitor about his
domain, 'but you can find room for everything you want to do.'

Charcot stood at the zenith of his career when this abundance of
material for teaching and investigating was placed at his disposal. He
was an indefatigable worker, always the most industrious of the whole
group. His private practice, crowded with patients 'from Samarcand and
from the Antilles', could not divert him from his activities as a
teacher and investigator. This throng was assuredly not attracted
merely by the famous scientist, but as much or more by the great
physician, and by the sympathetic nature of the man, who always knew
how to give counsel, and could surmise and guess in those cases where
the present status of science did not permit him to know. He has often
been reproached on account of his therapeuty, which with its
multiplicity of prescriptions could not but offend a rationalistic
conscience: he simply continued the current and local methods
customary at that time and place, without deceiving himself much about
their effectiveness. Incidentally, he was not pessimistic in regard to {17}
therapeutic results and was ever willing to encourage at his clinic
experiments with new methods of treatment, which had but a short-lived
success, as others were quick to point out. As a teacher, Charcot was
positively fascinating; each of his lectures was a little masterpiece
in construction and composition, perfect in style, and so impressive
that the words spoken resounded in one's ears and the subject
demonstrated remained before one's eyes for the rest of the day. He
rarely made a demonstration with a single patient, but was accustomed
to present a whole group or a number of contrasting types which he
then compared with one another. In the hall in which he gave his
lectures hung a picture of the 'citizen' Pinel, causing the poor
insane of the Salpêtrière to be relieved of their chains; for after
having been the scene of so many horrors during the French Revolution,
the Salpêtrière had also witnessed this most humane innovation. Maître
Charcot himself made a strange impression during these lectures;
usually bubbling over with vivacity and cheerfulness, with witticisms
always on his lips, he would appear at such moments solemn and
serious, nay, even aged in his velvet cap; his voice seemed muffled,
and we almost understood how malicious strangers could accuse the
whole performance of theatricality. Those who expressed themselves in
this manner were probably accustomed to the lack of form in German
clinical lectures or else they forgot that Charcot, who gave only one
lecture a week, could prepare it carefully.

Charcot was very probably following a tradition of long standing with
this ceremonious lecture, in which everything was prepared and had to
happen as planned; nevertheless he felt the need of displaying his {18}
activity to his pupils in a less artificial setting. For this purpose
he made use of the out-patient department which he took charge of
personally in the so-called _Leçons du mardi_. There he examined
cases quite unknown to him, risked all the chance occurrences of an
interrogation, laid his authority aside and confessed at times that in
one case diagnosis was impossible, and that in another appearances had
deceived him. Never did he appear greater to his students than on
these occasions, when he thus did his best to lessen the distance
between teacher and pupils by giving them a complete and faithful
account of his own train of thought, by stating his doubts and
misgivings with the utmost frankness. The publication, at first in
French, now also in German of these improvised lectures of the years
1887 and 1888 has extended the circle of his admirers indefinitely;
nor has any other neuropathological work ever achieved greater success
among the medical public.

About the time that the clinic was instituted and the course in
pathological anatomy given up, there occurred a change in Charcot's
scientific interests to which we owe the best part of his work. He
explained that the theory of organic nervous diseases was for the
present fairly complete, and he began to turn his attention almost
exclusively to hysteria, thus suddenly focussing general attention on
this subject. This most enigmatic of all nervous diseases---no
workable point of view having yet been found from which physicians
could regard it---had just at this time come very much into discredit,
and this ill-repute related not only to the patients but was extended
to the physicians who treated this neurosis. The general opinion was
that anything may happen in hysteria; hysterics found no credit
whatsoever. First of all Charcot's work restored dignity to the
subject; gradually the sneering attitude, which the hysteric could {19}
reckon on meeting when she told her story, was given up; she was no
longer a malingerer, since Charcot had thrown the whole weight of his
authority on the side of the reality and objectivity of hysterical
phenomena. Charcot had repeated on a small scale the act of liberation
commemorated in the picture of Pinel which adorned the lecture hall of
the Salpêtrière. Now that the blind fear of being fooled by the poor
patient which had stood in the way of a serious study of the neurosis
was overcome, the question arose which mode of procedure would most
speedily lead to the solution of the problem. The wholly unprejudiced
observer might have found an opening in the following reflection: If I
find a person in a condition bearing all the marks of a painful
affect, crying, screaming, raving, I am led to surmise that a mental
process is going on in him of which these bodily phenomena are the
adequate expression. In such a case the normal person is capable of
telling us what is troubling him, but the hysteric would answer that
he did not know; and the problem at once arises: How comes it that the
hysteric is subject to an affect of the causes of which he claims to
know nothing? If we adhere to the conclusion that there must exist a
corresponding psychic process, and at the same time believe the
patient's assertion when he denies its existence, if we assemble all
the manifold signs which indicate that the patient nevertheless
behaves as though he knows the cause, if we search into the patient's
life and find therein a cause---a trauma---likely to create such an
affective expression---then indeed the solution is forced upon us that
the patient is in a peculiar mental condition in which his impressions
or memories are no longer all linked up one with the other, and in {20}
which it is possible for one memory to express its affect by means of
bodily phenomena without the other mental processes---the
ego---knowing about it or being able to interfere; and the
recollection of the well-known psychological difference between sleep
and the waking state might have lessened the strangeness of such an
hypothesis. Let no one object that the theory of dissociation of
consciousness as a solution of the enigma of hysteria is too
far-fetched to suggest itself to the untrained and unprejudiced
observer. In fact the Middle Ages had chosen this very solution, in
declaring possession by a demon to be the cause of hysterical
manifestations; all that would have been required was to replace the
religious terminology of those dark and superstitious times by the
scientific one of to-day.

Charcot did not choose this path in his explanation of hysteria,
though he drew plentifully from existing records of witchcraft trials
and of possession in order to show that the manifestations of neurosis
were the same then as they are now. He treated hysteria like any other
theme of neuropathology, gave the complete description of its
manifestations, showed that these had their own laws, and taught his
pupils to recognize the symptoms which make the diagnosis of hysteria
possible. He and his pupils occupied themselves in most careful tests
with the disturbances of sensibility caused by hysteria on the skin
and the deeper tissues, with the behaviour of the sense organs,
peculiarities of hysterical contractures and paralyses, trophic
disturbances and alterations of metabolism. The manifold forms of the
hysterical attack were described and a scheme drawn up which
represented the typical configuration of the attack of '_grande
hystérie_' in four stages, and permitted the correlation of the
commonly observed attacks of '_petite hystérie_' with the type. They {21}
also investigated the localization and frequency of the so-called
hysterogenic zones and their relation to the attacks, and so
on. Equipped with all this information about the manifestations of
hysteria it was possible to make a number of surprising discoveries;
it was found that hysteria was far commoner among men than had been
suspected, especially among working-men, and that certain conditions
which had been ascribed to alcoholic or lead poisoning were
hysterical. It was possible to include a large number of hitherto
unintelligible, unclassified affections under the head of hysteria,
and to distinguish the part played by hysteria in cases where the
neurosis was combined with other diseases, forming a complex clinical
picture. Most far-reaching in its influence was probably that research
work concerning the nervous diseases following upon traumas---the
traumatic neuroses---the conception of which is still under discussion
to-day; in all these affections Charcot successfully presented the
case for hysteria.

Since the latest extensions of the conception of hysteria had so
frequently led to a rejection of any ætiological diagnosis, the need
arose to investigate the ætiology of hysteria. Charcot laid down a
simple formula for this: heredity is the unique originating cause of
hysteria, which is therefore a form of degeneration, a member of the
'_famille névropathique_', all other ætiological factors playing the
part of precipitating causes, of '_agents provocateurs_'.

The building up of this great structure of doctrine was not, of
course, achieved without violent opposition. This was, however,
nothing but the barren objection of an older generation which disliked
making any change in its views. The younger group of
neuropathologists, in Germany as well, accepted Charcot's theories to
a greater or lesser extent. Charcot himself was quite convinced of {22}
the success of his teaching in regard to hysteria; if objections were
raised that the four stages of the attack, or that hysteria among men,
etc., were not observable outside France, he pointed out that he had
himself overlooked these things for a long time, and reasserted that
hysteria was the same everywhere and at all times. He disliked to hear
the French accused of being a far more nervous nation than other
peoples, and hysteria spoken of as their national foible; he was
delighted when a paper on a case of 'reflex epilepsy' in a German
grenadier could be diagnosed by him at a distance as one of hysteria.

At one point Charcot's work rose above the level of his general
treatment of hysteria and took a step which gives him for all time the
glory of being the first to elucidate hysteria. While he was occupied
with the study of hysterical paralyses appearing after traumas, the idea
occurred to him to reproduce by artificial means such paralyses as he
had previously carefully differentiated from organic disturbances; for
this purpose he took hysterical patients and placed them in a state of
somnambulism by hypnotism. He succeeded in producing a faultless
demonstration and proved thereby that these paralyses were the result of
specific ideas holding sway in the brain of the patient at moments of
special disposition. With this the mechanism of an hysterical phenomenon
was for the first time disclosed, and on this incomparably fine piece of
clinical research his own pupil Janet, and also Breuer and others, based
their theories of the neurosis which, while agreeing with the mediæval
view, replaces the 'demon' of priestly imagination by a psychological
formula.

Charcot's application of the phenomena of hypnosis to hysteria enabled
a very great advance to be made in this important sphere of hitherto {23}
neglected and despised facts, because the weight of his reputation put
an end once for all to doubts of the reality of hypnotic
manifestations. But this exclusively nosographic approach was not
suited to a purely psychological subject. Limiting the study of
hypnosis to hysterical patients, distinguishing between greater and
lesser hypnotism, establishing three stages of 'greater' hypnosis
distinguished by somatic signs---all these practices sank in the
estimation of contemporaries when Liébeault's pupil, Bernheim,
undertook the task of basing the theory of hypnotism on a broader
psychological foundation and of making suggestion the nucleus of
hypnosis. Only the opponents of hypnotism who content themselves with
hiding their own lack of experience behind some recognized authority
still cling to Charcot's pronouncements, and like to quote an
expression uttered in his last years denying that hypnosis has any
therapeutic efficacy whatever.

As for the ætiological theories which Charcot defended in his doctrine
of the '_famille névropathique_' and made the cornerstone of his whole
conception of nervous diseases, they too will probably soon need to be
probed into and corrected. So greatly did Charcot over-estimate heredity
as a cause that no loophole was left by which nervous disease could be
acquired; to syphilis he allotted only a modest place among the '_agents
provocateurs_'; nor did he, in ætiology or elsewhere, differentiate
sharply enough between the organic nervous affections and the neuroses.
The progress our science has made in additions to its knowledge will
inevitably diminish the value of much that Charcot has taught us, but
neither the passing of time nor the changing of ideas will diminish the
glory of the man whom we---in France and elsewhere---are mourning
to-day.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

II {24}

ON THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM OF
HYSTERICAL PHENOMENA[2]

(In collaboration with Dr. Joseph Breuer, 1892)

I

Stimulated by a chance observation, we have for a number of years been
investigating the most varied types and symptoms of hysteria with
reference to the exciting cause, the event which evoked the phenomenon
in question for the first time, often many years before. In the great
majority of cases it is impossible to discover this starting-point by
straightforward interrogation of the patient, be it ever so thorough;
partly because it is often a matter of experiences which the patient
finds it disagreeable to discuss, but chiefly because he really does not
remember and has no idea of the causal connection between the exciting
occurrence and the pathological phenomenon. As a rule it is necessary to
hypnotise the patient and under hypnosis to arouse recollections
relating to the time when the symptom first appeared; one can then
succeed in revealing this connection in the clearest and most convincing
manner.

In a great number of cases this method of examination has yielded
results which appear to be valuable theoretically as well as
practically. From the theoretical point of view the results are
valuable because, for the pathology of hysteria, the accidental factor
is decisive to a far greater extent than is known or acknowledged. In {25}
regard to traumatic hysteria it is obviously the accident which has
evoked the syndrome; and when we learn from the utterances of patients
in hysterical attacks that they invariably hallucinate in every attack
a repetition of the original occurrence which evoked the first, the
causal connection then also becomes perfectly clear here. The question
is more obscure in the case of other phenomena.

Our experience has shown us, however, that the most varied symptoms,
usually regarded as spontaneous and, so to speak, idiopathic products of
hysteria, have just as strict a connection with the exciting trauma as
those mentioned above in which the relation of the two sets of facts to
one another is transparent. To exciting causes of this kind we have been
able to trace anæsthesias as well as neuralgias of the most varied kind,
often of many years duration, contractures and paralyses, hysterical
attacks and epileptoid convulsions which all observers had taken for
genuine epilepsy, _petit-mal_, symptoms of the nature of tics, chronic
vomiting and anorexia carried to the point of refusal of food, the most
varied disturbances of vision, constantly recurring visual
hallucinations---and the like. The disproportion between the many years
duration of an hysterical symptom and the single occurrence which evoked
it is similar to that which we are accustomed to see regularly in
traumatic neurosis; it was quite frequently in childhood that the events
occurred producing a more or less grave symptom which persisted from
that time onwards.

The connection is often so clear that it is quite evident how the
exciting event has happened to produce just this and no other
manifestation; the phenomenon is determined in a perfectly clear
manner by the cause; to take the most ordinary example, a painful {26}
affect, which was originally excited while eating but was suppressed,
produces nausea and vomiting, and this continues for months as
hysterical vomiting. A girl watching in harrowing anxiety at the
bedside of a sick person falls into a twilight state and has a
terrifying hallucination while her right arm which is hanging over the
back of the chair 'goes to sleep'; from this develops a paresis of
that arm with contracture and anæsthesia. She wants to pray but can
find no words; finally she succeeds in repeating an English prayer
which she learnt in childhood. Then later a severe and highly
complicated hysteria develops in which she can speak, write and
understand only English, while for a year and a half her mother-tongue
remains unintelligible to her.---A child who is very ill at last falls
asleep, and its mother tries her utmost to keep quiet and not to wake
it; but just in consequence of this resolution (hysterical
counterwill) she makes a clucking noise with her tongue. On another
occasion when she wishes to keep absolutely quiet this happens again,
and so a tic in the form of tongue-clicking develops which for a
number of years accompanies every excitement.---A highly intelligent
man assists while his brother's ankylosed hip is straightened under an
anæsthetic. At the instant when the joint gives way with a crack he
feels a violent pain in his own hip-joint which lasts for almost a
year; and so on.

In other cases the connection is not so simple; there exists only what
may be called a symbolic relation between the cause and the
pathological manifestation, such as normal people also fashion in
dreams; for example, a neuralgia links itself on to some mental
distress, or vomiting accompanies a feeling of moral disgust. We have
had under observation patients who habitually made extensive use of {27}
such symbolism. In yet other cases a determination of this kind is not
at the first glance clearly intelligible; to these belong precisely
the typical hysterical symptoms---hemianæsthesia, contraction of the
field of vision, epileptiform convulsions and the like. The exposition
of our theories concerning this group must be reserved for a more
detailed consideration of the subject.

Such observations seem to us to prove the pathogenic analogy between
ordinary hysteria and traumatic neurosis and to justify an extension
of the concept of traumatic hysteria. In traumatic neurosis the active
cause of illness is not the trifling bodily injury but the affect of
fright---the psychic trauma. Similarly, our investigations of many, if
not of the majority, of hysterical symptoms have revealed causes which
must be described as psychic traumas. Any experience which rouses the
distressing affects of fright, apprehension, shame, or psychical pain
can have this effect and it obviously depends on the sensitiveness of
the person concerned (as well as on a further condition which we will
refer to later) whether the experience acquires the importance of a
trauma. We not infrequently find in ordinary hysteria several partial
traumas instead of one grand trauma---a group of causes---which can
only achieve traumatic effectiveness by accumulation and which belong
together only in so far as they form parts of a whole painful
experience. In still other cases circumstances in themselves
apparently indifferent have attained an otherwise unexpected
importance as traumas, either on account of their conjunction with
really effective experiences or because they occurred at a moment of
special susceptibility. This importance they then retain henceforward. {28}

But the causal connection between the exciting psychical trauma and the
hysterical symptom is not of such a kind that the trauma (like an _agent
provocateur_) sets going a symptom which then becomes independent and
persists on its own account. On the contrary, we are of opinion that the
psychical trauma, or the memory of it, acts as a kind of foreign body
constituting an effective agent in the present even long after it first
penetrated; and we see the proof of this in a highly remarkable
phenomenon which also lends an important practical interest to these
results of our observations.

The discovery that we made, at first to our own great surprise, was
that when we had succeeded in bringing the exciting event to clear
recollection, and had also succeeded in arousing with it the
accompanying affect, and when the patient had related the occurrence
in as detailed a manner as possible and had expressed his feeling in
regard to it in words, the various hysterical symptoms disappeared at
once, never to return. Recollection without affect is nearly always
quite ineffective; the original psychical process must be repeated as
vividly as possible, brought into _statum nascendi_ and then 'talked
out'. In the case of excitation phenomena---contractures, neuralgias,
and hallucinations---the symptoms appear again during this repetition
in full intensity and then disappear for ever. Defects in functioning,
paralyses and anæsthesias disappear in the same way, the transitory
exacerbation not being of course perceptible in those cases.[3] {29}

One may be inclined to suspect that the explanation lies in
unintentional suggestion; the patient expects to be rid of his suffering
as a result of the treatment, and this expectation might be the
effective factor, not the 'talking out'. But this is not the fact; the
first observation of this kind was a highly complicated case of hysteria
having symptoms with distinct causes which were separately dispersed,
and was analysed on these lines in the year 1881, that is, in the
'pre-suggestion' era. It was made possible by spontaneous auto-hypnosis
on the part of the patient, and it occasioned the observer the greatest
surprise.

Inverting the phrase '_cessante causa cessat effectus_', we may well
conclude from these observations that the exciting experience continues
in some way to be effective even years after, not indirectly by means of
a chain of causes linking up with one another, but directly as the
actual exciting cause---just as, for instance, the recollection of
mental distress in full consciousness at some later period may stimulate
tears; we thus conclude that _hysterical patients suffer principally
from reminiscences_.[4]

II

It may at first appear strange that experiences long since past should
operate with such intensity, and that the memory of them should not {30}
succumb to the fate which we see overtaking all our memories; perhaps
these facts may become rather more comprehensible in the light of the
following considerations.

The fading of a memory or of its affect depends on several factors.
First and foremost it depends on whether an energetic reaction
(discharge of feeling) supervened on the affective experience or
not. By _reaction_ we here mean the whole range of voluntary and
involuntary reflexes, by which according to experience the affects are
habitually worked off---from weeping up to an actual act of
revenge. If this reaction occurs with sufficient intensity a great
part of the affect disappears; common speech bears witness to these
facts of every-day observation in the expressions 'to cry oneself
out', 'to storm oneself out (_sich austoben_)'. If the reaction is
suppressed the affect remains attached to the memory. An insult which
is returned, if only in words, is remembered differently from one
which had to be endured in silence. Common speech also recognizes
this difference in the psychical and bodily consequences, and most
characteristically designates silently endured suffering as a
_Kränkung_,[5] wound, injury, mortification. The reaction of an
injured person to the trauma has a really complete 'cathartic' effect
only if it takes the form of a fully adequate reaction, such as an act
of revenge. But man finds a surrogate for such an act in speech, by
the help of which the affect may be almost as effectually
'abreacted'. In other cases talking is itself sufficient as a reflex,
for example, complaining or relieving the burden of a secret (the
confessional!). If a reaction of this kind by word or deed, or in the {31}
mildest cases by tears, does not ensue, the memory of the occurrence
retains for a time its affective tone.

'Abreaction' is, however, not the only kind of solution at the disposal
of the normal psychical mechanism in a healthy person who has met with a
psychical trauma. Even if the memory is not abreacted it becomes merged
in the great complex of associations, and is then ranged alongside of
other experiences which perhaps contradict it; thus it undergoes
correction by means of other ideas. After an accident, for example, the
remembrance of the danger and the subsequent (weakened) reproduction of
the terror is accompanied by the memory of the sequel, of the rescue and
the consciousness of present security. The memory of an injury to the
feelings is corrected by an objective evaluation of the facts,
consideration of one's actual worth and the like, and thus the normal
man succeeds by means of associations in dissipating the accompanying
affect.

In addition to this there is also that general effacing of impressions,
that fading of recollection called 'forgetting', which tends more than
anything else to absorb ideas which have lost their affective tone.

Our observations have shown that those memories which give rise to
hysterical phenomena are retained with wonderful freshness and with
full affective tone for a long period. But we must mention as a
further striking fact, to be turned to account later, that these
recollections are not at the disposal of the patient in the way that
his more commonplace memories are. On the contrary, when the patient
is in his usual psychical condition these experiences are completely
absent from his memory or are present to it only in the most summary
manner. Only when patients are questioned under hypnosis do these {32}
memories recur with the undiminished vividness of recent events.

Thus for six months one of our patients under hypnosis reproduced with
hallucinatory vividness everything which had excited her on the
corresponding day of the previous year (during an acute hysteria); her
mother's diary, of which she knew nothing, attested the perfect accuracy
of the reproduction. Another patient lived through with hallucinatory
clearness---partly in hypnosis, partly in spontaneous attacks---all the
experiences of an hysterical psychosis which she had suffered from ten
years before, and in regard to which amnesia had been almost complete
until the moment of the re-emergence. Several ætiologically important
recollections dating back fifteen to twenty-five years were of
astonishing integrity, and intensity of feeling; on reproduction their
effect had the full force of new experiences.

As a reason for this we can only conjecture that these recollections
have met with an exceptional fate in reference to all the ordinary
processes of effacement discussed above, for we find that they relate to
traumas which have not been sufficiently abreacted; closer investigation
of the reasons which have prevented the operation of the latter then
shows us at least two groups of conditions under which reaction to the
trauma does not ensue.

In the first group we reckon those cases in which the patient has not
reacted to the psychical trauma because its nature excluded the
possibility of any such reaction, as in the case of the apparently
irretrievable loss of a loved person, or when social conditions made a
reaction impossible, or when the trauma concerned something which the
patient wished to forget and therefore deliberately repressed[6] and {33}
excluded from his conscious thoughts. Under hypnosis we discover
painful ideas of precisely this character underlying the hysterical
phenomena (e.g. in the hysterical deliria of saints and nuns, of
abstinent women and well-brought-up children).

The second group of conditions is not determined by the content of the
recollection, but by the mental condition of the patient at the moment
when the given experience occurred. That is to say, among the exciting
factors of hysterical symptoms we also discover under hypnosis ideas
which though not in themselves significant owe their preservation to the
circumstance that they happen to coincide with a seriously disabling
affect, for example, terror, or with a directly abnormal mental
condition, such as the half-hypnotic twilight state of day-dreaming,
auto-hypnosis, and the like. In these cases it is the nature of these
conditions which made a reaction to the experience impossible.

Naturally both determinants may and often do occur together. This
happens when a trauma effective enough in itself occurs during a state
of seriously disabling affect or of altered consciousness; but it seems
that in many persons an abnormal state of this kind is produced as the
result of a psychic trauma which then in its turn makes a reaction
impossible.

Both groups of determining conditions have this in common: that the
psychical traumas which are not resolved by reaction will also fail of
solution by means of associative absorption. In the first group the
patient's intention to do so causes him to forget the painful {34}
experiences and consequently to exclude them from association as far
as possible. In the second group the associative absorption does not
succeed because sufficient associative connection does not exist
between the normal state of consciousness and the pathological state
in which these ideas originally arose. We shall have immediate
occasion to go more closely into these conditions.

Thus it may be said that the ideas which have become pathogenic are
preserved with such freshness and affective force because the normal
process of absorption by abreaction and by reproduction in a state of
unrestrained association is denied them.

III

In describing the conditions which according to our experience are
decisive for the development of hysterical phenomena from psychical
traumas, we mentioned the abnormal states of consciousness in which
such pathological ideas arise; and we laid stress on the fact that the
recollection of the effective psychical trauma is not to be found in
the normal memory of the patient, but in his memory under
hypnosis. Indeed, the more we occupied ourselves with these phenomena
the more certain did our conviction become that that splitting of
consciousness, which is so striking in the well-known classical cases
of _double conscience_, exists in a rudimentary fashion in every
hysteria and that the tendency to this dissociation---and therewith to
the production of abnormal states of consciousness, which may be
included under the term '_hypnoid_'---is a fundamental manifestation
of this neurosis. This view is in agreement with those of Binet and
the two Janets; we have not had the opportunity, however, to confirm
their highly remarkable discoveries in reference to anæsthetic {35}
patients.

We should like therefore to supplement the often-quoted phrase 'hypnosis
is an artificial hysteria' with another---namely, 'the existence of
hypnoid states forms the foundation and condition of hysteria'. There is
one thing common to all these hypnoid states and to hypnosis, in spite
of all their differences---namely, that the ideas which emerge in them
are marked by great intensity of feeling but are cut off from
associative connection with the rest of the content of consciousness.
These hypnoid states are capable of association among themselves and the
ideas belonging to them may in this way attain different degrees of
psychical organization. Incidentally, however, the nature of these
states and the degree of their inaccessibility to the rest of conscious
processes would very probably vary in a fashion similar to that of
hypnosis, which ranges from light sleepiness to somnambulism, from
complete recollection to absolute amnesia.

If such hypnoid states exist before the manifest illness, they provide
a foothold upon which the affect establishes itself with its
pathogenic recollection and its subsequent somatic
manifestations. This situation corresponds to dispositional
hysteria. But our observations show that a severe trauma (such as that
in a traumatic neurosis) or a troublesome suppression (for instance,
of sexual affect) can effect a splitting of groups of ideas in people
previously free from it, and this would constitute the mechanism of
psychically acquired hysteria. Between the extremes of these two forms
we must recognize a series within which the readiness to dissociation
in the persons concerned and the volume of affect roused by the trauma
varies inversely. {36}

We have nothing new to say concerning the origin of dispositional
hypnoid states. They often develop, we believe, from the 'day-dreams' so
frequently met with also in healthy people, great opportunity for which
is provided, for instance, in the feminine occupation of needlework. The
question why the 'pathological associations' formed in such states are
so strong and why they influence somatic processes so much more strongly
than ideas habitually do is part of the problem of the operation of
hypnotic suggestion in general. Our experiences teach us nothing new on
this point; they do, however, illuminate the contradiction between the
statement 'hysteria is a psychosis' and the fact that one finds among
hysterics people with the clearest and most critical intellects, of
great strength of character and will-power. These characteristics in
such people are valid for their waking thoughts; in the hypnoid state
they become alienated from their conscious personalities as we all are
in dreams. But whereas our dream-psychoses do not influence our waking
existence the products of hypnoid states intrude as hysterical phenomena
into waking life.

IV

Almost the same conclusions that we have just formed concerning
hysterical symptoms of long duration may be repeated concerning
hysterical attacks. As is well known, we possess a schematic
description of the '_grande attaque_', worked out by Charcot,
according to which four phases may be recognized in a complete attack:
(1) the epileptoid, (2) that of violent movements, (3) that of
'_attitudes passionnelles_' (the hallucinatory phase), and (4) that of
the concluding delirium. According to Charcot, all the various forms
of an hysterical attack (which as a matter of fact are more frequently {37}
observed than the full _grande attaque_) are derived from a
shortening, lengthening, omission or isolation of these separate
phases.

Our attempt at explanation has to do with the third phase, the
_attitudes passionnelles_. When this is well-marked it will reveal
itself as an hallucinatory reproduction of a memory important for the
outbreak of the hysteria, i.e. the memory of the one grand trauma in
what is called _κατ' ἐξοχήν_ traumatic hysteria, or of a series of
inter-related partial traumas which lie at the root of ordinary
hysteria. The remaining alternative is that the attack will reproduce
those experiences which were raised to importance by happening to occur
at a time of special sensitivity to traumas.

But there are also attacks which seems to consist of nothing but motor
symptoms and in which the _phase passionnelle_ is lacking. If we can
succeed in establishing a _rapport_ with the patient during such
general clonic attacks, during tonic catalepsy, or during an _attaque
de sommeil_, or, better still, if we succeed in summoning up an attack
while the patient is under hypnosis, we find that these attacks too
are based on the memory of a psychic trauma or series of traumas which
usually finds expression in an hallucinatory phase. For instance, a
little girl has suffered for years from attacks of general convulsions
which might have been epilepsy and had in fact been taken for it. To
establish a differential diagnosis she was hypnotised and was promptly
seized by an attack. When asked: 'What do you see now?' she answered:
'The dog, the dog is coming!' Further enquiry revealed that the first
attack of the kind had appeared after she had been chased by a mad
dog. Therapeutic success later confirmed the diagnosis of a
psychogenic malady.---A clerk who had become hysterical in consequence {38}
of being assaulted by his superior suffered from attacks during which
he fell to the ground in a frenzy of rage, but without uttering a word
or betraying any signs of an hallucination. An attempt to produce the
attack under hypnosis proved successful, and the patient revealed that
he was again living through the situation in which his superior had
openly insulted him in the street and thrashed him with a stick. A few
days afterwards he returned complaining that the same attack had
occurred again, and this time he revealed under hypnosis that he had
been living through the situation which provoked the actual outbreak
of the disease, i.e. the trial in court where he failed to obtain
compensation for the injury.

The memories which come to the fore in hysterical attacks, or can be
wakened during them, correspond also in all other respects with the
exciting occurrences which we have found at the root of hysterical
symptoms of long duration. Like these, they relate to psychic traumas
which have remained unresolved by abreaction or by associative mental
operations; and like these, they---or at least their essential
constituents---are absent from the store of memories of which normal
consciousness is made up; they belong to the ideational content of
hypnoid states of consciousness with their narrow fields of association.
Finally, they also admit of the therapeutic test. Our observations have
often demonstrated that a memory of this kind which had hitherto
provoked such attacks lost this power as soon as it was brought during
hypnosis to a reaction or to associative readjustment.

The motor phenomena of hysterical attacks are to be explained partly
as a general mode of reaction to the affect which accompanies the
memory, and may be compared, for example, with the beating movements {39}
of all the limbs which even an infant makes use of for this purpose;
and partly as signifying direct emotional expressions of this memory;
although they also elude this explanation to some extent as do the
hysterical stigmata in chronic symptoms.

There is yet another aspect of the hysterical attack which reveals
itself in the light of the theory we have just indicated: that in
hysteria there are present ideational groups (arising in hypnoid
states) which, cut off from associative relations with the remainder
but associable _inter se_, establish a more or less highly organized
nucleus of a second consciousness, a _condition seconde_. An
hysterical symptom of long duration then corresponds to an intrusion
of this _condition seconde_ into the somatic innervations usually
controlled by normal consciousness; an hysterical attack, however,
gives evidence of a higher organization of this _condition seconde_
and, when of recent origin, signifies the moment at which this hypnoid
consciousness takes possession of the subject's whole personality
(i.e. an acute hysteria); but recurring attacks which contain a memory
signify a recurrence of this moment. Charcot has already suggested
that the hysterical attack is probably the nucleus of a _condition
seconde_. During the attack, control of the entire somatic innervation
has passed to the hypnoid consciousness. Experience shows that in
these cases normal consciousness is not always completely superseded;
it may even perceive the motor phenomena of the attack while the
psychic processes of the latter escape its notice.

The typical course of a severe hysteria is, as is well known, that
first an ideational content is formed in hypnoid states, which then,
when sufficiently developed, takes possession during a period of
'acute hysteria' of the somatic innervation and personality of the {40}
patient, creates chronic symptoms and attacks, and then recedes until
mere vestiges of it are left. If therefore the normal personality can
regain control, what remains of the hypnoid ideational contents then
returns in hysterical attacks and again temporarily produces in the
patient similar states, which are again susceptible themselves and
predisposing to the influence of traumas. A sort of equilibrium
between the psychical groups united in the same personality is then
frequently established; attacks and normal life exist side by side
without affecting one another. The attacks then arise spontaneously,
as memories commonly do; but they may also be provoked, just as any
memory may be aroused according to the laws of association.
Provocation of an attack occurs either by stimulation of an
hysterogenic zone or by a new experience resembling the pathogenic
experience. We hope to be able to show that no essential difference
exists between the two conditions, apparently so distinct; that in
both cases a hyperæsthetic memory has been stirred. In other cases
this equilibrium is very unstable; the attack appears as an expression
of the vestiges of hypnoid consciousness whenever the normal
personality is exhausted and powerless. It is not impossible that in
such cases the attack may be divested of its original significance and
may return as a motor reaction without content.

It remains a task for further enquiry to discover what are the
conditions determining whether in any given patient an hysteria will
take the form of attacks, or chronic symptoms, or a combination of both.

V

It is now clear how the method of psychotherapy which we have just
described leads to recovery. By providing an opportunity for the
pent-up affect to discharge itself in words the therapy deprives of {41}
its effective power the idea which was not originally abreacted; by
conducting it into normal consciousness (in light hypnosis) it brings
it into associative readjustment or else dispels it by means of the
physicians' suggestion, as happens in cases of somnambulism combined
with amnesia.

We regard the therapeutic effect achieved by employing this procedure as
important. We naturally cannot cure that element in hysteria which is
dispositional; we can do nothing against the return of hypnoid states.
Even during the productive state of an acute hysteria our procedure
cannot prevent the phenomena which have just been removed with such
difficulty being forthwith replaced by new ones. But when the acute
stage has passed off and its vestiges remain in the form of chronic
hysterical symptoms and attacks our method will frequently remove them
in turn, and the results are permanent because radical. It therefore
appears to us that in this respect it far surpasses the effect of
removal by direct suggestion which is now practised by
psychotherapeutists.

Although, by thus disclosing the psychical mechanism of hysterical
phenomena, we have now made a further step along the path which Charcot
first opened up so successfully with his explanations and experimental
imitations of hystero-traumatic paralyses, we nevertheless do not
conceal from ourselves that it is only the mechanism of the hysterical
symptom that has been brought within our grasp and not the inner causes
of hysteria. We have but touched upon the ætiology of hysteria and have
really only been able to throw light on the causes of its acquired
forms---the significance of the accidental factor for this neurosis.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

III {42}
SOME POINTS IN A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF ORGANIC AND HYSTERICAL PARALYSES[7]
(1893)

In 1885 and 1886, when I was his pupil, Charcot was good enough to
entrust me with the task of making a comparative study of organic and
hysterical motor paralyses, based upon observations at the Salpêtrière,
which might serve to discover some of the common characteristics of
neuroses and lead to a conception of their nature. Accidental and
personal reasons prevented me from following his suggestion for a long
time; even now I only intend to give an account of some of the results
of my work, omitting the details needed for a complete demonstration of
my views.

I

I must begin with some remarks on the nature of organic paralyses,
which incidentally represent generally accepted conclusions. Clinical
neurology recognizes two forms of motor paralyses: periphero-spinal
(or bulbar) and cerebral. This distinction is entirely in harmony with
the facts of the nervous system, which show that there are only two
segments in the course of the motor fibres: one extending from the
periphery to the anterior horn cells of the spinal cord, and a second
which proceeds from here to the cerebral cortex. Modern
neuro-histology, based upon the work of Golgi, Ramón y Cajal,
Kölliker, etc., formulates these facts as follows: The path of fibres
conducting motor impulses consists of two neurones (a {43}
neuro-histological unit composed of a cell and its fibres) which meet
in intimate relation at the so-called motor cells of the anterior
horn. The essential clinical difference between these two types of
paralysis is the following: _Periphero-spinal paralysis is a paralysis
of individual elements while cerebral paralysis is a paralysis en
masse_. Types of the former are the facial palsy of Bell, the
paralysis in infantile anterior poliomyelitis, etc. Now in these
diseases each muscle, we might say each muscle fibre, may be paralysed
individually and in isolation. It depends only upon the site and
extent of the nerve lesion; there is, moreover, no definite rule
according to which one peripheral element escapes paralysis while
another is permanently subject to it.

Cerebral paralysis, on the other hand, is always a disease affecting a
considerable portion of the periphery, an extremity, a segment of it, or
a complicated motor apparatus. It never affects one muscle alone, as for
example, the biceps brachii or the tibialis; in any apparent exceptions
to this rule (cortical ptosis, for example) it is evident that the
muscles concerned are of the kind which in themselves fulfil a
particular function---in which they are the sole agents.

It may be noted that in cerebral paralyses affecting the extremities
distal segments always suffer more than proximal ones; the hand, for
example, is more paralysed than the shoulder. As far as I know, there is
no isolated cerebral paralysis of the shoulder in which the hand retains
its motor power, while the reverse is the rule in incomplete paralyses.

In a critical study of aphasia, published in 1891 (_Zur Auffassung der
Aphasien_, _Wien_, _1891_), I attempted to show that the cause of this
important difference between periphero-spinal and cerebral paralysis
was to be sought in the structure of the nervous system. Each element {44}
in the periphery corresponds to one in the grey substance, which is,
as Charcot expresses it, its neural terminus; the periphery is then,
so to say, projected on to the grey substance of the spinal cord,
point by point, element for element. I have proposed that the
particularized periphero-spinal paralysis should be named 'projection
paralysis'. The relation between the elements of the spinal cord and
those of the cortex is, however, different. The number of conducting
fibres would no longer suffice for a second projection of the
periphery, to the cortex. We must suppose that the fibres coming from
the spinal cord to the cortex no longer represent single peripheral
elements, but rather a group of them; on the other hand, a peripheral
element may correspond to several spino-cortical fibres. The change in
arrangement occurs at the point where the two segments of the motor
system meet.

Therefore I would say that the reproduction of the periphery in the
cortex is no longer an accurate one, point for point; it is not a true
projection. The relation is established so to say by representative
fibres, and I propose therefore to name the cerebral form of paralysis
'representation paralysis'.

Naturally, when a projection paralysis is total and very extensive, it
too becomes a paralysis _en masse_ and its striking distinctive
characteristic disappears. Cortical paralysis, on the other hand, which
is differentiated from the other cerebral paralyses by a greater
tendency to dissociation, nevertheless invariably presents the character
of a representation paralysis.

The other differences between projection paralysis and representation
paralysis are well known. Among them I may mention the preservation of
nutrition and of electrical reaction in the latter. Although {45}
clinically very important, these signs have not the theoretical
significance that is to be ascribed to the first differential trait
mentioned, i.e., whether the paralysis be one of individual elements
or _en masse_.

Hysteria has often been credited with the faculty of simulating the most
varied kinds of organic nervous diseases. The question arises whether it
can simulate accurately the characteristics of both types of organic
paralysis, whether there are hysterical projection paralyses and
hysterical representation paralyses, as in the organic symptomatology.
An important fact at once confronts us here. Hysteria never simulates
the periphero-spinal or projection paralyses; hysterical paralyses show
the characteristics of organic representation paralyses only. This is
indeed a very interesting fact, since Bell's palsy, musculo-spinal
paralysis, etc., are among the most common diseases of the nervous
system.

It should be noted in this connection, in order to avoid all confusion,
that I am dealing only with flaccid hysterical paralyses and not with
hysterical contractures. It seems to me impossible to apply the same
rules to both hysterical paralyses and hysterical contractures. The
contention that the paralysis never affects an isolated muscle (unless
such a muscle be the sole agent of a function), that the paralysis is
always _en masse_, agreeing in this respect with an organic cerebral
representation paralysis, can only be maintained in respect of flaccid
hysterical paralyses. Further, in regard to the nutrition and electrical
reactions of the paralysed part hysterical paralysis shows the same
characteristics as organic cerebral paralysis.

But although hysterical paralysis may be related in this way to
cerebral and especially to cortical paralysis, which exhibits a {46}
greater aptitude for dissociation, important distinctive traits are
not lacking between them. In the first place, it is not subject to the
constant fixed rule of organic cerebral paralyses, namely, that the
distal segment is always more extensively affected than the proximal
one. In hysteria, the shoulder or the thigh may be more seriously
paralysed than the hand or the foot. Movements may occur in the
fingers while the proximal part is still absolutely motionless. There
is not the least difficulty in producing artificially an isolated
paralysis of the thigh, of the leg, etc., and clinically we quite
frequently meet with these isolated paralyses which do not conform to
the rules of organic cerebral paralyses.

In this important respect hysterical paralysis is, so to speak,
intermediate in type between projection paralysis and representation
paralysis. On the one hand it does not possess all the characteristics
of dissociation and isolation proper to the former; on the other hand it
is by no means subject to the rules which strictly govern the latter.
With these reservations we may say that hysterical paralysis also is a
representation paralysis, but one possessing a special manner of
representation which remains to be discovered.[8]

II

As a step in this direction I propose to study the other traits which
differentiate hysterical paralysis from the most perfect form of {47}
cerebral organic paralysis---namely, cortical paralysis. The first of
these distinguishing characteristics has been mentioned, the fact that
hysterical paralysis may be much more dissociated and systematised
than cerebral paralysis. The symptoms of organic paralysis appear in
hysteria as if apportioned. Hysteria reproduces the common organic
hemiplegia (paralysis of the upper and lower extremities and of the
lower half of the face) only to the extent of imitating the paralysis
of the limbs; frequently it even splits off the paralysis of the arm
from that of the leg, exhibiting with the greatest ease paralysis in
the form of a monoplegia. It reproduces in an isolated form the motor
aphasia seen in the syndrome of organic aphasia and, as I have
observed in some unpublished cases, it can create a total aphasia
(motor and sensory) for a given language, without affecting in the
least the ability to understand and to speak another, a phenomenon
unheard-of in organic aphasia. This power of dissociation is again
manifested in those isolated paralyses in which one segment of a limb
is affected while other portions of the same limb are entirely intact,
and again, when one function is completely abolished (abasia astasia)
while another function performed by the same organ is unaffected. The
more complex the function in question, the more striking is this
dissociation. In organic disease, whenever several functions are
impaired in different degrees, it is always the most complex function,
the one most recently acquired, that is most extensively affected by
the paralysis.

In addition to the above, hysterical paralysis presents another
characteristic, which is, as it were, the hall-mark of the neurosis.
Indeed, as I heard Charcot say, hysteria is a malady with extravagant
manifestations, with a tendency to produce its symptoms in the {48}
severest possible degree. This characteristic is not met with only in
the paralyses but also in the contractures and anæsthesias. The
degree of distortion that may be produced by hysterical contractures
is well known and is hardly equalled in organic symptomatology. We
also know how frequently hysteria exhibits the absolute, profound
anæsthesias, of which the organic lesions only reproduce a faint
sketch. The same is true of the paralyses; they are often as complete
as is possible. The hysterical aphasic does not utter a word, while
the organic aphasic almost always retains a few syllables, 'yes',
'no', an oath, etc.; the paralysed arm is absolutely inert, and so
on. This characteristic is too well known to dwell on it at length. On
the other hand, it is known that in organic paralysis partial paresis
is always more common than complete paralysis.

Hysterical paralysis, then, shows an _exact delimitation_ and an
_excessive intensity_. It possesses these two qualities
simultaneously, and it is in this respect that it contrasts most
strongly with organic cerebral paralysis, in which these two
characteristics are never associated. Monoplegias do exist in organic
symptomatology also, but they are almost always monoplegias _a
potiori_ and not sharply delimited. If an arm is paralysed in
consequence of a cortical lesion, there is almost always a minor
concomitant affection of the face and leg; and if this complication is
no longer visible at a given period, it existed nevertheless at the
beginning of the disease. Cortical monoplegia is indeed always a
hemiplegia, of which one part or another has been more or less effaced
but still remains recognizable. To go further, let us suppose that the
paralysis has affected the arm alone, that it is a pure cortical {49}
monoplegia; in such a case we shall see that the paralysis is one of
moderate degree. As this monoplegia increases in degree, and as soon
as it becomes a total paralysis, it at once loses its characteristic
of being a pure monoplegia and will be accompanied by motor
disturbances in the leg or the face. _It cannot become a complete
paralysis and at the same time remain restricted in area_.

This is the very condition, however, that hysterical paralysis can
easily accomplish, as we may see daily in clinical work. For example, it
may affect the arm exclusively without showing a trace in the leg or the
face. Further, in the arm it is as complete as a paralysis can possibly
be, and this forms a striking contrast to organic paralysis, a
difference that gives occasion for serious reflection.

There are, of course, cases of hysterical paralysis in which the degree
of paralysis is not excessive and in which the dissociation offers
nothing remarkable. Such cases are recognized by other traits; but they
are cases that do not bear the typical stamp of neurosis and, since they
cannot teach us anything about the nature of the latter, are of no
interest for our present purpose.

Let me add a few remarks of minor importance, though they overstep the
limits of my subject.

To begin with, I may recall the fact that hysterical paralyses are
much more frequently accompanied by sensory disturbances than are
organic paralyses; such disturbances are altogether more profound and
frequent in neurosis than in organic disease. Nothing is more common
than hysterical anæsthesia or analgesia. Recollect, in contrast to
this, how obstinately sensation persists in cases of organic
lesion. If a peripheral nerve is cut, the anæsthesia will be less
extensive and intense than might be expected. When an inflammatory {50}
process attacks the spinal nerves or the spinal cord centres the
result always is that motility suffers in the first instance, while
sensibility remains or is merely diminished; for some part of the
nervous elements which have not been completely destroyed always
persists. With cerebral lesions the frequency and the permanency of
motor hemiplegia is well known, while the accompanying hemianæsthesia
is vague and transitory, and is not always present. Only a few special
localizations can produce a marked and lasting sensory disturbance
(_carrefour sensitif_), and even this fact is not free from doubt.

This difference in the nature of the sensory disturbances in organic
lesions and in hysteria is scarcely explicable with our present
knowledge. The solution of this problem would probably reveal the core
of the whole matter.

Another point that seems to me worthy of mention is that there are
some forms of cerebral paralysis which, just like the periphero-spinal
projection paralyses, are not found in hysteria. Paralysis of the
lower half of the face, the most frequent manifestation of organic
brain disease, should be mentioned first in this connection, and, if I
may be permitted to enter the field of sensorial disturbances,
homonymus lateral hemianopsia. I know that I run a risk in stating
that a given symptom does not exist in hysteria when the researches of
Charcot and his pupils are almost daily discovering new and hitherto
unsuspected symptoms. But I must take things as they are at the
moment. The existence of an hysterical facial paralysis is seriously
contested by Charcot, and, even if we believe those who vouch for it,
it is a very rare phenomenon. Hemianopsia has not as yet been seen in
hysteria, and I believe it never will be. {51}

Now how is it that hysterical paralyses closely simulate cortical ones
and yet differ from them in the distinctive characteristics that I have
attempted to enumerate, and what is the special type of representation
to which they conform? The answer to this question would embody a large
and important part of the theory of this neurosis.

III

Not the least doubt exists about the conditions controlling the
symptomatology of cerebral paralysis. They are the facts of
anatomy---the structure of the nervous system, the distribution of its
vessels and the inter-relation between these two sets of facts and the
nature of the lesion. We have said that the basis of the difference
between the projection paralysis and the representation paralysis lies
in the smaller number of fibres proceeding from the spinal cord to the
cortex in comparison with the number proceeding from the periphery to
the spinal cord. Again, every clinical detail of a representation
paralysis finds its explanation in some detail of cerebral anatomy and,
_vice versa_, we can deduce the structure of the brain from the clinical
characteristics of the paralyses. We believe that a perfect parallel
exists between these two series of facts.

Thus if cerebral paralysis does not show any great tendency to
dissociation, it is because the fibres conducting motor impulses run
too close together for a great part of their intra-cerebral course for
them to be injured individually. If cortical paralysis shows a greater
tendency to monoplegias, it is because the diameter of the conducting
bundle, brachial, crural, etc., goes on increasing up to the
cortex. If paralysis of the hand is the most complete of all the
cortical ones, it is, I believe, because the contralateral relation
between hemisphere and periphery is more nearly complete for the hand {52}
than for any other part of the body. If the distal segment of an
extremity suffers a greater degree of paralysis than a proximal
segment, it may be assumed that the representative fibres of the
distal segment are more numerous than those of the proximal one, so
that the influence of the cortex is more important for the former than
for the latter. If moderate-sized lesions of the cortex do not succeed
in producing pure monoplegias, we infer from this that the motor
centres of the cortex are not cleanly separated from one another by
indifferent areas, or that there are factors operating at a distance
(_Fernwirkungen_) which nullify the effect of an exact separation of
the centres.

Similarly, if disturbances of various functions are always found in a
mixed form in organic aphasia, this is explained by the fact that
branches of the same artery nourish all the speech centres, or, if the
view expressed in my critical study of aphasia is accepted, it is
because we are dealing, not with separate centres, but with a continuous
association area. In any event, there is always some reason to be found
in anatomy for these things.

The remarkable combinations which are so often observed in the
symptomatology of cortical paralyses (motor aphasia and right
hemiplegia, alexia and right hemianopsia) are explained by the proximity
of the injured centres. Hemianopsia itself, a symptom that seems curious
and strange to the unscientific mind, is only explicable by the crossing
of the fibres of the optic nerve at the chiasma; like all the details of
cerebral paralyses it is the clinical expression of an anatomical fact.

Since there cannot be more than one authentic cerebral anatomy, and
since that one is expressed in the clinical characteristics of {53}
cerebral paralyses, it is evidently impossible for that anatomy to
explain the distinctive traits of hysterical paralyses. For this
reason we should not draw conclusions about cerebral anatomy based
upon the symptomatology of these paralyses.

We must certainly turn our attention to the nature of the lesion to find
this difficult explanation. In organic paralyses the nature of the
lesion plays a secondary part, it is rather the extent and localization
of it that, under the given conditions of the structure of the nervous
system, produce the characteristics of organic paralysis we have
mentioned above. What can be the nature of the lesion in hysterical
paralysis which alone dominates the situation, independent of
localization, of extent, and of the anatomy of the nervous system?

Charcot constantly taught us that it is a cortical lesion, but one of a
purely dynamic or functional kind.

It is easy to understand the negative side of this proposition. It is
equivalent to affirming that no appreciable tissue changes will be
found _post mortem_; but regarded from a positive stand-point, it is
far from being devoid of ambiguity. After all, what is a dynamic
lesion? I am sure that many who read the works of Charcot think that
dynamic lesion is indeed a lesion, but a lesion of which no trace is
found after death, like œdema, anæmia, active hyperæmia. But the
latter, although they do not necessarily persist after death, are true
organic lesions, however insignificant and transitory. Paralyses
produced by lesions of this type partake, necessarily, of all the
characteristics of organic paralyses. Œdema and anæmia could no more
produce the dissociation and intensity of an hysterical paralysis than
could hæmorrhage and softening. The only difference would be that a {54}
paralysis produced by œdema, by vascular constriction etc., would be
less lasting than a paralysis caused by the destruction of nervous
tissue. All the other conditions are common to both, and the anatomy
of the nervous system will determine the characteristics of a
paralysis in a case of transitory anæmia no less than in a case of
permanent anæmia.

I do not think that these remarks are wholly uncalled-for. Reading
'there must be an hysterical lesion' in a given centre (the same centre
an organic lesion of which would produce the corresponding organic
syndrome) and recollecting that it is customary to localize the dynamic
hysterical lesion in the same way as the organic lesion, we are led to
believe that there lurks behind the expression 'dynamic lesion' the idea
of a lesion like œdema and anæmia, which are in fact transitory organic
affections. I maintain on the contrary that the lesion in hysterical
paralyses must be entirely independent of the anatomy of the nervous
system, since _hysteria behaves in its paralyses and other
manifestations as if anatomy were non-existent, or as if it had no
knowledge of it_.

Indeed, a good number of the features of hysterical paralyses justify
this statement. Hysteria is ignorant of the distribution of the nerves
and for this reason does not simulate the periphero-spinal or
projection paralyses; it is not acquainted with the optic chiasma and
consequently does not produce a hemianopsia. It regards the organs
according to the common popular meaning of their names: the leg is the
leg up to its insertion into the hip, the arm is the upper extremity
as mapped out by our clothing. It would see no reason for combining a
facial paralysis to a brachial one. An hysterical patient who loses
the power of speech has no motive for forgetting the meaning of {55}
language, since motor aphasia and word-deafness are not related in the
popular mind. On this point I must agree completely with the views
expressed by Janet in the latest numbers of the _Archives de
Neurologie_; hysterical paralyses demonstrate their truth just as well
as anæsthesias and psychic symptoms do.

IV

I shall now try finally to suggest what might be the lesion that causes
hysterical paralyses. I do not claim that I shall demonstrate what it
actually is; it is merely a matter of pointing out a line of thought
that may lead to a concept not in contradiction with the features of
hysterical paralysis, in so far as this differs from organic cerebral
paralysis.

I will take the word 'functional or dynamic lesion' in its proper sense:
'alteration in function or mechanism', alteration in a functional
attribute. Such an alteration, for example, would be a diminution in
excitability or in a physiological quality which in the normal state
remains constant or varies within fixed limits.

But it will be said that a functional alteration is only an organic one
considered from a different aspect. Let us suppose that nervous tissue
is in a state of transitory anæmia, its excitability will be diminished
by that circumstance; it is not possible by this means to avoid
considering organic lesions.

I will try to show that a functional alteration may exist without an
accompanying organic lesion, at least without a lesion capable of
detection even by means of the most delicate methods. In other words,
I will give an appropriate example of a primary functional change; to
do so, I only ask permission to pass over into the field of
psychology, which cannot be ignored in dealing with hysteria. {56}

With Janet I maintain that it is the common, popular idea of the organs
and of the body in general that is at work in hysterical paralyses as
well as in anæsthesias, etc. This idea is based, not upon a profound
knowledge of neuro-anatomy, but upon our tactile and, above all, our
visual perceptions. If it determines the characteristics of hysterical
paralysis the latter must prove to be ignorant and independent of any
idea of the anatomy of the nervous system. The lesion of hysterical
paralysis will be an alteration of the concept, of the idea 'arm', for
example. But what kind of alteration in regard to the concept is capable
of producing a paralysis?

Psychologically considered, the paralysis of the arm is embodied in the
fact that the concept 'arm' cannot enter into association with those
other ideas that make up the ego, of which the body of the individual is
an important part. The lesion, then, would consist in the abolition of
the accessibility of the concept 'arm' in association. The arm acts as
if it did not exist in the interplay of associations. Of course, if the
physical conditions corresponding with the concept 'arm' are profoundly
changed then the concept will also be lost, but I must show that it may
be inaccessible without being destroyed and without its physical
substratum (the nervous tissue of the corresponding cortical area) being
damaged.

I will commence with examples taken from ordinary life. A comic story
is told of a loyal subject who would no longer wash his hand because
his sovereign had touched it. The relation of this hand to the idea
'king' seems to be so important for the psychic life of this person
that he refused to let it enter into other relations. We obey the same
impulse when we break the glass in which we have drunk the health of a
newly-married couple. Ancient savage tribes, in burning the horse, the {57}
weapons, and even the wives of a deceased chief together with his
body, followed a similar idea that no one should touch them after
him. The motive for all these acts is clear. The affective value which
attaches to the first association is reluctant to let the object enter
into a new association with another object and consequently renders
the idea inaccessible to association.

If we now pass on to the field of the psychology of concepts we find
that this is not a simple comparison but an almost identical situation.
If the concept 'arm' is attached to an association of great affective
value it will be inaccessible to the free play of other associations.
The arm will be paralysed in proportion to the persistence of that
affective value or to the diminution in the latter effected by suitable
psychic measures. This is the solution of the problem that we have
raised; for in every case of hysterical paralysis we find that the
paralysed organ or the abolished function is engaged in a subconscious
association endowed with great affective value, and it may be
demonstrated that the arm becomes free as soon as this affective value
is removed. The concept 'arm' exists, then, in the physical substratum;
but it is not accessible to conscious associations and volition because
its entire associative affinity, so to speak, is saturated by a
subconscious association with the recollection of the event, of the
trauma, that produced the paralysis.

Charcot was the first to teach us that we must turn to psychology for
the explanation of the hysterical neurosis. Breuer and I have followed
his example in a preliminary paper.[9] In this paper we show that the
permanent symptoms of so-called non-traumatic hysteria (the stigmata
excepted) may be explained by the same mechanism that Charcot {58}
recognized in traumatic paralyses. But we also give the reasons why
these symptoms persist and why they can be cured by a special form of
hypnotic psychotherapy. Every occurrence, every psychic impression is
supplied with a certain affective value (_Affektbetrag_), of which the
ego rids itself either by means of a motor reaction or by a process of
mental association. If the person cannot or will not free himself of
this excess, the memory of the impression acquires the importance of a
trauma and becomes the cause of the permanent symptoms of
hysteria. When the impression remains subconscious its elimination is
impossible. We have called this theory: _Das Abreagieren der
Reizzuwächse_ (the abreaction of an accumulation of stimuli).

To sum up, I think that it is quite in harmony with our general
conception of hysteria, formed from the teachings of Charcot, to state
that the lesion in hysterical paralyses consists of nothing but the
inaccessibility of the concept of the organ or function to the
associations of the conscious ego; that this purely functional change
(the concept itself being intact) is caused by the fixation of that
concept in subconscious association with the memory of the trauma; and
that this concept cannot become free or accessible as long as the
affective value of the psychic trauma has not been eliminated by an
adequate motor reaction or a conscious psychic process. Even if this
mechanism does not take place, if a direct auto-suggestive idea is
always necessary in an hysterical paralysis, as in the traumatic cases
of Charcot, we have succeeded in showing what the nature of the lesion,
or rather of the change, in hysterical paralysis may be, so as to
explain the differences between it and organic cerebral paralysis.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV {59}
THE DEFENCE NEURO-PSYCHOSES[10]

An endeavour to provide a psycho-
logical theory of acquired hysteria,
many phobias and obsessions, and
certain hallucinatory psychoses.

(1894)

After a close study of several patients suffering from phobias and
obsessions a tentative explanation of these symptoms forced itself upon
me; and as it later enabled me successfully to divine the origin of
similar pathological ideas in other cases, I consider it worthy of
publication and of further tests. Along with this 'psychological theory
of phobias and obsessions', observation of these patients has resulted
in a contribution to the theory of hysteria, or rather an alteration in
it, which appears to account for an important characteristic common both
to hysteria and to the neuroses mentioned above. Further, I had
opportunities of gaining some insight into the psychological mechanism
of a form of disease that is undoubtedly of mental origin, and then
found that the tentative point of view I had adopted established an
intelligible connection between these psychoses and the two neuroses
mentioned. At the end of this essay I shall bring forward an hypothesis
which I have employed in all three cases.

I

Let me begin with the alteration that in my view we are called upon to
make in the theory of the hysterical neurosis. {60}

Since the publication of the fine work carried out by P. Janet, J.
Breuer and others, it may be taken as generally acknowledged that the
syndrome of hysteria, in so far as it permits of understanding up to the
present, justifies the concept of a splitting of consciousness, with the
formation of separate psychical groups; opinions are less definite,
however, concerning the origin of this splitting of consciousness and
the part which this character plays in the structure of the hysterical
neurosis.

According to Janet's theory[11] the splitting of consciousness is a
primary feature of the hysterical change. It is dependent on an inborn
weakness in the capacity for psychical synthesis, on the narrowness of
the 'field of consciousness' (_champ du conscience_) which in the form
of a psychic stigma is evidence of the degeneration of hysterical
persons.

In contradistinction to Janet's view, which seems to me to admit of many
and various objections, we have that advocated by J. Breuer in our joint
publication[12]. According to Breuer, the 'foundation and condition' of
hysteria is the occurrence of peculiar dream-like states of
consciousness with diminished capacity for association, for which he
suggests the name 'hypnoid states'. The splitting of consciousness is
then secondary and acquired; it occurs because the ideas which emerge in
hypnoid states are cut off from associative connection with the
remaining contents of consciousness.

I can now bring forward evidence of two other more extreme forms of
hysteria in which it is impossible to regard the splitting of
consciousness as primary in Janet's sense. In the first of these forms
I repeatedly succeeded in demonstrating that the splitting of the {61}
contents of consciousness is the consequence of a voluntary act on the
part of the patient; that is to say, it is instituted by an effort of
will, the motive of which is discoverable. By this I do not of course
mean that the patient intends to produce a splitting of his
consciousness; the patient's aim is a different one, but instead of
attaining its end it produces a splitting of consciousness.

In the third form of hysteria, as shown by the mental analysis of
intelligent patients, the splitting of consciousness plays an
insignificant part, or perhaps none at all. These are the cases in which
all that had happened was that the reaction to traumatic stimuli had
failed to occur, so that they are accordingly dissolved and cured by
'abreaction'[13]---they are the pure 'retention' hysterias.

In connection with what I have to say about phobias and obsessions I
shall here deal only with the second form of hysteria, which for reasons
that will soon be evident I shall designate as _defence hysteria_, and
distinguish by this name from _hypnoid_ and _retention hysteria_. I may
also provisionally represent my cases of defence hysteria as cases of
'acquired hysteria', because there was in them no question either of
grave hereditary taint or of individual atrophic degeneration.

These patients whom I analysed had enjoyed good mental health up to
the time at which an intolerable idea presented itself within the
content of their ideational life; that is to say, until their ego was
confronted by an experience, an idea, a feeling, arousing an affect so
painful that the person resolved to forget it, since he had no
confidence in his power to resolve the incompatibility between the {62}
unbearable idea and his ego by the processes of thought.

Such unbearable ideas develop in women chiefly in connection with sexual
experiences and sensations, and the patients can recollect with the most
satisfactory minuteness their efforts at defence---their resolution to
'push the thing out', not to think of it, to suppress it. I will give
from my experience some examples which I could easily multiply: A young
girl who disapproved of herself because while nursing her sick father
she had let her mind dwell on the thought of a young man who had made a
slight erotic impression on her; a governess who had fallen in love with
her employer and had resolved to thrust this affection from her mind
because it appeared to her incompatible with her pride; and so on.[14]

I do not of course assert that an effort of will to thrust such things
out of the mind is a pathological act, nor am I able to say whether and
in what manner intentional forgetting is successful in people who remain
healthy, although subject to similar mental impressions. I only know
that this kind of 'forgetting' did not succeed with the patients whom I
analysed, but led to various pathological reactions, giving rise either
to hysteria, or to an obsession, or to an hallucinatory psychosis. The
ability to bring about by an effort of will one of these states, which
are all of them associated with splitting of consciousness, is to be
regarded as the manifestation of a pathological disposition---which,
however, is not necessarily identical with personal or hereditary
'degeneration'.

In regard to the intermediate processes between the patient's effort
of will and the onset of the neurotic symptom, I have formed an
opinion which may be expressed in the customary psychological {63}
abstractions somewhat as follows: The task which the ego undertakes in
defence---of treating the unbearable idea as '_non arrivée_'---is
absolutely insoluble; both the memory-trace and the affect attached to
the idea are there once and for all, and it is no longer possible to
extirpate them. But it amounts to an approximate fulfilment of this
task if the ego succeeds in transforming a strong idea into a weak
one, in depriving it of its affect---the quantity of excitation with
which the idea is charged. The weak idea will then make practically no
demands on the work of association; the quantity of excitation,
however, which is then detached from the idea, must be utilized in
another direction.

Up to this point the processes are the same in hysteria and in phobias
and obsessions; from now onwards their ways diverge. In hysteria the
unbearable idea is rendered innocuous by the quantity of excitation
attached to it being transmuted into some bodily form of expression, a
process for which I should like to propose the name of _conversion_.

The conversion may be either total or partial, and it proceeds along
the line of the motor or sensory innervation that is more or less
intimately related to the traumatic experience. Thus the ego succeeds
in resolving the incompatibility within itself; but instead it has
burdened itself with a memory-symbol, which dwells in consciousness,
like a sort of parasite, either in the form of a persistent motor
innervation or else as a constantly recurring hallucinatory sensation,
and remains until a reversion takes place in the opposite
direction. The memory-trace of the repressed idea is not, however,
annihilated by this process; on the contrary, from now onwards it
forms the nucleus of a secondary psychical group. {64}

I will only add a few more words to this conception of the
psycho-physical processes in hysteria. When once such a nucleus of an
hysterical splitting has been formed owing to a 'traumatic' factor it
will be developed by the influence of other factors (which might be
called 'auxiliary traumatic' factors) as soon as an impression of a
similar kind, subsequently experienced, succeeds in breaking through the
barriers erected by the will, in furnishing the weakened idea with fresh
affect and in re-establishing for a time an associative connection
between the two psychical groups---until a further conversion creates a
defence against it. The distribution of excitation thus brought about in
hysteria proves as a rule an unstable one; the excitation which is
directed into a wrong channel (into somatic innervation) now and then
finds its way back to the idea from which it was detached, and then
compels the subject either to undertake the work of associative
absorption or else to discharge it by the way of hysterical attacks---a
conclusion which is supported by the familiar opposition between the
hysterical attack and chronic symptoms. Breuer's cathartic method
achieves its results by deliberately effecting such a re-transmutation
of the excitation from the somatic into the mental field, in order then
to enforce a resolution of the opposed elements by a process of thought
and a discharge of the excitation in speech.

The conclusion that the splitting of consciousness in acquired
hysteria is based on an act of will also explains with surprising
simplicity the remarkable fact that hypnosis regularly widens the
narrowed consciousness of the hysteric and makes the psychical group
which has been split off accessible. Indeed, we know it to be a
peculiarity of all sleep-like conditions that they abrogate that
distribution of excitation upon which the 'will' of the conscious {65}
personality depends.

Thus we can see that the characteristic factor in hysteria is not to be
found in the splitting of consciousness but in the _capacity for
conversion_, and we may assume that the psycho-physical capacity to
transmute such large quantities of excitation into somatic innervation
is an important element of the disposition to hysteria, which in other
respects is still unknown.

This capacity does not in itself preclude mental health and leads to
hysteria only where there is some mental incompatibility or an
accumulation of excitation. With this new turn in the theory Breuer and
I approach Oppenheim's[15] and Strümpell's[16] well-known definition
of hysteria, and recede from Janet[17] who assigns too great importance
to the splitting of consciousness as a characteristic of hysteria. The
presentation here given may claim to have rendered the relation between
conversion and the hysterical splitting of consciousness intelligible.

II

If the capacity for conversion does not exist in a person predisposed
to hysteria and yet the separation of its affect from an unbearable
idea is nevertheless undertaken as a defence against the latter, then {66}
this affect must persist in the psychical sphere. Thus weakened, the
idea remains present in consciousness, detached from all associations;
but its affect, now freed from it, attaches itself to other ideas
which are not in themselves unbearable, but which through this 'false
connection' grow to be obsessions. This is shortly the psychological
theory of obsessions and phobias which I mentioned to start with.

I will now enumerate the various elements necessary to the structure of
this theory that admit of direct proof, and then describe those that I
have myself supplied. Apart from the final result of the process, that
is, the obsession, it is possible in the first place to demonstrate the
ultimate source of the affect which is now falsely attached to some
other idea. In all the cases I have analysed it was in the sexual life
that a painful affect---of precisely the same quality as that attaching
to the obsession---had originated. On theoretical grounds it is not
impossible that this affect may at times arise in other spheres; I have
merely to state that hitherto I have not discovered any other origin of
it. Incidentally, it is easy to see that it is precisely in regard to
the sexual life that unbearable ideas most frequently arise.

Further, we have the most unequivocal utterances on the part of
patients in proof of the effort of will, the attempt at defence, upon
which the theory lays emphasis; and in at least a number of cases the
patients themselves will inform us of the fact that the phobia or
obsession first made its appearance after this effort of will had
apparently succeeded in its aim. 'Once something very disagreeable
happened to me, and I did my utmost to thrust it out of my mind, to
think no more about it. Finally I succeeded, but then I got this,
which since then I have never been rid of.' With these words a patient {67}
confirmed the chief points of the theory I have developed here.

Not all those who suffer from obsessions are themselves so clear about
the origin of them. As a rule, when one draws these patients' attention
to the original idea of a sexual nature, the answer is, 'It can't come
from that; indeed, I thought very little about that. For a moment I was
scared, but I turned my mind to something else and since then it hasn't
troubled me.' In this frequent objection we have a proof that the
obsession represents a substitute or surrogate for the unbearable sexual
idea, and has taken its place in consciousness.

Between the patient's effort of will which successfully represses the
intolerable sexual idea, and the appearance of the obsessional idea,
which though having little intensity in itself is now endowed with
incomprehensibly strong affect, there lies a gap which the theory here
developed aims at filling in. The detachment of the sexual idea from its
affect and the connection of the latter with another idea, suited to it
but not intolerable, are processes which occur outside
consciousness---they may be presumed but they cannot be proved by any
clinical-psychological analysis. Perhaps it would be more correct to
say: These processes are not of a psychical nature at all, but are
physical processes the psychical consequences of which are so
represented as if what is expressed by the words 'detachment of the idea
from its affect and false connection of the latter' had really happened.

Alongside the cases which show the unbearable sexual idea followed
subsequently by the obsession, there is another series in which
obsessions and painful sexual ideas are present simultaneously. We
cannot very well call the latter 'sexual obsessions', for _one_
essential feature of obsessions is missing from them; they are fully {68}
justified, whereas the painfulness of the ordinary obsession
constitutes a problem for both physician and patient. So far as I
have been able to see in cases of this kind, it appears that in them a
perpetual defence is going on against sexual ideas continually arising
anew; that is, we are here concerned with an operation that has not
yet been completed.

As long as they are conscious of the sexual origin of their obsessions,
the patients often keep them concealed. When they complain about them,
they as a rule express their astonishment that they are subject to the
affect in question---that they feel anxious, or that they have such and
such an impulse, and so on. To the experienced physician this affect
appears, on the contrary, to be justified and comprehensible; he only
finds it surprising that an affect of that kind should be associated
with an inappropriate idea. The affect of the obsession appears to him,
in other words, to be _dislocated_ or _transposed_, and if he is
proceeding on the assumptions here laid down he can in a great number of
cases attempt its re-translation into the sexual.

Any idea which is either suited by nature to be associated with an
affect of this quality or else bears a certain relation to the
unbearable idea---in consequence of which it appears practicable to
employ it as a surrogate for the latter---may be made use of in
secondary connection with the detached affect. Thus for example, an
unattached anxiety, the sexual origin of which the patient is unable
to recall, will seize upon the common primary phobias of mankind in
regard to animals, thunderstorms, darkness and the like, or upon
things which are manifestly associated with the sexual in some way or
other, such as urination, defæcation, defilement and contagion
generally. {69}

The ego gains considerably less advantage by choosing the method of
_transposition_ of affect as a measure of defence than it does by the
hysterical conversion of psychical excitation into somatic innervation.
The affect which the ego had to endure remains unchanged and
undiminished, just as before---the only difference being that the
unbearable idea is suppressed and cut off from recollection. The
repressed ideas then form again the nucleus of a second psychical group,
which, as it seems to me, is accessible even without the aid of
hypnosis. If in phobias and obsessions the striking symptoms which in
hysteria accompany the formation of an independent psychical group fail
to appear, this is probably because in the former the whole
transformation takes place within the psychical sphere---the relation
between psychical excitation and somatic innervation has undergone no
change.

To illustrate what has been said concerning obsessions I will give a few
examples, which are probably typical:

1. A young girl suffered from obsessive reproaches. If she read in the
papers about counterfeiting coinage the thought occurred to her that
she also had forged coins; if an unknown criminal had committed a
murder she asked herself anxiously whether she had not done the
deed. At the same time she was quite conscious of the absurdity of
these obsessive reproaches. This sense of guilt gained for a time such
an influence over her that her critical faculty was stifled, so that
she accused herself to her relations and her physician of having
really committed all these crimes (psychosis through simple
intensification---overwhelming-psychosis---_Überwältigungspsychose_). A
close examination then revealed the source in which her sense of guilt
arose: Accidentally stimulated by a voluptuous sensation, she had {70}
allowed herself to be led astray by a friend into masturbation and had
practised it for years, with full knowledge of her wrong-doing and
accompanied by most intense self-reproaches, which as usual were of no
avail. An excessive indulgence after attending a ball had evoked the
intensification leading to the psychosis. After a few months of
treatment and close watching the patient was cured.

2. Another young girl had suffered from the dread of being forced to
pass water and wet herself ever since the time when an impulse of this
kind had really obliged her to leave a concert during a performance.
This phobia had gradually made her completely unable to enjoy herself
or to go into society. She only felt well if there was a closet near
at hand to which she could have access without arousing attention. Any
organic complaint justifying this lack of confidence in her control of
the bladder was excluded; at home under quiet conditions and at night
the urgency did not arise. A penetrating enquiry showed that the
urgency had appeared for the first time in the following
circumstances: A gentleman to whom she was not indifferent had been
sitting not far from her at the concert; she began to think about him
and to imagine how she would sit beside him as his wife. During this
erotic reverie she had that bodily sensation which is to be compared
with erection in men and which in her case---I do not know if it is
always so---ended with a slight desire to micturate. She became
greatly frightened by the sexual sensation, to which she was otherwise
quite accustomed, because she had resolved within herself to overcome
her affection for this man as well as for all others, and the next
moment the affect transferred itself to the accompanying desire to
micturate and compelled her to leave the hall after a very painful {71}
struggle. In her life she was so prudish that she positively shuddered
at anything sexual and could not even contemplate the thought of
marrying; on the other hand, she was sexually so hyperæsthetic that
during every erotic reverie, which she willingly indulged in, that
pleasurable sensation appeared. The erection was always accompanied by
the desire to micturate which, up to the time of the scene at the
concert, had made no impression on her. Treatment led to a nearly
complete mastery of the phobia.

3. A young woman who in five years of married life had had only one
child complained to me of an obsessive impulse to throw herself from the
window or balcony, and also of the fear of stabbing her child which
seized her at the sight of a sharp knife. She confessed that marital
relations seldom occurred, and only with precautions against conception;
but she added that this was no privation to her as she was not of a
sensual nature. I ventured to tell her that at the sight of a man she
had erotic ideas and that she had therefore lost confidence in herself
and regarded herself as a depraved person, capable of anything. The
re-translation of the obsession into the sexual was successful; in tears
she confessed at once to her long-concealed misery in her marriage and
later on related in addition some painful thoughts of an unchanged
sexual nature, such as the often-recurring sensation of something
forcing itself under her skirts.

I have turned experiences of this kind to therapeutic advantage by
re-directing the attention of patients with phobias and obsessions, in
spite of all their protestations, back to the repressed sexual ideas
and, where feasible, in blocking the source whence they arose. I {72}
naturally cannot assert that _all_ phobias and obsessions arise in the
manner here described; for, first, my experience of them embraces only
a limited number as compared with the relative frequency of these
neuroses, and secondly, I myself know that these 'psychasthenic'
symptoms, as Janet terms them, are not all to be estimated alike.[18]
There are, for example, pure hysterical phobias. I believe, however,
that the mechanism of transposition of affect will be found to exist
in the great majority of phobias and obsessions; and I would therefore
urge that these neuroses, which are as often found in an isolated form
as combined with hysteria or neurasthenia, should not be loosely
classified together with ordinary neurasthenia, in which there is
absolutely no ground for assuming a psychical mechanism of the
principal symptoms.

III

In both the cases described above defence against an unbearable idea
was effected by detachment of its affect from it; the idea itself
remained in consciousness, although weakened and isolated. Now there
exists a very much more energetic and successful kind of defence,
which takes the following form: the ego rejects the unbearable idea
together with its associated affect and behaves as if the idea had
never occurred to the person at all. But, as soon as this process has
been successfully carried through, the person in question will have
developed a psychosis, and his state can only be described as one of
'hallucinatory confusion'. A single example will serve to illustrate {73}
this.

A young girl gave her first impulsive affection to a man and firmly
believed in the return of her love. As a matter of fact she was
mistaken; the young man had another motive for visiting the house.
Disappointments were not spared her; first of all she defended herself
against her experiences by means of hysterical conversion, thus
preserving her belief that he would one day come and seek her hand; but
at the same time she felt unhappy and ill on account of incomplete
conversion and of the perpetual experience of fresh painful impressions.
Finally on a certain day, the day of a family festival, she waited for
him in a state of intense excitement. The day wore on without his
coming; after all the trains by which he could arrive had gone by, her
condition passed into one of hallucinatory confusion. He _is come_, she
hears his voice in the garden, hastens downstairs in her night-dress to
receive him. From that time she lived for two months in a happy dream,
of which the content was that he is there, ever by her side, everything
is as it was a little while ago (before the time of the disappointment
against which she had so strenuously defended herself). The hysteria and
the depression of spirits were both overcome; nothing of the latter
period of doubt and suffering was alluded to during her illness; she was
happy as long as she was left undisturbed, and only raved when some
circumstance of her surroundings prevented her from carrying out the
logical promptings of her blissful dream. This psychosis, which at the
time of its occurrence had been unintelligible, was explained ten years
later with the aid of an hypnotic analysis.

The fact to which I now wish to call attention is that the content of
such an hallucinatory psychosis consists precisely in the accentuation {74}
of the very idea which was first threatened by the experience
occasioning the outbreak of the illness. One is therefore justified
in saying that the ego has averted the unbearable idea by a flight
into psychosis; and the process by which this result is obtained again
withdraws itself out of range of self-perception as well as of
psychological-clinical analysis. It is to be regarded as the
expression of a high degree of pathological predisposition and may
perhaps be described somewhat as follows: The ego has broken away from
the unbearable idea; but, the latter being inseparably bound up with a
part of reality, in so far as the ego achieves this result it has also
cut itself loose from reality, totally or in part. In my opinion, this
is the condition under which certain ideas acquire hallucinatory
vividness, and consequently when this form of defence is successfully
carried through the person finds himself in a state of hallucinatory
confusion.

I have very few analyses of psychoses of this kind at my disposal; but I
think we must here be concerned with a type of psychical illness that is
very frequently developed, for in no insane asylum are analogous
examples wanting---for instance, the mother who, falling ill after the
loss of her baby, is to be seen incessantly rocking a log of wood in her
arms, or the jilted bride arrayed in all her finery who has for years
been awaiting her betrothed.

It is perhaps not superfluous to point out that the three modes of
defence here described, together with the three forms of illness to
which they lead, may all be combined in the same person. The
simultaneous appearance of phobias and hysterical symptoms, observed
so often in practice, is one of those factors which render it
difficult to distinguish hysteria in a clear-cut manner from other {75}
neuroses, and make it necessary to set up the category of 'mixed
neuroses'. To be sure, hallucinatory confusion is not often compatible
with a continuance of hysteria, nor of obsessions, as a rule. On the
other hand, it is not rare for a defence psychosis to break out
episodically in the course of an hysterical or mixed neurosis.

I should like finally to dwell for a moment on the hypothesis which I
have made use of in the exposition of the defence neuroses. I mean the
conception that among the psychic functions there is something which
should be differentiated (an amount of affect, a sum of excitation),
something having all the attributes of a quantity---although we possess
no means of measuring it---a something which is capable of increase,
decrease, displacement and discharge, and which extends itself over the
memory-traces of an idea like an electric charge over the surface of the
body. We can apply this hypothesis, which by the way already underlies
our theory of 'abreaction',[19] in the same sense as the physicist
employs the conception of a fluid electric current. For the present it
is justified by its utility in correlating and explaining diverse
psychical conditions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

V {76}
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DETACHING
FROM NEURASTHENIA A PARTICULAR
SYNDROME: THE ANXIETY-NEUROSIS[20]
(1894)

It is difficult to say anything of general validity concerning
neurasthenia so long as we allow this name to cover all that Beard
included under the term. In my opinion, nothing but gain to
neuropathology can result if we make an attempt to distinguish from
neurasthenia proper all those neurotic disturbances of which the
symptoms, on the one hand, are more closely related to one another
than to the typical symptoms of neurasthenia (headache, spinal
irritation, and dyspepsia with flatulence and constipation) and, on
the other hand, show in their ætiology and their mechanism essential
differences from typical neurasthenia. If we accept this plan we shall
soon obtain a more or less uniform picture of neurasthenia; and shall
then be in a position to differentiate more sharply than had hitherto
been possible between neurasthenia proper and various kinds of
pseudo-neurasthenia, such as the clinical picture of the organically
determined nasal reflex neurosis, the nervous disorders of the
cachexias and arterio-sclerosis, the early stages of general paralysis
of the insane and of the psychoses. Further, it will be possible---as
Möbius proposed---to eliminate many of the nervous conditions of the
hereditarily degenerate; and we shall also find good reason to include {77}
under melancholia many neuroses (especially intermittent and periodic
types) which are to-day called neurasthenia. But the most decisive
change of all will be introduced if we decide to distinguish from
neurasthenia the syndrome I here propose to describe, which fulfils
with unusual completeness the conditions set forth above. The symptoms
of this syndrome are clinically much more closely related to one
another than to those of neurasthenia proper (that is, they frequently
appear together and replace each other during the course of the
illness), while the ætiology and mechanism of this neurosis are
essentially different from what remains of true neurasthenia after
this subtraction has been made from it.

I call this syndrome 'Anxiety-Neurosis', because all its component
elements can be grouped round the central symptom of 'morbid anxiety'
and because individually they each have a definite connection with
this. I believed that this conception of the symptoms of the
anxiety-neurosis had originated with myself until an interesting paper
by E. Hecker[21] came into my hands, in which I found the same idea
expounded with the most satisfying clearness and
completeness. Although Hecker recognizes certain symptoms as
equivalents or incomplete manifestations of an anxiety-attack, he does
not separate them from neurasthenia as I propose to do; this is
evidently due to his not having taken into account the difference in
the ætiological conditions of the two forms of disease. When this
last difference between them is fully recognized, we have no longer {78}
any motive for designating anxiety symptoms by the same term as those
of neurasthenia proper; for the purpose served by giving a name,
however arbitrary it may be in other respects, is above all that of
enabling us more easily to form generalizations.

I. CLINICAL SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF ANXIETY-NEUROSIS

What I call 'anxiety-neurosis' manifests itself in a partial and in a
complete form, and may be met with either as an isolated state or
combined with other neuroses. The cases which are more or less complete
and at the same time isolated are naturally those which in particular
give support to the idea that anxiety-neurosis is a clinical entity. In
other cases where there is a complex of symptoms corresponding to a
mixed neurosis, we have to distinguish and separate from it those
symptoms which belong neither to neurasthenia nor to hysteria and so on,
but to anxiety-neurosis.

The clinical picture of anxiety-neurosis comprises the following
symptoms:

1. _General irritability_. This is a common nervous symptom and as
such belongs to many nervous conditions. I include it here because it
invariably appears with anxiety-neurosis and is important
theoretically. An increase of irritability always signifies an
accumulation of excitation or an inability to tolerate such an
accumulation, that is, an absolute or a relative accumulation of
excitation. One form of expression of this increase of
irritability---auditory hyperæsthesia---seems to me worthy of special
mention; this undue sensitiveness to noise is undoubtedly explicable
on the basis of the close inborn connection between auditory
impressions and fright. Auditory hyperæsthesia is frequently a cause
of sleeplessness, more than one form of which belongs to the {79}
anxiety-neurosis.

2. _Anxious expectation_. I cannot better describe the condition I have
in mind than by this name and by appending a few examples. A woman who
suffers from anxious expectation will imagine every time her husband
coughs, when he has a cold, that he is going to have influenzal
pneumonia, and will at once see his funeral in her mind's eye. If when
she is coming towards the house she sees two people standing by her
front door, she cannot avoid the thought that one of her children has
fallen out of the window; if the bell rings, then someone is bringing
news of a death, and so on; whereas on all these occasions there is no
particular ground for exaggerating a mere possibility.

Anxious expectation of course fades off imperceptibly into normal
anxiousness. It comprises all that is covered by the word
'nervousness'---apprehensiveness, the tendency to look on the dark side
of things; but at every opportunity it exceeds the limits of this
plausible form of nervousness and is frequently recognized by the
patient himself as a kind of compulsion. For one form of anxious
expectation---that relating to one's own health---we may reserve the old
term _hypochondria_. Hypochondria does not always coincide with a high
degree of anxious expectation; in general it requires as a preliminary
condition the presence of paræsthesias and disagreeable bodily
sensations, and therefore hypochondria is the form favoured by true
neurasthenics when they fall victims to anxiety-neurosis, as they often
do.

The tendency to _pangs of conscience_, scrupulousness and pedantry may
be a further expression of anxious expectation, a tendency which is
especially frequent among morally sensitive people and likewise ranges {80}
from the normal to an exaggeration known as _folie du doute_.

Anxious expectation is the nuclear symptom of this neurosis; it clearly
reveals, too, something of the theory of it. We may perhaps say that
there is here _a quantum of anxiety in a free-floating condition_, which
in any state of expectation controls the selection of ideas, and is ever
ready to attach itself to any suitable ideational content.

3. This is not the only way in which apprehensiveness---which is not
usually present in consciousness but is ever lying in wait---can express
itself. It can, on the contrary, erupt suddenly into consciousness
without being called forth by any train of thought, and thus bring about
an _anxiety-attack_. An anxiety-attack of this kind either consists of a
feeling of anxiety alone without any associated idea, or associated with
the nearest interpretation, such as sudden death, a stroke, or
approaching insanity; or else the feeling of anxiety is combined with
paræsthesias (similar to the hysterical aura); or finally, together with
the feeling of anxiety there is an accompanying disturbance of any one
or more of the bodily functions, such as respiration, heart's action,
vasomotor innervation, or glandular activity. The patient lays stress on
one or other of these symptoms, and complains of 'heart-spasms',
'difficulty in breathing', 'drenching sweats', 'ravenous hunger' and the
like; and in his description the feeling of anxiety frequently recedes
into the background or is described quite vaguely as a 'feeling of
illness', of 'distress', and so on.

4. It is interesting, and important diagnostically, that the degree to
which these elements are combined in anxiety-attacks varies
extraordinarily, and that almost every accompanying symptom can alone
constitute the attack just as well as the anxiety itself can. There {81}
are consequently _rudimentary anxiety-attacks_ and _equivalents of an
anxiety-attack_ (all probably having the same meaning), showing a
manifold and hitherto little appreciated variety of forms. A closer
study of these larval anxiety-states (Hecker) and their diagnostic
differentiation from other attacks should soon become a necessary
piece of work in neuropathology.

I will here append a list including only those types of anxiety-attack
known to me:

_a_. Attacks accompanied by disturbances of the _heart's action_, such
as palpitation, either with transitory arhythmia, or with tachycardia of
longer duration that may end in grave weakness of the heart, the
differentiation from organic morbus cordis never being easy; or
pseudo-angina pectoris---diagnostically a delicate problem!

_b_. Attacks accompanied by disturbances of _respiration_, several forms
of nervous dyspnœa, attacks similar to asthma, and the like. I would
emphasize that even these attacks are not always accompanied by
recognizable anxiety.

_c_. Attacks of _sweating_, often nocturnal.

_d_. Attacks of _tremor_ and _shuddering_, which are only too easily
confounded with hysteria.

_e_. Attacks of _ravenous hunger_, often accompanied by giddiness.

_f_. Attacks of sudden _diarrhœa_.

_g_. Attacks of locomotor _vertigo_.

_h_. Attacks of so-called _congestion_, practically embracing all that
has been called vasomotor neurasthenia.

_i_. Attacks of _paræsthesias_ (but these seldom occur without anxiety
or some similar feeling of distress). {82}

5. _Awakening in fright_ (the _pavor nocturnus_ of adults), which is
usually combined with morbid anxiety, dyspnœa, sweating and the like, is
very frequently nothing but a variety of the anxiety attack. This
disturbance conditions a second type of sleeplessness which also lies
within the compass of anxiety-neurosis.---I have no doubt in my own mind
that the _pavor nocturnus_ of children also includes a type which
belongs to anxiety-neurosis. The hysterical tinge, i.e. the coupling of
morbid anxiety with the reproduction of some appropriate experience of
dream, gives the _pavor nocturnus_ of children the appearance of being
something distinct; but it also appears in a pure form without dream or
recurring hallucination.

6. _Vertigo_ takes a prominent place in the group of symptoms of the
anxiety-neurosis. Its mildest form is better described as giddiness; and
its graver manifestations, 'attacks of vertigo' (with or without
anxiety), constitute one of the most momentous symptoms of this disease.
The dizziness of the anxiety-neurosis is neither rotatory nor is it
confined to particular planes or directions as is Menière's vertigo. It
belongs to the class of locomotor or co-ordinatory dizziness, as do the
cases of oculo-motor paralysis; it consists of a specific discomfort
accompanied by the feeling that the ground is rocking, the legs giving
way, that one can't keep upright because one's legs are as heavy as lead
and are shaking and wobbling. This dizziness never leads to a fall. I
venture, however, to assert that a profound fainting fit may supervene
in the place of an attack of vertigo of this kind. Other swoon-like
conditions in anxiety-neurosis appear to result from cardiac collapse.

An attack of vertigo is not seldom accompanied by the worst kind of
morbid anxiety, and is frequently attended by cardiac and respiratory {83}
disturbances. According to my observations the vertigo produced by
heights, mountains and precipices also frequently belongs to the
anxiety-neurosis; further, I do not know whether one would not be
justified in recognizing alongside this the existence of a vertigo of
gastric origin.

7. On the basis of chronic apprehensiveness (anxious expectation) on
the one hand, and a tendency to attacks of vertigo with anxiety on the
other, two groups of typical phobias develop, the first relating to
common physiological dangers, the other to locomotion. To the first
group belongs the fear of snakes, thunderstorms, darkness, vermin, and
so on, as well as the typical moral over-sensitiveness, and the forms of
'_folie du doute_'; the available anxiety is here used simply to
exaggerate the aversions which are implanted instinctively in everyone.
Usually, however, a phobia with obsessive strength arises only when,
added to such an instinctive aversion, a reminiscence of an experience
in which the anxiety could come to expression supervenes---for example,
after the patient has actually experienced a thunderstorm in the open
air. To attempt to explain such cases as mere continuations of strong
impressions would be incorrect; what makes these experiences significant
and their retention in memory of long duration is indeed simply the
anxiety, which both originally and subsequently thus found a means of
expression. In other words, such impressions remain potent only in cases
where 'anxious expectation' is present.

The other group includes _agoraphobia_ with all its accessory forms,
collectively characterized by their relation to movement. We
frequently find a precursory attack of vertigo as the foundation of
the phobia; but I do not believe that one can postulate this every {84}
time. Occasionally we see that after a first attack of giddiness
without anxiety locomotion still continues possible without hindrance,
although henceforth constantly accompanied by the sensation of
giddiness; but that under certain conditions, such as being alone, in
narrow streets and so on, locomotion becomes impossible when once
anxiety has become combined with an attack of vertigo.

The relation of these phobias to those of the obsessional neurosis, the
mechanisms of which I have discussed in an earlier paper[22] in this
Journal, is of the following kind: the correspondence between them is
that in both an idea becomes obsessive in consequence of its being
connected with an unattached affect. The mechanism of _transposition of
affect_ holds good therefore for both kinds of phobia; but in the
phobias of the anxiety-neurosis (1) this affect is always the same,
always that of anxiety; (2) it does not originate in a repressed idea,
proves not reducible further by psychological analysis, and is also not
amenable to psychotherapy. The mechanism of substitution does not
therefore hold good for the phobias of the anxiety-neurosis.

Both kinds of phobias (or obsessional ideas) frequently appear side by
side, although the atypical phobias which are based on obsessional
ideas need not necessarily develop on the basis of an
anxiety-neurosis. A very frequent, apparently complicated mechanism
makes its appearance when the content of an originally simple phobia
of the anxiety-neurosis type is replaced by another idea, the
substitution being then subsequently added to the phobia. The
'protective measures' originally directed towards combating the phobia
are the ideas most frequently employed as substitutions. Thus, for {85}
example, 'brooding mania' arises from the patient's effort to disprove
that he is crazy, as his hypochondriacal phobia maintains: the
hesitations and doubts, and still more the repetitions, of _folie du
doute_, arise from a justifiable doubt about his own powers of correct
reasoning, since he is aware of the persistent disturbance of the
obsessional idea; and so on. We can therefore assert that many
syndromes of the obsessional neurosis, such as _folie du doute_ and
the like, are also clinically, though not conceptually, to be reckoned
as belonging to the anxiety-neurosis.[23]

8. Digestive processes are subject to only a few disturbances in
anxiety-neurosis, but these are characteristic. Sensations such as
nausea and biliousness are not at all rare, and the symptom of ravenous
hunger can, by itself or in combination with others (congestions),
constitute a rudimentary anxiety-attack; as a chronic condition
analogous to anxious expectation we find a tendency to diarrhœa which
has given rise to the queerest diagnostic mistakes. If I am not
mistaken, it is this diarrhœa to which Möbius[24] has recently called
attention in a short paper. I conjecture further that Peyer's reflex
diarrhœa, which he derives from the disorders of the prostate,[25] is
nothing but this diarrhœa of anxiety-neurosis. The deception of a reflex
relationship comes about because the same factors which are active in
the origin of such prostatic affections also come into play in the
ætiology of anxiety-neurosis.

The behaviour of the gastro-intestinal tract in anxiety-neurosis
presents a sharp contrast to the influence of neurasthenia on those
functions. Mixed cases often show the well-known 'alternation of {86}
diarrhœa and constipation'. The urgent need to micturate that occurs
in the anxiety-neurosis is analogous to this diarrhœa.

9. The _paræsthesias_ which may accompany attacks of vertigo or anxiety
are interesting in that they (as also the sensations of the hysterical
aura) become associated in a definite sequence; but I find that, in
contrast to those of hysteria, these associated sensations are atypical
and changing. A further similarity to hysteria ensues because a kind of
_conversion_[26], which may otherwise easily be overlooked, to bodily
sensations takes place in anxiety-neurosis, e.g. a conversion which
takes effect in rheumatic muscles. Quite a number of rheumatic persons,
so-called, who moreover are demonstrable as such, in reality suffer from
anxiety-neurosis. Along with this increased sensitiveness to pain I have
observed in a series of cases of anxiety-neurosis a tendency to
_hallucinations_ which could not be explained as hysterical.

10. Several of the symptoms mentioned which accompany or take the place
of an anxiety-attack appear also in a chronic form. They are then still
less easy to recognize, since the accompanying anxious sensation is less
clearly recognizable than in anxiety-attacks. This is particularly true
of diarrhœa, vertigo, paræsthesias. Just as an attack of vertigo may be
replaced by a fainting-fit, so may chronic giddiness be replaced by a
constant feeling of sinking to the ground, exhaustion, etc.

II. THE INCIDENCE AND ÆTIOLOGY OF ANXIETY-NEUROSIS

In many cases of anxiety-neurosis no ætiology is recognizable at
all. It is remarkable that in such cases evidence of a grave {87}
hereditary taint is seldom difficult to establish.

But where there are grounds for regarding the neurosis as an acquired
one, careful enquiry to that end reveals a series of injurious
conditions (_noxiæ_) and influences within the sexual life as important
factors in the ætiology. At first sight these appear to be very various
in their nature but they soon disclose their common character, which
explains the fact that they always have the same effect on the nervous
system; further, they are either present alone or together with other
'ordinary' injurious factors, which latter may be regarded as having a
contributory effect. As this sexual ætiology of the anxiety-neurosis is
so very commonly demonstrable I feel justified _for the purpose of this
short paper_ in disregarding cases with a doubtful or a different
ætiology.

In setting forth in greater detail the ætiological conditions under
which anxiety-neurosis makes its appearance it will be advisable to
treat of men and women separately. Anxiety-neurosis appears in female
persons---disregarding for the moment their predisposition---in the
following cases:

_a_. as _virginal anxiety or anxiety in adolescents_. A number of
unambiguous observations has shown me that anxiety-neurosis can be
evoked in maturing girls by their first meeting with the sexual problem,
that is, by any more or less sudden revelation of what had hitherto been
hidden, for example, seeing the sexual act, or hearing or reading
something of that nature; in these cases anxiety-neurosis is typically
combined with hysteria;

_b_. as _anxiety in the newly-married_. Young married women who remain
anæsthetic during the first acts of intercourse often fall ill of an
anxiety-neurosis which again disappears as soon as the anæsthesia {88}
gives way to normal sensitivity. Since the majority of young women
remain healthy during a temporary anæsthesia of this kind, there are
conditions necessary to the outbreak of this anxiety, which I will
mention later;

_c_. as anxiety in women whose husbands suffer from ejaculatio præcox or
from impaired potency; and

_d_. whose husbands practise coitus interruptus or reservatus. These
cases belong together, for on analysing a large number of examples it is
easy to convince oneself that they depend simply on whether the wife
obtains satisfaction in coitus or not. The latter case provides the
condition for the genesis of an anxiety-neurosis. On the other hand, the
wife is saved from neurosis if the husband who is afflicted with
ejaculatio præcox can immediately repeat the congress with a better
result. Congressus reservatus by means of condoms is not injurious to
the wife if she is very quickly roused and the husband very potent; if
not, this kind of contraception is no less injurious than the others.
Coitus interruptus is almost always harmful; though only for the wife
when the husband practises it regardlessly, that is to say, when he
interrupts coitus as soon as _he_ is near to ejaculation without
troubling himself about the stage of his wife's excitement. If on the
other hand the husband waits for his wife's satisfaction then the coitus
will be equivalent to the normal for her---but the husband will become a
sufferer from anxiety-neurosis. I have collected and analysed a great
number of observations which have provided the material for these
conclusions;

_e_. as _anxiety in widows and voluntarily abstinent persons_, often
found in typical combination with obsessional ideas; {89}

_f_. as anxiety in the _climacteric_ during the last great increase of
sexual need.

Cases _c_., _d_., and _e_. embrace the conditions under which
anxiety-neurosis in the female sex most frequently arises and is least
dependent on hereditary predisposition. On the basis of these cases of
anxiety-neurosis---curable, acquired cases---I shall try to prove that
the injurious sexual condition (_noxia_) discovered in them really
represents the ætiological factor of this neurosis. Before doing so,
however, I will go on to discuss the sexual conditions for
anxiety-neurosis in men. I propose to set up the following groups, which
all have their analogies among women:

_a_. anxiety of the voluntarily _abstinent_, frequently combined with
_defence_ symptoms (obsessional ideas, hysteria). The motives which are
decisive for intentional abstinence bring it about that a number of
hereditarily-disposed or eccentric persons, etc. belong to this
category;

_b_. anxiety in men during _frustrated excitement_ (during an engagement
to marry), in persons who (from fear of the consequences of sexual
intercourse) content themselves with handling or gazing at the woman.
This group of conditions (which by the way applies equally to the other
sex: engagement, relationships involving sexual forbearance) furnishes
the purest cases of the neurosis;

_c_. anxiety in men who practise coitus interruptus. As has been said
already, coitus interruptus is harmful to the woman when it is
practised without regard to her satisfaction; but it becomes harmful
to the man if, in order to provide satisfaction for the woman, he
voluntarily controls coitus and delays the ejaculation. It thus
becomes intelligible that as a rule only _one_ partner of a married
couple practising coitus interruptus falls ill. Incidentally, coitus {90}
interruptus but rarely leads to a pure anxiety-neurosis in men; there
usually results a combination of it with neurasthenia;

_d_. anxiety in _ageing men_. There are men who have a climacteric like
women and who develop anxiety-neurosis at the time of their waning
potency and increased libido.

Finally I must add two other cases which are valid for both sexes:

_e_. The neurasthenics who after practising masturbation fall victims to
anxiety-neurosis as soon as they desist from their form of sexual
gratification. These persons have rendered themselves particularly
incapable of tolerating abstinence.

I observe here that in order to understand the anxiety-neurosis it is
important to realize that any pronounced manifestation of it occurs only
among men who are still potent and among women who are not anæsthetic.
Among neurasthenics whose potency has already been seriously diminished
by masturbation, the anxiety-neurosis resulting from abstinence is of a
very meagre character and confines itself as a rule to hypochondria and
mild chronic dizziness. The majority of women are to be regarded as
'potent'; a really impotent, i.e. really anæsthetic, woman is likewise
only mildly affected by anxiety-neurosis and tolerates the injurious
sexual conditions described surprisingly well.

How far beyond this we may be justified in postulating a constant
relation between particular ætiological factors and particular symptoms
in the complex of anxiety-neurosis, I do not yet wish to express any
opinion.

_f_. The last of the ætiological conditions I have to bring forward
appears at first sight not to be of a sexual nature at {91}
all. Anxiety-neurosis also arises (in both sexes) as a result of the
factor of over-work or exhausting exertion, for example, nights of
watching, sick-nursing, or even after severe illness.

The principal objection to my proposition of a sexual ætiology for the
anxiety-neurosis will probably run as follows: abnormal conditions in
the sexual life of the kind mentioned are found so very frequently that
they must be forthcoming wherever one looks for them. Their presence in
the cases of anxiety-neurosis quoted does not therefore prove that the
ætiology of this neurosis is to be found in them. The number of people,
moreover, who practise coitus interruptus, etc., is incomparably greater
than the number of those afflicted with anxiety-neurosis and the great
majority of the former tolerate this unhealthy condition quite well.

To this I have to reply that we should certainly not be right in
expecting to find in the neuroses an ætiological factor of _rare_
occurrence, seeing how very great their frequency admittedly is,
especially that of anxiety-neurosis; also that it actually fulfils a
postulate of pathology if in an ætiological enquiry the ætiological
factor is proved to be more frequent than its effect, since for the
latter other conditions are also required (disposition, summation of
specific ætiological factors, reinforcement by other 'ordinary'
injurious factors); and further, that detailed exploration of suitable
cases of anxiety-neurosis proves beyond question the importance of the
sexual factor. I will here confine myself to the ætiological factor of
coitus interruptus only and to adducing certain observations which
confirm it.

1. So long as an anxiety-neurosis in young married women is not yet
established, but only appears sporadically and disappears again {92}
spontaneously, it is possible to demonstrate that every such wave of
the neurosis is traceable to a coitus lacking in satisfaction. Two
days after this experience, or in persons of little resistance, on the
next day, an attack of anxiety or vertigo regularly appears, bringing
in its train the other symptoms of the neurosis, which all again
disappear together with the attack if marital relations occur
sufficiently seldom. A chance absence from home on the part of the
husband, or a holiday in the mountains necessitating the separation of
the couple, have a good effect; the gynæcological treatment that is
usually resorted to in the first instance is beneficial because
marital relations are broken off while it lasts. Strange to say,
however, the success of local treatment is but transitory---and even
in the mountains the neurosis reappears as soon as the husband in his
turn arrives; and so forth. When a physician who understands this
ætiology advises a patient in whom the neurosis is not yet established
to substitute normal relations for coitus interruptus a _therapeutic_
test of the statements made here is supplied. The anxiety is removed
and does not return again without a fresh cause of a similar nature.

2. In the history of many cases of anxiety-neurosis both among men and
women we find a striking fluctuation in the intensity of the clinical
symptoms, and even in the appearance and disappearance of the whole
condition. One year, they will say, was pretty good, the next was
frightful; on one occasion the improvement coincided with a certain
treatment which however on the next attack turned out quite useless;
and so on. Now if we enquire into the number and sequence of the
children and compare this record with the history of the neurosis a
simple solution results---the periods of improvement and well-being {93}
coincide with the wife's pregnancies, during which of course the need
for contraception was no longer present. The treatment that had been
so beneficial to the man, however, regardless of whether it was at
Pfarrer Kneipp's or at a hydrotherapeutic sanatorium, was the one
after which his wife had become pregnant.

3. From the anamnesis of patients we frequently find that the symptoms
of anxiety-neurosis have at some definite time supplanted the symptoms
of some other neurosis, for instance, neurasthenia, and have taken their
place. In such a case it can quite regularly be proved that, shortly
before the change in the clinical picture, a corresponding change had
taken place from one to another of the various kinds of unhealthy sexual
conditions possible.

Observations of this kind can be supplemented to any extent at
pleasure, positively compelling the physician to acknowledge a sexual
ætiology for a certain category of cases; other cases, however, which
would otherwise remain quite unintelligible, can at least be
understood without difficulty and classified by employing the sexual
ætiology as a key to them. These are those very numerous cases in
which we find everything that is also present in the previous
category---the clinical symptoms of anxiety-neurosis on the one hand,
and the specific factor of coitus interruptus on the other---but where
something else has interposed itself as well, namely, a long interval
between the ætiology we assume and its effect, and perhaps also
ætiological factors of a non-sexual nature too. Take, for example, a
man who has a heart-attack after receiving news of his father's death
and from that time onwards suffers from anxiety-neurosis. The case is
not clear, for the man was not nervous before this event; the death of {94}
the father who was well advanced in years did not occur under any
special circumstances, and one must admit that the normal, expected
decease of an aged father is not an experience which usually causes
illness in a healthy adult. Perhaps the ætiological analysis will be
clearer if I add that this man had for eleven years practised coitus
interruptus and always with regard for his wife's satisfaction. The
clinical symptoms at least are identical with those that appear in
other persons after an unhealthy condition of the same sexual nature
lasting for a short period and without the interpolation of another
trauma. Other cases must be estimated similarly, that of a woman in
whom anxiety-neurosis broke out after the loss of a child, or that of
a student whose studies preparatory to his qualifying examination were
interrupted by an anxiety-neurosis. I do not find that the effect in
these cases is explained by the ostensible ætiology. One is not
necessarily 'over-worked' by close study, and a healthy mother usually
reacts only with normal grief to the loss of a child. More
particularly, too, I should expect that the student would develop
cephalasthenia through over-work, and the mother in our example
hysteria. That they both develop an anxiety-neurosis induces me to lay
emphasis on the fact that the mother had lived for eight years in
marital coitus interruptus, and that the student had for three years
had a passionate love-relationship with a 'respectable' girl whom he
dared not allow to conceive.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the specific sexual
_noxia_ contained in coitus interruptus at least disposes the person
concerned to acquire it in those cases where it is not in itself
enough to induce anxiety-neurosis. The neurosis then breaks out as {95}
soon as the influence of another ordinary injurious factor is added to
the latent effect of the specific factor; the former can _reinforce
the specific factor quantitatively but cannot replace it
qualitatively_. The specific factor always remains decisive for the
form taken by the neurosis. I hope to be able to prove this statement
in regard to the ætiology of the neuroses also on a wider scale.

Some few pages back I mentioned an assumption which is not improbable in
itself---namely, that a _noxia_ such as coitus interruptus attains its
effect by _summation_. According to the disposition of the person
concerned and the other burdens on his nervous system, a longer or
shorter time will be required before the effect of this summation
becomes evident. Those persons who tolerate coitus interruptus
apparently without harmful results are in reality becoming thereby
disposed to the disorder of anxiety-neurosis, which may break out either
at any time spontaneously or after an ordinary and otherwise
insufficient trauma; just as the chronic alcoholic will in the end
develop a cirrhosis or other illness as an effect of summation, or under
the influence of a fever will go down with a delirium.

III. ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A THEORY OF THE
ANXIETY-NEUROSIS

The following considerations can only claim the value of a preliminary
tentative attempt at a theory; criticism of them should not affect the
reader's acceptance of the _facts_ set forth above. Moreover, this
'Theory of Anxiety-Neurosis' represents only a fragment of a more
comprehensive presentation of the neuroses which increases the
difficulty of assessing its value.

The material already brought forward in regard to the anxiety-neurosis
has provided a few openings for some insight into its mechanism. In {96}
the first place it was surmised that we are here dealing with an
accumulation of excitation; secondly, there was the exceedingly
important fact that the anxiety, which underlies all the clinical
symptoms of this neurosis, _is not derived from any psychical
source_. A psychical origin would be present, for example, if we found
as the basis of an anxiety-neurosis a single or repeated shock,
justified by the circumstances, which had subsequently become the
source of the readiness to anxiety. But this is not what we find; an
hysteria or a traumatic neurosis may develop as a result of a single
shock---an anxiety-neurosis never. Since among the causes of
anxiety-neurosis coitus interruptus forces itself so much into the
foreground, I thought at first that the source of the continual
anxiety might lie in the fear, revived with every act, that the method
might miscarry and be followed by conception. But I have found that
this state of mind either in man or woman during coitus interruptus is
irrelevant for the genesis of anxiety-neurosis; that women who at
bottom are indifferent to the consequences of a possible conception
are just as liable to the neurosis as those who shudder at the
possibility, and that all depends on which of the partners forfeits
satisfaction in this method of intercourse.

A further indication is furnished by the observation, not before
mentioned, that in whole groups of cases anxiety-neurosis is
accompanied by a very noticeable abatement of sexual libido,[27]
i.e. of _psychical desire_; so that, on being told that their
sufferings result from 'insufficient satisfaction', patients regularly {97}
answer that that is impossible, because all their need for it has now
disappeared. From all these data: that an accumulation of excitation
is involved; that the anxiety which probably represents this
accumulated excitation is of somatic origin, so that it is somatic
excitation which is accumulated; further, that the somatic excitation
is of a sexual nature and that a decline in the psychical share in the
sexual process goes along with it---all these data prepare our minds
for the statement that _the mechanism of anxiety-neurosis is to be
sought in the deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the
psychical field, and in an abnormal use of it, due to this
deflection_.

This conception of the mechanism of anxiety-neurosis becomes clearer
if we accept the following view of the sexual process, which relates
primarily to men. In the sexually mature male organism somatic sexual
excitation is produced---probably continuously---and periodically acts
as a psychical stimulus. In order to define this idea more clearly,
let us interpolate that this somatic sexual excitation takes the form
of pressure on the walls of the vesiculæ seminales which are lined
with nerve-endings; this visceral excitation will then actually
develop continuously, but only when it reaches a certain height will
it be sufficient to overcome the resistance in the paths of conduction
to the cerebral cortex and express itself as a psychical
stimulus. Thereupon the constellation of sexual ideas existing in the
mind becomes charged with energy and a psychical state of libidinous
tension comes into existence, bringing with it the impulse to relieve
this tension. The necessary psychical relief can only be effected by
what I shall describe as a _specific_ or _adequate activity_. For the
male sexual impulse this adequate activity consists in a complicated
spinal reflex act resulting in the relief of the tension at these {98}
nerve-endings and in all the preparatory psychical processes necessary
to induce this reflex. Nothing but the adequate activity would be
effective; for, once it has reached the required level, the somatic
sexual excitation is continuously transmuted into psychical
excitation; the activity which will free the nerve-endings from
burdensome pressure and so abolish the whole of the somatic excitation
present, thus allowing the subcortical tracts to re-establish their
resistance, must absolutely be carried into operation.

I will refrain from describing more complicated forms of the sexual
process in this manner. I will only add the statement that in essentials
this formula is applicable also to women, notwithstanding the confusion
introduced into the problem by all the artificial arresting and stunting
that the female sexual impulse undergoes. In women also we must
postulate a somatic sexual excitation, and a condition in which this
excitation becomes a psychical stimulus, evoking libido and the impulse
to a specific activity to which sensual pleasure is attached. Where
women are concerned, however, we cannot state what is the process
analogous to the relief of tension in the vesiculæ seminales.

The ætiology of neurasthenia proper as well as of anxiety-neurosis can
now be brought within the compass of this conception of the sexual
process. Neurasthenia arises whenever a less adequate relief
(activity) takes the place of the adequate one, thus, when
masturbation or spontaneous emission replaces normal coitus under the
most favourable conditions; while anxiety-neurosis is produced by all
those factors which prevent the somatic sexual excitation from being
assimilated psychically. The clinical symptoms of anxiety-neurosis {99}
appear when the somatic sexual excitation that is deflected from the
mind is expended subcortically in quite inadequate reactions.

I shall now try to test the ætiological conditions of anxiety-neurosis
given above, in order to see whether they show the common character I
have ascribed to them. The first ætiological factor in men that I
mentioned is voluntary abstinence. Abstinence consists in foregoing
the specific activity which otherwise follows upon libido. Privation
of this kind can have two consequences, namely, that the somatic
excitation becomes augmented by accumulation, and secondly, that it is
then dissipated along other paths, through which it may find its
discharge more easily than along the path to the mind. Libido will
therefore subside again and the excitation will express itself instead
subcortically as anxiety. In cases where libido does not subside or
where the somatic excitation is expended by a short cut in emissions,
or where it actually becomes exhausted in consequence of being
restrained, anything else may arise, but not
anxiety-neurosis. Abstinence leads to anxiety-neurosis in the way
described. Abstinence is also the agent in the second ætiological
group, that of frustrated excitement. The third case, that of coitus
reservatus with regard for the woman, acts by disturbing the psychical
state of preparedness for the sexual process, in that it adds to the
task of dealing with the sexual affect another, a deflecting,
psychical task. In consequence of this psychical deflection libido
also gradually subsides, the further developments being then the same
as in abstinence. Anxiety in ageing men (the male climacteric)
requires another explanation. There is no reduction in libido here;
but, just as during the climacteric in women, such an increase in the {100}
production of somatic excitation occurs that the psyche proves
relatively unable to master it.

There is no greater difficulty in bringing the ætiological conditions in
women within the scope of our theory than in the case of men. Virginal
anxiety is a particularly clear example; the constellations of ideas to
which the somatic sexual excitation should become attached are not yet
sufficiently developed. In anæsthetic newly-married women anxiety only
appears when the first acts of intercourse arouse a sufficient quantity
of somatic excitation. When local indications of the state of excitement
(such as spontaneous local sensations, desire to micturate and the like)
are lacking, then anxiety is also absent. In cases where intercourse
involves ejaculatio præcox or coitus interruptus, the explanation is
similar to that given for men---libido gradually declines from the
psychically unsatisfying act, while the excitation called forth by the
act is expended subcortically. An _estrangement_ between the somatic and
the psychical in the course taken by sexual excitation is established
sooner and is more difficult to remove in women than in men. In
widowhood and in voluntary abstinence, as also in the climacteric, the
process is the same in women as in men; although in abstinence there
must also be the additional factor of an intentional repression of
sexual ideas which the abstinent woman battling with desire must
frequently resolve upon, and similarly, at the time of the menopause,
the detestation with which the ageing woman regards the unduly increased
libido must come into operation.

The two last ætiological conditions enumerated also seem to fall into
line without difficulty.

The tendency to anxiety in masturbators who have become neurasthenic {101}
is explained by the fact that these persons very easily pass into a
condition of 'abstinence' after they have for so long been accustomed
immediately to discharge every access of somatic excitation, however
small, although not in a normal manner. Finally, the last case, in
which anxiety-neurosis arises from serious illness, overwork,
exhausting sick-nursing, etc., may be brought into relation with the
mode of action of coitus interruptus and then find a simple
interpretation: by reason of the deflection of interest the mind is no
longer capable of mastering the somatic sexual excitation, a task
which is continuously incumbent on it. We know to what a low level
libido can sink under these conditions; and we have here an excellent
example of a _neurosis which has, it is true, no sexual ætiology, but
nevertheless shows a sexual mechanism_.

The theory here developed shows the symptoms of anxiety-neurosis to be
in some measure _surrogates_ for the specific activity which should
follow upon sexual excitation, but has not done so. In further
corroboration of this I may point out that even in normal coitus the
excitation expresses itself also in accelerated breathing, palpitations,
sweating, congestion and so on. In the corresponding anxiety-attacks of
our neurosis we see the dyspnœa, palpitations, etc. of coitus in an
isolated and exaggerated form.

The question may now be asked: Why does the nervous system under such
conditions---of psychical incapacity to master sexual
excitation---take on the particular affective state of anxiety? The
reply may be indicated somewhat as follows: The psyche develops the
affect of anxiety when it feels itself incapable of dealing (by an
adequate reaction) with a task (danger) approaching it externally; it {102}
develops the neurosis of anxiety when it feels itself unequal to the
task of mastering (sexual) excitation arising endogenously. That is to
say, _it acts as if it had projected this excitation into the outer
world_. The affect and the neurosis corresponding to it stand in a
close relation to each other; the first is the reaction to an
exogenous, the second to an analogous, endogenous, excitation. The
affect is a state which passes rapidly, the neurosis is a chronic
state; because an exogenous excitation acts like a single shock, an
endogenous one like a constant pressure. _The nervous system reacts to
an internal source of excitation with a neurosis, just as it reacts to
an analogous external one with a corresponding affect_.

IV. RELATION TO OTHER NEUROSES

There are still a few words to be said concerning the relation of
anxiety-neurosis to the other neuroses in respect of its incidence and
its inner connections with them.

The purest cases of anxiety-neurosis are as a rule the most developed.
These cases are found among young and sexually potent persons; they show
a uniform ætiology and no very long duration.

More frequently, however, anxiety symptoms occur contemporaneously and
in combination with those of neurasthenia, hysteria, obsessions and
melancholia. If because of this clinical confusion we are to refrain
from distinguishing anxiety-neurosis as a self-contained unity, then to
be logical we should have in addition to renounce the distinction
between hysteria and neurasthenia which has been acquired so
laboriously.

For the analysis of 'mixed neuroses' I can advocate the following
important formula: _Wherever a mixed_ _neurosis exists a combination {103}
of several specific ætiologies may be discovered_.

The number of ætiological factors which conditions a mixed neurosis may
occur quite fortuitously; for instance, if a fresh injurious factor adds
its effect to those already existing, e.g. a woman who had always been
hysterical begins at a certain point in her married life to experience
coitus reservatus and then acquires anxiety-neurosis in addition to her
hysteria; a man who had previously been in the habit of masturbating,
and had become neurasthenic, becomes engaged to be married and is
sexually roused during the intimacy with his fiancée, and then acquires
anxiety-neurosis in addition to his neurasthenia.

In other cases the number of ætiological factors is no accident; on the
contrary, some one of them has brought another into activity; for
example, a woman whose husband practises coitus reservatus without
regard to her satisfaction finds herself compelled to relieve by
masturbation the distressing excitation aroused by the act, as a result
of which she develops an anxiety-neurosis, but not in a pure form,
showing at the same time symptoms of neurasthenia; another woman in the
same injurious situation will have to battle with lewd thoughts and
visions, against which she struggles to defend herself, and will in this
way develop obsessional ideas as well as the anxiety-neurosis as a
result of coitus interruptus; lastly, a third woman's husband will lose
his attraction for her in consequence of coitus interruptus and she will
develop an affection for another man which she carefully keeps secret,
as a result of which we find a mixture of anxiety-neurosis and hysteria.

In a third category of mixed neuroses the interrelation of the
symptoms is even closer, in that the very same ætiological determinant {104}
regularly and simultaneously evokes both neuroses. Thus for example,
the sudden sexual revelation which is active in cases of virginal
anxiety always gives rise to hysteria as well as anxiety-neurosis;
cases of voluntary abstinence are for the most part from the beginning
united with true obsessional ideas; coitus interruptus never seems to
me to be able to provoke a pure anxiety-neurosis in men, but always a
combination of it with neurasthenia; and so on.

It follows from these considerations that the ætiological conditions for
the incidence of the neuroses must be distinguished more clearly from
their specific ætiological factors. The former, for example, coitus
interruptus, masturbation and abstinence, are still capable of various
interpretations; each one of them can produce many neuroses; only the
ætiological factors into which they can be resolved, such as _inadequate
relief_, _psychical inadequacy_, _defence by substitution_, have an
unequivocal and specific relation to the ætiology of the individual
great neuroses.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

In its essence anxiety-neurosis presents the most interesting
similarities to and differences from the other great neuroses,
particularly neurasthenia and hysteria. It shares with neurasthenia
its main characteristic: the source of the excitation, the inciting
factor in the disturbance, is somatic in nature, whereas in hysteria
and the obsessional neurosis it is psychical in nature. In other
respects we see rather a kind of antithesis between the symptoms of
neurasthenia and those of anxiety-neurosis which may be summed up in
the words: impoverishment or accumulation of excitation
respectively. This antithesis does not prevent the two neuroses from
being combined with one another, but is nevertheless clearly {105}
demonstrated by the fact that the most extreme forms of both neuroses
are also the purest.

In symptomatology anxiety-neurosis and hysteria have many points in
common, which need to be better appreciated. The appearance of
symptoms either in a chronic form or as attacks, the paræsthesias
grouped like aurœ, the hyperæsthesias and points of pressure which are
found in certain surrogates of the anxiety-attack (dyspnœa and
heart-attacks), the exacerbation (through conversion) of pains perhaps
having an organic basis---these and other common features even permit
the conjecture that much of what we attribute to hysteria may with
more justification be laid at the door of anxiety-neurosis. If we go
into the mechanism of the two neuroses so far as it has been possible
to discover it up to the present, aspects come to light which suggest
that anxiety-neurosis is actually the somatic counterpart of
hysteria. In each of them there is an accumulation of
excitation---which perhaps accounts for the similarity of the symptoms
already described; in each of them there is a _psychical inadequacy as
a consequence of which abnormal somatic processes come about_. In each
of them there occurs a deflection of excitation to the somatic field
instead of psychical assimilation of it; the difference is merely
this, that in anxiety-neurosis the excitation (in the displacement of
which the neurosis expresses itself) is purely somatic (the somatic
sexual excitation), whereas in hysteria it is purely psychical (evoked
by conflict). Little wonder then that hysteria and anxiety-neurosis
are regularly combined with one another, as in 'virginal anxiety' or
'sexual hysteria', and that hysteria simply borrows a number of its
symptoms from the anxiety-neurosis. These intimate relations between {106}
anxiety-neurosis and hysteria provide a new argument for demanding the
distinction of anxiety-neurosis from neurasthenia; for if this
distinction is not admitted then neither are we justified in
maintaining the distinction between neurasthenia and hysteria which
was so laboriously come by and is so indispensable for the theory of
the neuroses.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI {107}
A REPLY TO CRITICISMS ON THE ANXIETY-
NEUROSIS[28]
(1895)

In No. 2 of Mendel's _Neurologisches Zentralblatt_ 1895, I published a
short paper in which I ventured an attempt to distinguish a series of
nervous states from neurasthenia and give them independence under the
name of 'Anxiety-Neurosis'.[29] I was led to do so by finding a
constant combination of certain clinical and ætiological characters,
which may always decide us to make such distinctions. I found, as E.
Hecker[30] had done before me, that the neurotic symptoms in question
could all be united under the head of 'pertaining to the expression of
_anxiety_'; and I was able to add from my study of the ætiology of the
neuroses that these component parts of the complex 'anxiety-neurosis'
show special ætiological conditions which are almost the opposite of
the ætiology of neurasthenia. My observations had shown me that in the
ætiology of the neuroses (at least of the acquired and acquirable
forms) sexual factors play a predominant part, hitherto far too little
appreciated; so that the assertion: 'the ætiology of the neuroses lies
in sexuality', with all its necessary inexactness _per excessum et
defectum_, nevertheless comes nearer to the truth than the other
doctrines ruling at the present time. A further statement to which {108}
experience forced me was to the effect that the various sexual noxiæ
were not to be found indifferently in the ætiology of all neuroses,
but that there were evidently special relationships of particular
noxiæ to particular neuroses. I thought I could assume, therefore,
that I had discovered the specific causes of the different neuroses. I
then sought to comprehend in a short formula the peculiarity of the
sexual noxiæ which constitute the ætiology of anxiety-neurosis, and
arrived at the statement, dependent on my idea of the sexual process
(see pp. 98--9): Anxiety-neurosis is produced by anything which
withholds somatic sexual tension from the psychical and interferes
with its elaboration within the psychical field. If we refer to the
concrete circumstances in which this factor expresses itself, we come
to the conclusion that voluntary or involuntary abstinence, sexual
intercourse with incomplete gratification, coitus interruptus, the
deflection of psychical interest from sexuality and so on, are the
specific ætiological factors of the states I have called
anxiety-neurosis.

When I published the paper mentioned above, I in no way deceived
myself about its power to arouse conviction. In the first place I knew
that I had only given a scanty, incomplete presentation---one that was
even in parts difficult to comprehend; it was perhaps just sufficient
to arouse the reader's expectation. I had besides adduced hardly any
examples and quoted no statistics; the technique of collecting the
case-histories was not touched on; no provision was made to avoid
misunderstandings; other objections than the most obvious ones were
not considered; and concerning the theory itself, only the main theme
was brought into prominence and its limitations were
disregarded. Accordingly, everyone was justified in forming his own {109}
judgement upon the conclusiveness of the whole proposition. I had to
look forward, moreover, to yet another source of disagreement. I know
very well that I have advanced nothing new by suggesting the 'sexual
ætiology' of the neuroses, that undercurrents in medical literature
acknowledging these facts have never been absent, and that the
official medicine of the schools has actually been aware of them
also. But the last has behaved, however, as if it knew nothing about
it, making no use of its knowledge, and deducing nothing from it. Such
conduct must surely have a deep-rooted cause, originating perhaps in a
kind of aversion from looking into sexual matters, or in a reaction
against older attempts at explanation which were regarded as
outworn. At all events, anyone who ventures to make something credible
to others who could without any trouble have discovered it for
themselves, must be prepared to meet with opposition.

With such a state of affairs it would perhaps have been more expedient
not to answer critical objections until I had expressed myself in
greater detail upon the complicated theme itself and had made myself
more intelligible. Nevertheless I cannot resist the motives which
induce me immediately to join issue with a recent criticism of my
theory of anxiety-neurosis. I do this because the writer, L. Löwenfeld
(Munich), the author of _Pathologie und Therapie der Neurasthenie und
Hysterie_, is one whose judgement probably has great weight with the
medical public, and because of a mistaken conception which Löwenfeld
imputes to me; and also because I wish at once to combat the idea that
my theory is to be overthrown so very easily by the first casual and
impromptu objections. {110}

Löwenfeld correctly discovers at a glance the essence of my work to be
my assertion that anxiety symptoms are due to a specific and uniform
ætiology of a sexual nature. If this cannot be established as a fact
then the principal reason for distinguishing an independent
anxiety-neurosis from neurasthenia also falls to the ground. There
remains, however, one difficulty to which I called attention---namely,
that anxiety symptoms have manifest relations also to hysteria; so that
the decision as Löwenfeld would have it brings the distinction between
hysteria and neurasthenia to grief; though this difficulty is obviated
by reference to heredity as the common cause of all the neuroses, a
point which will be discussed later.

Now by what arguments does Löwenfeld support the case against my theory?

1. I have emphasized as a point essential for comprehension of the
anxiety-neurosis that the anxiety of that condition does not admit of a
psychic derivation, that is, that the anxious expectation which
constitutes the nucleus of the neurosis cannot be acquired through a
single or repeated affect of fright which is justified psychically.
Fright, as I have pointed out, may result in hysteria or a traumatic
neurosis, but not in an anxiety-neurosis. It is easy to see that this
negation is simply the obverse of my assertion (with a positive
content): the anxiety of my neurosis represents a somatic sexual tension
deflected from the psychical field where it would otherwise have made
itself felt as libido.

Against this, Löwenfeld lays stress on the fact that in a series of
cases 'anxiety states appear immediately or shortly after a mental
shock (fright alone, or accidents accompanied by fright) and that
these circumstances make the co-operation of sexual noxiæ of the kind {111}
mentioned at least most improbable.' He gives in brief, as a
particularly pregnant example, one observation of a patient out of
many. This example relates to a woman aged thirty, married for four
years, of tainted stock, who had undergone a first difficult
confinement a year before. A few weeks after it her husband had an
attack of illness which frightened her exceedingly and in her
excitement she ran about the cold room in her chemise. From that time
onward she was ill, first with anxiety and palpitations in the
evenings, later with attacks of convulsive trembling, and in further
sequence phobias and the like---the picture of a fully-developed
anxiety-neurosis. 'Here', concludes Löwenfeld, 'the anxiety states are
manifestly of psychic origin consequent on a single shock.'

I do not doubt that my honoured critic can produce many similar cases;
I myself can supply a long series of analogous examples. Anyone who
had not seen such very common cases of the outbreak of
anxiety-neurosis following upon a mental shock could not regard
himself as qualified to discuss the question of anxiety-neurosis. I
will only observe in this connection that neither shock nor anxious
expectation is necessarily always demonstrable in the ætiology of such
cases; any other emotion will serve as well. If I hurriedly call to
mind a few cases from recollection there occurs to me that of a man of
forty-five who first had an anxiety-attack (with cardiac collapse) on
receiving the news of the death of his aged father: from that time
onwards a complete and typical anxiety-neurosis with agoraphobia
developed; further, a young man who fell a victim to the same neurosis
on account of the disagreements between his young wife and his mother,
and developed the agoraphobia afresh after every domestic quarrel; a {112}
student who was rather an idler and had his first anxiety-attacks
during a period of hard cramming under the spur of paternal
displeasure; a woman, herself childless, who fell ill in consequence
of anxiety concerning the health of her small niece, and so on. As to
the facts themselves which Löwenfeld employs against me there cannot
be the slightest doubt.

It is otherwise with their interpretation! Are we then without further
ceremony to accept the _post hoc ergo propter hoc_ conclusion and save
ourselves all critical consideration of the raw material? Surely we
are acquainted with examples enough in which the final exciting factor
cannot keep up its reputation as _causa efficiens_ in the face of
critical analysis? Take the relation between trauma and gout, as an
example. The rôle of a trauma in provoking an attack of gout in the
injured limb is probably not different from the part it plays in the
ætiology of tabes and general paralysis of the insane; only in the
case of gout everyone would see that it is absurd to say the trauma
has 'caused' the gout, instead of provoked it. It should make us
cautious when we meet with ætiological factors of such a
kind---ordinary factors, I should like to call them---in the ætiology
of the most varied forms of illness. Emotion, such as fright, is also
an ordinary factor of this kind; fright can evoke chorea, apoplexy,
paralysis agitans and what not, just as well as an
anxiety-neurosis. Now I should certainly not continue to argue along
these lines, that because of their prevalence the ordinary factors do
not satisfy our requirements, and therefore there must be specific
causes besides; it would beg the question at issue. But I am justified
in concluding as follows: If a single specific cause can be proved in
the ætiology of all or almost all cases of anxiety-neurosis, then our {113}
view will not necessarily be erroneous because the outbreak of illness
only occurs under the influence of some one or other ordinary factor,
such as emotion.

So it was in my cases of anxiety-neurosis. The man who fell
ill---inexplicably---after receiving the news of his father's death (I
make this interpolated comment because this death was not unexpected and
did not occur in unusual or tragic circumstances) had for eleven years
practised coitus interruptus with his wife whom he usually endeavoured
to satisfy; the young man who could not tolerate the quarrels between
his wife and his mother had practised withdrawal with his young wife
from the beginning, in order to save them the burden of offspring; the
student who developed anxiety-neurosis through overwork, instead of
cerebrasthenia as we should expect, had for three years had a
relationship with a girl whom he dared not let become pregnant; the
woman who had no children herself and fell ill of anxiety-neurosis owing
to the illness of a niece was married to an impotent man and had never
been sexually gratified; and so on. Not all these cases are equally
clear nor prove my theory with equal force; but if I add them to the
very considerable series of cases in which the ætiology shows nothing
but the specific factor, they conform without a dissentient note to the
theory I have put forward and make it possible for us to extend our
ætiological comprehension beyond the boundaries which have existed
hitherto.

If anyone wishes to prove to me that I have unduly neglected the
significance of ordinary ætiological factors in the foregoing
discussion, he must confront me with observations in which my specific
factor is lacking, that is, with cases in which, although the _vita {114}
sexualis_ is (more or less) normal, anxiety-neurosis breaks out after
a mental shock. Now let us see whether Löwenfeld's case fulfils this
condition. My worthy opponent has manifestly not clearly recognized
this necessity in his own mind, otherwise he would not have left us so
completely in the dark concerning the _vita sexualis_ of his
patient. I will leave on one side the fact that the case of the lady
of thirty is obviously complicated by an hysteria, about the psychical
origin of which I should be the last to have any doubt; I naturally
admit without protest the presence of an anxiety-neurosis alongside
this hysteria. But before I make use of a case as evidence either for
or against my theory of the sexual ætiology of the neuroses I must
study the sexual conduct of the patient more thoroughly than Löwenfeld
has done here. I should not be contented with the conclusion that,
because the lady had the mental shock shortly after a confinement,
coitus interruptus had probably played no part during the previous
year and that therefore no sexual noxiæ had arisen here. I know of
cases of women who become pregnant year after year and develop
anxiety-neurosis because---_incredibile dictu_---all sexual relations
ceased after pregnancy had set in; so that in spite of having many
children they might have lived all the years of their married life in
sexual privation. It is known to every physician that women do
conceive from men whose potency is very feeble and who are not able to
give them satisfaction; and finally there are many women who are
afflicted with a congenital anxiety-neurosis, that is to say, are
endowed with a _vita sexualis_ (or develop it without demonstrable
external provocation) of the kind usually acquired by coitus
interruptus and similar noxiæ---a consideration which upholders of
the ætiology of heredity ought to take into account. In a number {115}
of these women we are able eventually to discover a past history of a
hysterical illness in their youth, which has affected the _vita
sexualis_ ever since or has established a deflection of sexual tension
away from the psychical field. Women with this kind of sexuality are
incapable of real satisfaction, even in normal coitus, and develop
anxiety-neurosis either spontaneously or after further effective
factors have supervened. Which of all these factors mentioned could
have contributed to Löwenfeld's case I do not know; but I repeat that
this case is evidence against me only if the lady who responded to a
single fright with an anxiety-neurosis had previously enjoyed a normal
_vita sexualis_.

It is impossible to pursue ætiological research by means of the
anamnesis of patients if we accept the patient's account as he gives it
or are satisfied with what he volunteers. If syphilidologists allowed
themselves to depend upon the declarations of their patients, when
endeavouring to trace an initial infection of the genitalia back to an
act of sexual intercourse, they would have to attribute an imposing
number of chancres to a chill in persons who protest their virginity,
and gynæcologists would have little difficulty in confirming the miracle
of parthenogenesis among their unmarried clients. I hope that some day
the idea will gain admittance that neuropathologists too may be subject
to similar ætiological prejudices in the work of collecting the
case-histories of the great neuroses.

2. Löwenfeld further says that he has repeatedly seen anxiety-states
appear and disappear where a change in the sexual life had certainly
not taken place, but where there were other factors in play. {116}

I too have had exactly the same experience, but I was not misled by
it. I too have brought anxiety-attacks to an end by psychical
treatment, improvement of the patient's general condition and so on. I
have naturally not concluded from this that lack of treatment was the
cause of anxiety-attacks. Not that I would credit Löwenfeld with a
conclusion of this kind, to be sure; my joking remark is only intended
to show that the state of affairs may easily be so complicated as to
nullify his objection completely. I have not found any difficulty in
harmonizing the fact brought forward here with the theory of a
specific ætiology of anxiety-neurosis. It will readily be granted that
ætiological factors exist which, in order to become effective, must
act with a certain intensity (or quantity) and over a certain length
of time, which therefore _summate_; the effects of alcohol are a
standard example of illness produced by summation. Accordingly we must
reckon with a space of time in which the specific ætiology is at work,
but during which its effects are not yet manifest. During such a
period the person is not yet ill, but he is disposed to a particular
illness---in this case to anxiety-neurosis---and as soon as the
'ordinary' noxia supervenes it can excite the outbreak of the neurosis
just as well as a further increase in operation of the specific
noxia. We can also express this as follows: It is not sufficient for
the specific ætiological factor to exist; a certain measure of it must
also be reached, and in attaining this measure a degree of the
specific noxia can be made up by an amount of 'ordinary' injurious
factors. If the last is again eliminated, the level of the specific
ætiological factor falls below the threshold; the symptoms recede
again. The entire therapy of the neuroses rests upon the fact that the
total load upon the nervous system, to which the latter is succumbing, {117}
can be reduced below this level by very various influences on the
combination of ætiological factors. No conclusions can be drawn from
this state of things in regard to the presence or absence of a
specific ætiology.

These considerations are surely indisputable and assured. Anyone who
does not think them sufficient may permit the following argument to
weigh with him. According to the views of Löwenfeld and many others the
ætiology of anxiety states lies in heredity. Now heredity can certainly
not be altered; if anxiety-neurosis is curable by treatment we (and
Löwenfeld too) ought to conclude that heredity cannot account for its
ætiology.

For the rest, I might have been spared defending myself against both
of Löwenfeld's objections if my worthy opponent had bestowed greater
attention upon my paper itself. Both objections are anticipated in it
and answered (p. 92 ff.); I could only repeat here what I said there;
I have even purposely analysed the same cases of illness
afresh. Further, the ætiological formulæ upon which I had previously
laid weight are contained in the text of my former paper. I will
repeat them once again here. I maintain that: _There exists a specific
ætiological factor for the anxiety-neurosis which in taking effect can
be reinforced quantitatively by 'ordinary' injurious factors but
cannot be replaced by them qualitatively_. Further: _This specific
factor determines more than anything the type of neurosis; whether a
neurotic illness occurs at all depends on the total load on the
nervous system_ (_in relation to its capacity to carry the load_). As
a rule neuroses are _overdetermined_; that is to say, several factors
in their ætiology operate together. {118}

3. I shall have less trouble in refuting Löwenfeld's next comments
because on the one hand they have little to do with my theory and on the
other because they call attention to difficulties which I acknowledge.
Löwenfeld says: 'The Freud

Fields

authorSigmund Freud
languageEnglish
chars653103
source_urlhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856
source: Project Gutenberglicence: Public domain (per item)year: —id: 79856citation: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79856

JSON